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YOUNG ENOUGH TO DIE?
EXECUTING JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*
Annika K Carlsten*
There is now an almost global consensus that people who commit
crimes when under 18 should not be subjected to the death penalty.
This is not an attempt to excuse violent juvenile crime, or belittle the
suffering of its victims and their families, but a recognition that
children are not yet fully mature - hence not fully responsible for their
actions - and that the possibilities for rehabilitation of a child or
adolescent are greater than for adults. Indeed, international standards
see the ban on the death penalty against people who were under 18 at
the time of the offense to be such a fundamental safeguard that it may
never be suspended, "even in times of war or internal conflict. However,
the US authorities seem to believe that juveniles in the USA are
different from their counterparts in the rest of the world and should be
denied this human right.'
INTRODUCTION
In the first year of the 'new millennium', in the midst of an
atmosphere of progress and new beginnings, the United States instead
continued a tradition it has practiced virtually nonstop for over 350
years. At a steady pace, the United States executed eighty-five
individuals: eighty-three men and two women.2 This brisk rate of
" The author would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Aaron Joshua Haines.
'The life I could not save, traded now for one I might.. .'
.. B.A, Political Science, 1995, The Evergreen State College; Olympia, WA; J.D.
Candidate 2002, University of Denver, College of Law, Denver, CO. The author is a
former juvenile social worker and a past clerk for Amnesty International's Program to
Abolish the Death Penalty.
1. Amnesty Int'l, ON THE WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY: CHILDREN AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE USA, October1998, Al Index: AMR 51/58/98 [hereinafter On the Wrong
Side of History].
2. USA Executions 2000 as of 12119100, at
http://www.smu.edu/-deathpen/execOO.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001). 2000 was the first
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executions averages one person killed every four days. 'Execution
friendly' Texas reached a record high: forty individuals, including a
'rare' double execution when Texas killed two men by lethal injection
just one hour apart.3  To a growing number of Americans, these
executions are, in and of themselves, a violation of the basic human
right to life. Four of these eighty-five executions, however, not only
offend people's sense of morality and compassion; they are also a
violation of international law. In direct violation of the spirit and
language of numerous international treaties and conventions, these
individuals were executed for crimes they committed as children.
This article will examine the United States' continued practice of
executing juvenile offenders in spite of numerous international treaties
that forbid the practice, and growing international condemnation of the
United States for doing so. Section I begins with an overview of the
history of juvenile executions in the United States, and relevant U.S.
case law governing the practice. Section II details the international
perspective, with an emphasis on the various treaties that forbid the
execution of juvenile offenders. Section III examines current
international objections, recent executions of juvenile offenders, and
contemporary legal challenges based upon relevant principles of
international law. The article concludes with observations on the
current status of the death penalty in the United States, and a
discussion of various strategies which could lead to recognition of the
death penalty as a crucial human rights concern, and in turn, to
absolute and universal abolition.
JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
At this time of unprecedented growth and prosperity, the U.S. finds
itself in an uncomfortable position in the global human rights debate.
While aggressively criticizing the human rights records of countries
such as China, Cuba, and Afghanistan, the U.S. also must defend its
continued and expanding use of the death penalty. In direct opposition
to the universal status quo, the United States remains one of only five
countries still known to execute people for crimes they committed while
post-Furman year in which two women were put to death: Betty Lou Beets on February
24, 2000 and Christina Marie Riggs on May 2, 2000. Id. At least one woman was
executed in 2001: Wanda Jean Allen on January 11, 2001. See Executions in the USA in
the Year 2001 at httpJ/www.amnestyusa.orgabolish/usexec.2001.html (last visited Feb.
15, 2001).
3. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders at
httpJ/www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2001). See
also Amnesty International, Double Executions Scheduled in Texas at
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/abolisIlarchive.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). Oliver Cruz
and Brian Roberson on Aug. 9, 2000. Id. Double executions occurred on only three other
occasions. Id.
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under the age of eighteen.4 As the saying goes, 'politics makes strange
bedfellows'. The other four countries are hardly ones that the U.S.
traditionally aligns itself with in any other policy area. These countries
(Iran; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; and Nigeria) are the very countries the
United States often tries to portray as uncivilized, barbaric, and lacking
in the trappings of a functioning democracy.5 Moreover, the number of
nations willing to engage in the practice is steadily shrinking. Yemen,
which previously allowed the execution of juvenile offenders, abandoned
the practice in 1998.6 A sixth country, Pakistan, recently announced
that they would no longer sentence juveniles to death.7 In Pakistan, the
announcement came from leaders of the military government.8 Even
they recognized the inherent distinction of a child from an adult, and
the need for a separate juvenile justice system in which governments
simply will not kill their own children.9
Despite these changes and growing opposition, the United States
remains adamant in its 'right' to continue this practice. The U.S. has
now executed more individuals in the last ten years for crimes they
committed as children than any other country."0 Since 1990, the US has
executed seventeen people for juvenile crimes. The other five countries
combined have executed a documented nine individuals." The U.S. is
also the only country in the world known to have executed a juvenile
offender since 1997.2
4. Sister Helen Prejean, Address at the University of Colorado (Nov. 16, 2000)
(author's impressions).
5. See Mike Farrell, On the Juvenile Death Penalty, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 207, 209
(1999).
6. See id.
7. See id. On July 1, 2000, Pakistan announced a series of legal reforms, including
changes to the law which had previously allowed for the imposition of the death penalty
on offenders as young as fourteen. See Rick Halperin, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (July 2,
2000), at http://venus.soci.niu.edu/-archives/ABOLISH/rick-halperin/junOO/0082.html.
Other changes included an end to the physical punishment of accused juveniles, and the
use of handcuffs or chains on juveniles unless necessary to prevent escape. Id.
8. See Halperin, supra note 7.
9. See id. Additional changes to the legal system in Pakistan include guaranteed
legal representation for all accused juveniles, at the expense of the state, and a separate
juvenile court system for all juveniles cases; juveniles will no longer be tried as adults and
their names will not be published publicly. See id.
10. See Jeff Glasser, Death be not Proud, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Jan. 17, 2000, at
26.
11. Amnesty Int'l, Execution of Child Offenders, at
http://www.anmestyusa.orgabolish/juvexec.html (last visited May 21, 2001) [hereinafter
Execution of Child Offenders].
12. See Glasser, supra note 10, at 26. Since 1997, the United States has executed
eight men for crimes they committed as juveniles: Joseph Cannon of Texas on Apr. 24,
1998; Robert Anthony Carter, also of Texas on May 18, 1998; Dwayne Allen Wright of
Virginia on Oct. 21, 1998, Sean Sellers of Oklahoma on Feb. 4, 1999; Douglas Christopher
Thomas of Virginia on January 10, 2000; Steve Edward Roach, also of Virginia, on Jan.
13, 2000; Glen McGinnis of Texas on Jan. 25, 2000; and Gary Graham (Shaka Sankofa),
2001
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As of July 2000, there were seventy-seven people living on Death
Row in the United States for acts they committed while under the age
of eighteen.'" Since 1973, at least 196 children have been sentenced to
death. 4  Of the thirty-nine states authorizing the death penalty,
twenty-four currently have legislation allowing prosecutors to seek the
execution of a minor who commits murder." In nineteen of these states,
the defendant can be as young as sixteen.1
6
Sixteen was designated as the minimum age of eligibility for death
by two Supreme Court cases in the late 1980's, Thompson v. Oklahoma 7
& Stanford v. Kentucky. In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that
the imposition of the death penalty on children under the age of sixteen
was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment ban on 'cruel and
unusual punishment'." Under a legal standard first pronounced in
Trop v. Dulles, questions of whether a particular punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment are answered in light of "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""' According to
Justice Stevens, "it would offend civilized standards of decency to
execute a person who was less than sixteen years old at the time of his
or her offense."2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted, "the
importance of 'the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of
our law, recognizing that there are differences which must be
again of Texas, on June 22, 2000. See Execution of Child Offenders, supra note 11.
Author's note: An additional juvenile was executed after this article was written: Gerald
Mitchell, put to death by the State of Texas on October 22, 2001. See Texas Executes
Juvenile Murderer, MORNING STAR, Oct. 24, 2001.
13. See id.
14. Victor Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions
for Juvenile Crimes, Jan. 1, 1973 - June 30, 2000, at
httpJ/www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streibjuvdeath.htm (last visited June 21, 2001)
[hereinafter The Juvenile Death Penalty Today].
15. See The Juvenile Death Penalty Today.
16. See id. Sixteen years of age has been established as the minimum in these states
by either state law or by court ruling. See id.
17. 487 U.S. 815 (1998).
18. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
19. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-3.
20. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). It is also interesting to note that in Trop, the Court
considered the relevant international standards in determining that it would be 'cruel and
unusual' to deny Trop his citizenship as punishment for desertion. 356 U.S. at 89..
However, such consideration of international standards has been specifically rejected by
Justice Scalia in relation to the execution of juveniles: "The plurality's reliance upon
Amnesty International's account of what it pronounces to be civilized standards of
decency in other countries.. .is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the
fundamental beliefs of this nation.. .We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the
United States that we are expounding.. .where there is not a consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may
think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (footnote 4) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
21. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
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accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as
compared with those of adults'. " ' Considering these factors, the Court
concluded that, "such a young person is not capable of acting with the
degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty."2
The Court apparently did feel, however, that a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old could be capable of such a 'degree of culpability'.' In
Stanford, brought the following year, the Court affirmed the use of the
death penalty on individuals who were at least sixteen at the time of
their offense.? Relying on the fact that a majority of states that permit
the death penalty had not prohibited its use for sixteen and seventeen
year old offenders, Justice Scalia stated that there was no national
consensus against such executions. In his words, the Court could,
"discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding
the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16
or 17 years of age. Accordingly.. .such punishment does not offend the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment."
27
As a result of this decision, states which fail to specify a minimum
age for the death penalty, or statutorily allow the death penalty for
offenders younger than sixteen, may only pursue the death penalty for
anyone sixteen or older.?
This does not mean, however, that the minimum age requirement
could not drop in the future. As a result of recent and highly publicized
acts of juvenile violence, various politicians have advocated the use of
the death penalty for children at younger and younger ages. New
Mexico Governor Gary Johnson proposed use of the death penalty on
thirteen-year-olds." California Governor Pete Wilson once
recommended capital punishment for fourteen-year-old offenders."0 One
22. Id. at 823, quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-591 (1975) (Powell, J.
dissenting).
23. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823.
24. Id. at 824-28.
25. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Kevin Stanford, the seventeen
year-old subject of Stanford v. Kentucky, continues to appeal his death sentence on the
grounds that he was inadequately represented at trial. See Juvenile Death Row Inmate,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Feb. 12, 2001. He is now thirty seven, and has spent more
than half of his life on death row. See id.
26. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373.
27. Id. at 380.
28. See Execution of Child Offenders, supra note 11. There are currently eight states
which do not specify a minimum age (Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah) and twelve which specify a minimum age of
fifteen or younger (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wyoming). See id. State Court
ruling may also effect the minimum age of eligibility. See also Streib, supra note 14.
29. See Farrell, supra note 5, at 211.
30. See id.
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Texas lawmaker, Rep. Jim Pitts of Waxahachie, went even further and
advocated the imposition of the death penalty on children as young as
eleven.3' Shortly after the fatal school shootings in Jonesboro,
Arkansas, Pitts announced he would introduce legislation lowering the
minimum age to eleven in capital murder cases seeking the death
penalty.32 The legislation was unsuccessful, and undoubtedly would
have faced Constitutional challenges, but it acts as testimony to a
growing willingness to execute younger and younger offenders.
California took more aggressive steps to expand the use of the
death penalty. "Proposition 21", a recent ballot measure in California
that succeeded in the 1999 general elections, requires adult trials for
anyone fourteen or older who is charged with murder, and establishes
the death penalty for gang-related murders.' California law currently
prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders. However, this practice
could change due to growing public concern over perceived youth
violence." Proposition 21 has been embroiled in numerous legal
challenges, with varying levels of success. 3' Future attempts by the
state legislature to lower the minimum age, possibly to fourteen or
fifteen, would lead to inevitable constitutional challenges.3 It is not
inconceivable that such challenges could result in a subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling lowering the minimum age of eligibility."
31. Peggy Fikac, Death Penalty at Age 11 Urged; As Lawmaker Proposes Extending
Capital, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Apr. 7, 1998.
32. Id.
33. Death Penalty News --- TEXAS, TENN., CALIF. (May 11, 2000) at
http://venus.soci.niu.edu/-archives/ABOLISHirick-halperin/apr00/0255.html (last visited
May 21, 2001).
34. Id. In the aftermath of the fatal school shooting in San Diego in March 2001, the
San Diego District Attorney was quick to point out that the 15-year-old defendant was
ineligible for the death penalty due to his age. See Shooting at Santana High School in
Santee, California, NBC NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, Mar. 6, 2001.
35. See Stacy Finz, Top State Court Won't Hear Challenge to Prop. 21, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., May 11, 2000 at A3.
36. See Bob Egelko, Court Curbs New Youth Crime Law, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb.
11, 2001 at Al. There is also discussion within the abolitionist community as to whether
or not the constitutionality of a statute is relevant at the time of sentencing or at the time
of actual execution. Therefore, some believe such a death sentence could be imposed but
never carried out. This may explain why several states continued to sentence defendants
under the age of sixteen to death even after Thompson. See Streib, supra note 14.
(Including a comprehensive list of every juvenile sentenced to death since January 1,
1973).
37. For an example of the Supreme Court's willingness to disregard stare decisis in
cases concerning capital punishment, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Given
the current conservative and pro-death penalty tone of the Supreme Court,
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment and 'evolving standards of decency' could
conceivably regress to allow the execution of children as young as fourteen or fifteen who
commit extremely brutal crimes.
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INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
Since the first juvenile execution in 1642, 361 people have been put
to death in the United States for crimes they committed when they
were children; seventeen since the reinstatement of the death penalty
in 1976.'8  These executions have not gone unnoticed by the
international community, which has widely condemned the practice.39
Numerous international treaties, declarations, and resolutions are
evidence of the international consensus against the execution of
juveniles. Increasingly, the United States appears in violation of global
human rights accords and customary international law.
Many international objections assert that the United States is
acting in direct violation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR")." According to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR,
"the sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age. .. "" One hundred ninety-nine
countries have signed this agreement. Of those, 140 countries have
ratified the ICCPR. The United States signed it on October 5, 1977,
and ratified it on June 8, 1992.4 However, in ratifying the ICCPR, the
U.S. stated a specific reservation addressing the executions of juveniles,
"The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a
pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age."'
The United States was the only country to sign the ICCPR with any
such reservation, which outraged and angered many in the
international community." Formal objections were filed by Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden."5 Moreover, when the United States first signed
the ICCPR, it agreed, "not to do anything which would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty, pending a decision whether to ratify it."4"
Essentially, the U.S. was bound to obey the spirit and intent of the Act
38. See Glasser, supra note 10 at 26. See also Execution of Child Offenders, supra
note 11.
39. See Execution of Child Offenders, supra note 11.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E., 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted by the U.S. Sept. 8,
1992).
41. Id. at art 6(5). See also Farrell supra note 5 at 209.
42. See Farrell supra note 5 at 209.
43. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (1992)
44. See Farrell, supra note 5, at 210.
45. See id.
46. On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 4.
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until it was either ratified or rejected. As a sign of support, the U.S.
even praised the ICCPR as, "the most complete and authoritative
articulation of international human rights law that has emerged in the
years following World War II.'" Yet, in obvious disregard for the
ICCPR, during the fifteen-year period between signing and ratifying the
ICCPR, the U.S. sentenced more than 70 children to death and
executed five."'
Furthermore, the U.S. reservation to Article 6 of the ICCPR is
illegal according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.49 In
1995, the United Nations Human Rights Committee also determined
that the objection was incompatible with the very purpose of the
ICCPR, and should be revoked." Three years later, the UN Special
Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions
agreed that the reservation was incompatible and should be
withdrawn.5 In his report, the UN Special Rapporteur outlined the
U.S. reservation to the ICCPR, while clarifying that reservations are
only allowed if they do not nullify the spirit and intent of the treaty:
At the time of ratification of the ICCPR, the United States
entered reservations concerning certain rights contained
in the Covenant. By entering a reservation, a State
purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of a
particular provision of the treaty in its application to that
State. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, reservations to multilateral treaties are allowed,
providing that the reservation is compatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty itself."'
After numerous parties to the ICCPR lodged objections to the
United States reservation, the Human Rights Committee expressed
concern that the reservation was "incompatible with the object and
purpose of the ICCPR".' The Committee elaborated, explaining, "[tihe
content and scope of reservations may 'undermine the effective
47. Farrell, supra note 5, at 209.
48. Id.
49. Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty Facts, at http'//www.amnestyusa.con/abolish/
juveniles.html (last visited May 21, 2001).
50. Death Penalty Debate, at httpJ/leonardo.gprep.pvtkl2.md.us/-stevens/
juvdeath.html (last visited May 8, 2000).
51. Id.
52. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedons, In Any
Part of the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependant Countries
and Territories. Extrajudicial, Summary or Abitrary Executions.: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 54' Sess., U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1998168/Add.3 (Mr. Bacre
Waly Ndiaye)(emphasis added) [hereinafter Ndiaye].
53. Amnesty Int'l, Juveniles and the Death Penalty: Executions Worldwide Since
1990, ACT 50/11/98, Nov. 1998 [hereinafter Juveniles and the Death Penalty].
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implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the
obligations of States parties'.I
Beginning in 1994, the Special Rapporteur made several overtures
to the United States Government, requesting an invitation to examine
these concerns and the status of executions in the United States.5
After several years of silence on the part of the United States, he
received an invitation in late 1996.56 According to the Special
Rapporteur, "the request for a visit to the United States was based on
persistent reports suggesting that the guarantees and safeguards set
forth in international instruments relating to fair trial procedures and
specific restrictions on the death penalty were not being fully
observed."57
Following his fact-finding mission to the United States, the Special
Rapporteur issued a report in which he concurred with the Human
Rights Committee's opinion that the U.S. reservation was
inappropriate. The report to the UN Economic and Social Council
addressed specific discrepancies and made several recommendations:
The Special Rapporteur shares the view of the Human Rights
Committee and considers that the extent of the reservations,
declarations and understandings entered by the United States at the
time of ratification of the ICCPR are intended to ensure that the
United States has only accepted what is already the law of the United
States. He is of the opinion that the reservation entered by the United
States on the death penalty provision is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty and should therefore be considered void...
The Special Rapporteur believes that the current practice of imposing
death sentences and executions of juveniles in the United States
violates international law. He further believes that the reintroduction
of the death penalty and the extension of its scope, both at federal and
at state level, contravene the spirit and purpose of article 6 of the
ICCPR, as well as the international trend towards the progressive
restriction of the number of offences for which the death penalty may
be imposed.m
The Special Rapporteur also addressed the Federal Government's
failure to make State Governments comply with the requirements of the
ICCPR:
54. Ndiaye, supra note 52.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Ndiaye, supra note 52.
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Not only do the reservations entered by the United States seriously
reduce the impact of the ICCPR, but its effectiveness nationwide is
further undermined by the absence of active enforcement mechanisms
to ensure its implementation at state level
a serious gap exists between federal and state governments, concerning
implementation of international obligations undertaken by the United
States Government ... the ICCPR appears not to have been
disseminated to state authorities and.. .knowledge of the country's
international obligations is almost nonexistent at state level. Further
... the Federal Government cannot claim to represent the states at the
international level and at the same time fail to take steps to implement
international obligations accepted on their behalf.9
Although the Federal Government has established eighteen as the
minimum age for imposing the death sentence in federal cases, that
does not relieve it of the responsibility to comply with international law
in other ways. Under the Supremacy Clause, "[AIlI Treaties made ...
under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding."' Thus, the federal government is not only bound by
the treaties it enters, but is also responsible for ensuring that
international treaties signed by the government are respected as the
'supreme law of the land' on every level. "[T]he fact that it has set 18 as
the minimum age of eligibility for federal death row does not absolve it
from its responsibility to ensure that state governments do the same. ""
As Alexander Hamilton articulated two centuries ago, the
Executive Branch has a responsibility to "keep the Nation informed of
the requirements of existing laws and treaties as part of the faithful
execution of the laws...,6, It is not acceptable for the government to
simply ignore state laws that allow the execution of juvenile offenders
when the practice is so clearly in contradiction with international law.
Furthermore, in 1997, Congress considered a bill that would have
lowered the federal government's minimum age requirement to
sixteen.' The legislation was unsuccessful, but the fact that Congress
actively considered such legislation testifies to their continued
willingness to flout the obligations of international law.
Moreover, despite the Special Rapporteur's report and increased
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
61. On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 5.
62. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 402-403 (3r ed. 1996).
63. See Farrell, supra note 5, at 211.
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international pressure to comply with the ICCPR, the U.S. has refused
to do so. Following the Special Rapporteur's announcement, the U.S.
Congress adopted a legislative amendment which would have forced the
Human Rights Committee to accept the U.S. reservation before the
U.N. could receive any related funding from the United States.'
Although Congress adopted the resolution, President Clinton vetoed it.'
Following subsequent reports by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, the
Chairman of the Republic National Committee, "called on the U.S.
Administration to 'publicly renounce' it and ensure that none of the
U.S. debts to the U.N. were paid until the report was 'formally
withdrawn and apologized for'."6 During this period, the U.S.
continued to both execute juvenile offenders and condemn additional
ones to death, in obvious disregard for the Special Rapporteur's concern
and disapproval.
The ICCPR is not the only international agreement in question.
The US policy of sentencing juveniles to death currently violates several
other treaties. These include the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Beijing Rules.
Each of these contains language specifically prohibiting the execution of
juvenile offenders, recognizing that juveniles have a great potential to
change, and should be given an opportunity for redemption.
Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC")
specifically states that, "[nleither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for
offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age. ."' By
prohibiting not only the use of the death penalty, but the notion of life
imprisonment with no prospect of parole, the CRC testifies to the belief
that juveniles are capable of change, and should not be denied the
possibility of future growth. Unfortunately, many U.S. legislators seem
to believe that such juvenile offenders are 'beyond hope'. As of 1999,
192 states have ratified the CRC.6 Only two countries have failed to
ratify this treaty, the United States and Somalia, which currently lacks
a functioning government."' Further, "the nearly universal ratification
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is an especially strong sign
of an international consensus that the death penalty should not be used
against juvenile offenders."70
64. See On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 4.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 5.
67. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a), adopted Nov. 20, 1989, G. A.
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44' Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/736 (1989).
68. See On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 6.
69. See Farrell, supra note 5, at 210.
70. Juveniles and the Death Penalty: Executions Worldwide Since 1990, supra note
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Moreover, all of the countries that have ratified the CRC have done
so with no reservations to Article 37(a), "further demonstrating the
almost global acceptance of the prohibition against the use of the death
penalty against those under 18 at the time of the crime."7' However, the
U.S. has made it clear that when, and if, it ratifies the CRC, it will
include a reservation similar to that of the ICCPR.72 Since the USA
signed the CRC in February, 1995, it has executed [eight] juvenile
offenders and sentenced over twenty others to death.73 It is apparent
that even if the U.S. eventually ratifies the CRC, it will continue to act
in a manner incompatible with the letter and spirit of the agreement.
The American Convention on Human Rights ("ACHR"), sponsored
by the Organization of American States ("OAS"), also prohibits states
from sentencing juvenile offenders to death. According to Article 4(5) of
the ACHR, "[clapital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of
age...,4 Despite participating in the creation of the ACHR, and having
signed the agreement without reservation, the United States has failed
to ratify the treaty as of January 2001. . However, it is noteworthy
that, "as a member of the OAS, the United States is subject to the
recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights," whether or not it ratifies the ACHR. 8
In addition, "international norms since at least the end of World
War II have prohibited the juvenile death penalty."77 The Fourth
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Times of War, created August 12, 1949, specifically forbids the use of
the death penalty against children. 7' Article 68 states, "In any case, the
death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person who
was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense." 79 Although
the U.S. ratified this convention, it continues to ignore the obvious
incompatibility of its current practice and 50 years of treaty obligations.
Additions to the Geneva Convention have confirmed the intended
prohibition of executing juveniles. Two protocols added in 1977 address
concerns related to the 'Protection of Victims of International Armed
71. See On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673,
676.
75. Cathleen E. Hull, "Enlightenment by a Humane Justice": An International Law
Argument Against the Juvenile Death Penalty, 47 KAN. L. REv. 1079, 1091 (1999).
76. Id.
77. Victor Streib, American Death Penalty for Juveniles: An International
Embarrassment, 5 GTWN. J. FIGHT. POV. 219, 220 (1998).
78. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of Aug. 12, 1949, 3516.
79. Id. at art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560,
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Conflicts.'w Drafters designed these amendments to protect civilians
who were living in areas engaged in armed conflict.81 The first, Protocol
One of 1977 Additional to Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949,
Article 77(5) provides that "[tihe death penalty for an offense related to
the armed conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not
attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offense was
committed..."82 Protocol Two 1977 Additional to Geneva Convention of
August 12, 1949, Article 6(4) simply states that, "[t]he death penalty
shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen
at the time of the offense. . ."' Both of these articles reflect the
international belief that the ban on executing minors is such a crucial
protection of children that it is not to be waived even in times of war.
The United Nations has taken more recent steps to show their
dispproval of executing juvenile offenders. In May 1984, the UN
Economic & Social Council passed a resolution concerning "Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death
Penalty."' Among the safeguards, "[plersons below 18 years of age at
the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to death,
nor shall the death sentence be carried out on pregnant women, or on
new mothers, or on persons who have become insane."' The Resolution
was endorsed by the General Assembly, and then adopted without a
vote on Dec. 14, 1984." The Safeguards are "not legally binding but
were endorsed by the UN General Assembly without a vote, a sign of a
strong consensus among nations that their provisions should be
observed."'
In March 2000, the European Union also reiterated their
dissatisfaction with the United States' use of the death penalty. In an
official "Memorandum on the Death Penalty", European Union officials
described their continued and adamant opposition to the death penalty,
particularly in cases involving juvenile offenders:
The European Union (EU) is opposed to the death penalty in all cases
80. See Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 77(5), June 8, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 1391, 1425 [hereinafter Protocol I]; See also Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, art. 6(4), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1446 [hereinafter Protocol II].
81. Amnesty International, Juveniles and the Death Penalty, supra note 53.
82. Protocol I, supra note 83.
83. Protocol II, supra note 83.
84. See Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death
Penalty, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted by E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N.
ESCOR, 36' Sess., U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES1984/50 (1984), available at
httpJ/www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/h/hcomp41.htm.
85. Id.
86. See Amnesty International, Juveniles and the Death Penalty: Executions
Worldwide Since 1990, supra note 54.
87. Id.
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and has consistently espoused its universal abolition... In countries
which maintain the death penalty, the EU aims at the progressive
restriction of its scope and respect for the strict conditions, set forth in
several international human rights instruments, under which the
capital punishment may be used ....
The EU is equally concerned about the imposition of the death penalty
on persons below 18 years of age.
All the EU Member States reject the idea of incorrigibility of juveniles.
These States hold the view that the problem of juvenile delinquency
should be addressed bearing in mind that young offenders are in the
process of full development, facing several difficulties of adaptation...
As a result, they are less mature, and thus less culpable, and should
not be treated as adults, deserving a more lenient criminal sanctions
system. This implies, among other things, rejection of the death
penalty for juveniles.
The European approach to juvenile justice is therefore deeply
consistent with internationally recognized juvenile justice standards,
as enshrined in [numerous] international human rights instruments...
In fact, the international norms in question expressly prohibit
sentencing to death persons below 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
The execution of juveniles is also a violation of what is commonly
referred to as "The Beijing Rules".89 These are the minimum standards
acceptable for the administration of juvenile justice as stipulated by the
United Nations.' According to Article 17.2, "[clapital punishment shall
not be imposed for any crime committed by juveniles."9 The agreement
specifically acknowledges that Article 17.2 is intended to comply with
the ICCPR.' Moreover, it states, "it is not the function of the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice to prescribe
which approach is to be followed but rather to identify one that is most
closely in consonance with internationally accepted principles."93 Again,
this requires that signatories recognize and abide by the international
prohibition against executing juveniles.
In addition to the above treaty obligations, there is also the
88. Embassy of Portugal, EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty, Mar. 9, 2000 at
http://www.portugalemb.org/eumemorandum.html (last visited May 1, 2000).
89. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (The Beijing Rules), G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40 Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 207,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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question of customary international law." Critics of the United States'
policy of executing juvenile offenders assert that the practice is both
contrary to, and prohibited by, customary international law." A
showing of four elements evidences customary international law.9 The
criteria necessary to establish such a finding include generality,
consistency, duration, and opiniojuris.w
The first two elements require that the practice be widespread and
not differ widely from state to state.9 Therefore, "a practice can be
general even if it is not universally followed; there is no precise formula
to indicate how wide-spread a practice must be, but it should reflect
wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant
activity."" As detailed above, the United States is one of only 5 nations
that still execute juvenile offenders. With the exception of these five
nations, there is a universal objection to the practice in all
circumstances, even amongst the remaining 90 states that still allow
capital punishment for adults.'02  Thus, the prohibition appears both
widespread and consistent from country to country. The first two
elements are evident.
The third requirement is that of duration. In order to be considered
customary, the legal principle must be established . within the
international community. 1 ' Such acceptance may have developed
gradually over time, or may have occurred more rapidly, depending on
the nature of the principle involved. 02 Hence, "although the prohibition
of the juvenile death penalty is not an 'ancient usage,' it has
nonetheless ripened into a customary norm.""2 The fact that numerous
countries have outlawed the practice, and that such a prohibition is
reflected in multiple treaties over a period of years, binding a vast
majority of states, attests to the qualifications of the prohibition as a
legal custom of sufficient duration.
The fourth and final requirement of customary international law
94. See Hull, supra note 75, at 1093. Customary international law is created when
"states in and by their international practice.. .implicitly consent to the creation and
application of international legal rules," Id. (quoting MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 42 (2' ed. 1993)).
95. Hull, supra note 75, at 1081.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1094.
98. See id. at 1094-5.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 102,
reporters' note b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
100. See Amnesty International, The Death Penalty List of Abolitionist and
Retentionist Countries (As of April 1, 1999), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
abolish/abret.html (last visited May 21, 2001).
101. See Hull, supra note 75, at 1095.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1096.
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has been described as the "psychological element." 4 In short, opinio
juris requires that states believe that compliance with a legal principle
is required by international law.' °5 This is a more difficult element to
prove. However, "when a large number of states recognize a particular
rule, a presumption arises that the rule is generally recognized.""m
Thus, one can argue that many states prohibit the execution of
juveniles from a sense of both moral and legal obligation.
One must also acknowledge that, "a principle of customary law is
not binding on a state that declares its dissent from the principle during
its development . Under this, the United States can attempt to argue
that it is not bound by the customary prohibition on executing juveniles.
The fact that the U.S. has continued to execute juveniles despite
international objections certainly supports this assertion. However,
this argument is weakened by the United States' leading role in the
creation of many treaties, and its failure to specifically object to treaty
obligations at the time of creation."' It is noteworthy that the United
States' formal objection to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR was not expressed
until 1992, more than twenty-five years after the conclusion of the
treaty, and that additional treaties in this area have been signed
without any objection.' Failure to maintain consistent and articulated
objections to the prohibition weakens the credibility of the United
States' assertion that it is not obligated by customary international law.
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
International law is not without its advocates in the U.S. legal
arena. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to bring the U.S.
justice system into compliance with the rest of the world. In Domingues
v. Nevada, sixteen-year-old Michael Domingues was sentenced to death
for murdering his neighbor and her daughter.1 His attorney appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court, arguing that his death sentence was in
direct violation of the ICCPR, and was therefore illegal under
international law."' In 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the
U.S. reservation to the ICCPR was valid and did not prohibit the
execution of Domingues.12
In Domingues, "the Nevada Supreme Court also ignored the
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 83.
108. See Hull, supra note 75, at 1097.
109. See id. at 1097-8.
110. Domingues v. State, 114 Nev. 783 (1998).
111. Amnesty International, About the Program, at http://www.amnestyusa.com/
abolish/page2.html (last visited April 7, 2000).
112. Domingues, 114 Nev. at 785.
VOL. 29:3
YOUNG ENOUGH TO DIE?
recognized principle of international law that states may not invoke
domestic laws to avoid complying with their commitments under
international treaties."' This was the essence of Chief Justice
Springer's dissent; "The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which the United States is a 'party', forbids imposing the
death penalty on children under the age of eighteen... Under the
majority's interpretation of the treaty, the United States, at least with
regard to executing children, is a 'party' to the treaty, while at the same
time rejecting one of its most vital terms."" Springer concluded by
stating, "[u]nder Nevada's interpretation of the treaty, the United
States will be joining hands with such countries as Iran, Iraq,
Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan in approving death sentences for
children. I withhold my approval.""'
Despite the Chief Justice's comments, the majority upheld the
death sentence against Domingues."' Following this ruling, Domingues
requested a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the
court to examine the international legal issues. On June 7, 1999, the
Supreme Court requested that the Attorney General's office submit
briefs outlining the government's understanding of their obligations
under the ICCPR. 7 The Court appeared willing to examine the issue
in-depth. This case could have made the difference between life and
death for every juvenile currently living on Death Row.
In November 1999, after receiving the requested briefs, the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the Domingues case.""
Although Domingues may be able to appeal his conviction and death
sentence on other grounds, the Court's denial was felt by every juvenile
currently facing execution.
As the Supreme Court debated whether to grant certiorari in the
Domingues case, three young men whose lives could have been saved by
such an event were preparing for their own executions. Only months
after the Supreme Court announced its refusal to examine the issue, all
three were dead. They were executed in a two-week period in January
of 2000. " 9 These men were only seventeen when they committed their
crimes; the oldest was barely twenty-seven when the state of Texas
killed him.2 0
The first executed was twenty-six-year-old Chris Thomas, who was
113. On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 6.
114. Domingues, 114 Nev. at 786 (Springer, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Domingues v. Nevada, 526 U.S. 1156 (June 7, 1999).
118. Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (Nov. 1, 1999)
119. See Execution of Child Offenders, supra note 11. See also Glasser, supra note 10,
at 26.
120. See Glasser, supra note 10 at 26.
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put to death in Virginia on January 10, 2000. 2 ' Thomas was executed
for the murder of his girlfriend's parents, even as new evidence was
presented which showed that his girlfriend had acted as more than an
accomplice and had in fact committed at least one of the murders.
'2
Thomas' lawyer appealed for a stay to the U.S. Supreme Court, citing
the possibly exculpatory evidence and violations of international law in
his case.ln The Court denied Thomas' petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and refused to stay his execution. 2 4
Only three days later, Virginia executed another man for a crime
he committed as a child."n At the age of seventeen, Steven Roach shot
and killed a seventy-year-old woman in rural Virginia.1 2' During his six
years on Death Row, he "apologized to the victim's family and
community, studied the Bible, married, and [wrote] letters to wayward
juveniles. " " Before the twenty-three-year-old's execution, numerous
international, political, and religious leaders intervened on his behalf.'"
The Secretary General of Amnesty International, Pierre Sane, pleaded
with Virginia Governor James Gilmore for clemency stating, "We in no
way seek to excuse the crime or belittle the suffering it has caused. We
seek only Virginia's compliance with international law and global
standards of justice."m Even staunch conservatives argued that Roach
was redeemable and should be spared.1 3' The Governor of Virginia
apparently was unmoved by the defendant's young age, his supporters'
pleas or the requirements of international law. On January 13, Steve
Roach became the youngest person executed in the United States since
the reinstatement of the death penalty 25 years ago.' 3' Poignantly, just
days before he was killed, Steve Roach remarked to a journalist, "I just
don't understand how Virginia can execute two juveniles in one week.
How can they say we can't be rehabilitated?"'
32
121. See Martin Kettle, No Clemency as Boy Pays Ultimate Price, GUARDIAN, Jan. 12,
2000 at 15.
122. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions of Juvenile Offenders, at
httpJ/www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgtuvexec.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
Execution of Juvenile Offenders]. In a glaring example of the inequities of the justice
system, because the accomplice was only fourteen at the time of the murders, she was
released from juvenile detention upon her twenty-first birthday. See id.
123. See Frank Green, Thomas Executed for Death of Couple; He was 17 Years Old at
Time of Slayings, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000 at Al.
124. In Re Douglas Christopher Thomas, 528 U.S. 1073, 1073 (2000).
125. See Frank Green, Roach, 23, Put to Death for 1993 Slaying; Execution of Young
Offender Criticized, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 14, 2000 at B1.
126. See id.
127. Glasser, supra note 10 at 26.
128. See Green, supra note 124, at Al.
129. Executions of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 123.
130. Glasser, supra note 10, at 26.
131. Executions of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 123.
132. Glasser, supra note 10, at 26.
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Steve Roach's death was followed by a third juvenile execution in
Texas, just twelve days later."n Glen Charles McGinnis was sentenced
to death in 1992 for the robbery and murder of a thirty-year-old dry
cleaning store clerk, Leta Ann Wilkerson.'3 Despite strong mitigating
evidence of a childhood marred by physical and sexual abuse, and no
previous prison record, McGinnis was sentenced to death rather than
life in prison.In Abolitionists within the United States and the
international community vigorously protested his scheduled execution,
citing his age and upbringing.1 36  Representatives of the European
Union released an "urgent humanitarian appeal" on his behalf,
stressing the international prohibition against the execution of such
juvenile offenders.37 However, the outcry and the demarche were to no
avail: Glen Charles McGinnis was put to death on January 25, 2000. 'm
In June of 2000, a fourth juvenile offender was scheduled for
execution: Gary Graham (now known as Shaka Sankofa)."9 Graham
was sentenced to death in 1981 for robbery and murder. "' He was
convicted solely on the basis of one eyewitness's testimony, a fact which
raised a great deal of public debate and controversy over both his actual
guilt and the standard of proof which should be required when
sentencing a person to death.' Questions also arose over his trial
lawyer's failure to call additional eyewitnesses who would have testified
that he was not the shooter. Lost in much of the media coverage was
the equally compelling fact that Graham was only seventeen when he
was arrested and convicted of first-degree murder.4 By the time he
was executed on June 22, 2000, he had spent more than half of his life
on death row.'"
A fifth juvenile offender was scheduled for execution in Georgia just
133. See Lisa Sandberg, World Pleas Fail to Save Texas Killer; Inmate Says Nothing,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 26, 2000 at 1A.
134. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at http-//www.tdcj.state.tx.us/statistics/
deathrow/drowlistmcginnis.jpg (last visited May 21, 2001).
135. Sandberg, supra note 133, at 1A.
136. See id.
137. See Statement from the Portuguese Embassy, European Union Death Penalty
Demarche on Behalf of Glen Charles McGinnis, Jan. 19, 2000
http://www.portugalemb.org/press/26.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2000).
138. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/statexecutedoffenders.htm (last visited June 21, 2001).
139. See Amy Dorsett and Kate Hunger, Capital Questions; As Execution Date Nears,
Proof of Houston Man's Guilt in Slaying Hinges on a Single Eyewitness, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 11, 2000 at 1A.
140. See id.
141. See Toni Locy, A Furor Over a Lone Star Execution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
Jul. 3, 2000.
142. See id.
143. See Steven A. Drizin and Stephen K Harper, Old Enough to Kill, Old Enough to
Die, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2000, at 1/Z1.
144. See id.
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two months after Graham." Alex Williams, now thirty-two, was to die
on August 22 d for the 1986 rape and murder of sixteen-year-old Aleta
Bunch.'" His planned execution generated international outrage and
pressure on the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles to commute his
sentence to life in prison."7 However, when the Georgia Supreme Court
stayed the execution in order to hear further appeals, the Board
declined to rule on the issue of commutation of Williams' sentence.
48
Williams' execution has now been stayed indefinitely while the Georgia
Supreme Court waits to hear an appeal based on two crucial legal
arguments concerning the execution of juvenile offenders.' 49 Williams'
lawyers are arguing first, and foremost, that the execution of juvenile
offenders is so rare as to constitute 'unusual' punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.5 ' In the alternative, they assert that his
execution would be a direct violation of international law. 5'
The first argument may prove successful. In 1999, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the execution of an individual under the age of
seventeen was a violation of the Florida State Constitution's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.1, 2 In doing so, the Court specifically
noted that no juvenile offender had been executed in Florida for more
than twenty-five years."3 The change in law has removed at least two
juvenile offenders from Death Row."
145. Raymond Bonner, Georgia Execution is Stayed in Case of Youthful Offender, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000 at A12.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1999). "There is no doubt that the murder
in this case is a deplorable crime and one for which the defendant should spend the rest of
his life in prison. However, we cannot impose the death penalty on this defendant who
was sixteen at the time of the crime, consistent with our case law and our
Constitution...." Id. The Court went on to say, "Accordingly, the death sentence is
vacated and reduced to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole." Id.
153. Brennan, 754 .2d at 7. "In this case, the defendant presented the trial court with
unrefuted data that at least since 1972, more than a quarter of a century ago, no
individual under the age of seventeen at the time of the crime has been executed in
Florida. In fact, our research reveals that the last reported case where the death penalty
was imposed and carried out on a sixteen-year-old defendant was Clay v. State, 143 Fla.
204, 196 So. 462 (1940), over fifty-five years ago." Id.
154. Keith Brennan on July 8, 1999 and Roderrick Justin Ferrell on November 9,
2000. Brennan, 754.2d. at 11; Ferrell v. State, 772 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2000) (No.SC93127).
Both death sentences were vacated and reduced to life in prison without parole. Brennan,
754 .2d. at 11; Ferrell v. State, 772 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2000) (No.SC93127). In a possible
response to these two cases, the 2001 session of the Florida legislature is considering
amending the Florida Constitution so that it specifically mentions the death penalty. See
Executing Teens?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001 at 10A. The Amendment
would change the Florida Constitutional language of "cruel or unusual" to the Federal
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CONCLUSIONS
Given the United States' reservations and objections to
international treaties that bar the execution of minors, the U.S. may be
able to dispute that it is in violation of international law. However, the
consensus against this practice is growing. In August 2000, the U.N.
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
formally declared that, "the imposition of the death penalty on those
aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the offence is contrary to
customary international law..."" In a strongly worded resolution, the
United Nations asserted once more that it, "condemns unequivocally
the imposition and execution of the death penalty on those aged under
18...15 In a pointed gesture towards those legal systems which seem
insistent upon ignoring the requirements of international law, the U.N.
called upon States to "remind their judges that the imposition of the
death penalty against such offenders is in violation of international
law."1
57
As a principle of customary international law, all countries are
expected to abide by this standard, regardless of which treaties they
may or may not have signed. Moreover, such a declaration is a sign
that the prohibition on executing juvenile offenders may soon progress
from an issue of customary international law to a matter ofjus cogens.,
When a legal principle attains the status of jus cogens, all States are
obligated to abide by that principle.59  Previous objections or
reservations are rendered moot." If the United States remains one of
the only countries to kill juveniles, their objections simply may no
longer be enough to justify their actions. 6 1
Furthermore, the continued policy of executing people for crimes
Constitution's "cruel and unusual" and would force Florida Courts to construe the issue
"in conformity" with interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. Critics of the
measure argue that these changes would effectively allow a return to the execution of
sixteen year-old offenders. See id.
155. E.S.C. Res. 2000/17, 52"' Sess., 26' mtg., U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/17
(2000).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. According to the Vienna Convention, jus cogens is "a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted..." Hull, supra note 75, at 1101, quoting the Vienna Convention,
art. 53.
159. Hull, supra note 75, at 1101.
160. Id.
161. See Hull, supra note 75, at 1102-1106 (discussing Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Case 9647, concerning the executions of two United States juvenile
offenders: James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton). Some commentators believe that the
prohibition on executing juvenile offenders has already reached the level of jus cogens.
See id.
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they committed as juveniles undermines the credibility of the United
States within the international human rights dialogue. According to
leading death penalty expert Victor Streib, "[ilt puts the U.S. in an
embarrassing international position on human rights. [When the U.S.
attacks the human rights record in other countries] they say, 'But you
execute your children'." 2 As long as the U.S. continues to act in
violation of the letter and spirit of crucial human rights treaties, they
will never be able to present a credible voice on the subject of human
rights. And, quite simply, until the United States is willing to respect
the human rights of their own children, they may not find the
international community willing to listen to their views on other
countries' atrocities and violations. "[F]or any country to adopt a
selective approach to its international human rights obligations can
serve only to undermine respect for the system as a whole and to
diminish the prospect for human rights for all."163
Moreover, the United States is facing increasing scrutiny
throughout the world for its continuing support of the death penalty
and its willful disregard for the protections of international law. In
November 2000, the International Court of Justice heard a case
between Germany and the United States concerning the 1999
executions of two German nationals, brothers Karl and Walter
LaGrand.'" The two were sentenced to death after a 1982 bank robbery
in which the bank manager was killed." Germany objected to the
failure of the United States to inform the men of their right to consular
assistance as required under the 1963 Vienna Convention, and strongly
objected to their scheduled executions.6' Arizona continued with the
executions of both men despite international pressure from Germany
and the European community.6 Walter LaGrand was executed just
one day after the International Court of Justice ruled that his execution
be postponed pending further court proceedings.'6 Germany's current
case seeks an official condemnation by the ICJ against the United
States for violating the LaGrands' consular rights, formal recognition of
Germany's right to seek unspecified reparations in the case, and
assurances that there will be no further violations.'69
The case has implications far beyond the LaGrands case. Every year a
162. Glasser, supra note 10, at 26.
163. On the Wrong Side of History, supra note 1, at 8.
164. See Betsy Pisik, U.S. Rebukes Germany on Death-Penalty Stance; Hits Call for
Reparations at World Court, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000 at Al.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Betsy Pisik, Execution of 2 Germans in U.S. Leads to World Court
Lawsuit, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000 at A13.
169. See id.
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number of foreign individuals are arrested in the U.S. and denied
consular access and some are executed each year... Unless
international courts, namely the ICJ, can fashion some remedy that
will get the attention of the arresting country, states are likely to
continue to ignore this international law obligation with impunity.
170
The U.S. State Department has admitted that it violated
international law by failing to inform numerous defendants of their
consular rights, and has apologized to Germany in the case of the
LaGrands. 7 1 It is also unclear what effect, if any, an ICJ ruling in
Germany's favor would have on the United States as, "although its
judgments are binding under international law, the World Court has no
independent means to enforce compliance."' The U.S. has denied all
requests for reparations and has insisted that the failure to provide
consular access had no effect on the outcome of the LaGrands' case. 7 3 A
ruling on the case is expected in Summer 2001.
74
Human rights advocates and international legal scholars are also
concerned by further implications of the United States refusal to
acknowledge the authority of the International Court of Justice. "[Ihf
the U.S. refuses to delay an execution not withstanding a ruling from
the highest international court, then other nations may act exempt as
well."" 5 In this way as well, the United States is contributing to the
erosion of human rights on a much larger scale.
The LaGrand case is not the only one drawing upon the provisions
of international law. In December 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court
declined to hear that State's appeal of a trial court decision that
suppressed the confession of a Guatemalan national.'76 The confession
was solicited in accordance with the required Miranda warnings, but
the suspect never was informed of his consular rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. "The ruling is believed to be the
only one in which a US trial court has suppressed a murder confession
170. ICJ Hears German Suit Against U.S. for Executions and Violations of Consular
Rights, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RPTR, Jan. 2001.
171. Id.
172. Pisik, supra note 166, at Al.
173. See id.
174. Daniel J. Crowley, World Court Hears German Gripe Against U.S., at
http://www.thesynapse.org/politics/punish.html (visited May 21, 2001). Author's note: On
June 27, 2001, the International Court ofJustice found overwhelmingly in Germany's
favor, ruling that the United States had breached its international obligations and
violated the LaGrands' consular rights. See Marlise Simons, World Court Finds U.S.
Violated Consular Rights of 2 Germans, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2001, at A10.
175. Richard C. Deiter, International Perspectives on the Death Penalty: A Costly
Isolation for the U.S, at http://www.deathpenatly.org/dpic/internationalreport.html
(visited July 27, 2000).
176. Delaware v. Reyes, 765 A.2d 953 (Del. 2000). It is noteworthy that in response to
the State's application for leave to appeal, defense lawyers submitted materials from the
ICJ LaGrand proceedings.
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on this basis." 7
The Canadian Supreme Court has also taken a stronger stance
against the United States' continued use of the death penalty. In
February 2001 the Court refused to extradite two Canadian citizens to
the United States, stating that it would be unconstitutional to return
the men to the United States until assurances were given that the men
would not face the death penalty if convicted. 78  Twenty-five year-olds
Sebastian Burns and Atif Rafay had been sought in connection with the
triple murder of Rafay's family in Washington State.79 In refusing to
extradite the two, the Court noted that Canada has abolished the death
penalty for all crimes, and that the last executed in Canada occurred in
1962. s° Moreover, under the extradition treaty between the United
States and Canada, the Canadian government is entitled to such
assurances.' The ruling also did not rely upon the fact that the two
men were Canadian citizens, suggesting that non-citizens may be
protected from extradition in future cases where the death penalty is a
possibility. 
8 2
RECOMMENDATIONS
For abolitionists who oppose the death penalty in any situation, the
execution of juvenile offenders is one traumatic aspect of a much larger
struggle. Recent polls suggest that nearly two-thirds of the American
public favors the death penalty.'" However, this is the lowest level in
twenty years.TM Moreover, statistics also show that Americans who are
given the choice of the death penalty or life in prison without parole
frequently choose life in prison instead. 85 Furthermore, many people do
not even realize that the U.S. currently executes juvenile offenders, and
are horrified when told the truth. "Simply encountering the bare facts
177. Mark and Heather Warren, Delaware Supreme Court Declines to Review Reyes
Decision, in CONSULAR RIGHTS IN AMERICA NEWSLETTER, Jan./Feb. 2001,
available at http;/venus.soci.niu.edu/-archives/ABOLISHIrick-halperin/jan01J0257.html
(last visited May 21, 2001).
178. See Canada Bars Extradition to US. for Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2001.
179. Id.
180. Id. Although Canada banned the death penalty for general crimes in 1976, it was
still theoretically legal to execute soldiers until 1998. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Sara Rimer, Support for a Moratorium in Executions Gets Stronger, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.con/2000/10/31/national/31DEAT/htm
(last visited May 21, 2001).
184. Id.
185. See Gallup Press Release, 2/24/00, from Death Penalty Information Center,
Summaries of Recent Poll Findings, at http'//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Polls.html (last
visited May 21, 2001).
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of this practice causes most to recoil in disgust."8 6
Despite the current Supreme Court's unwillingness to confront
requirements of international law, there is also the possibility of change
on the domestic legal front. Concerns over the execution of juvenile
offenders often mirror concerns over the execution of mentally retarded
individuals. 8 7 Legal challenges to the execution of either group are
often argued under the Eighth Amendment prohibition on 'cruel and
unusual' punishment. Thus, juveniles may, in the long run, benefit
from one of the cases that the Supreme Court agreed to hear during
2001."'
Penry v. Johnson concerns the case of a severely retarded man who
was sentenced to death in Texas for rape and murder.' 9 Many in the
legal community hope Penry's case, which established the legal
precedent allowing the execution of the mentally retarded in 1989, will
force the Court to examine the issue once again."®  In Penry v.
Lynaugh91 , the Court reasoned much the same as it had in Thompson
and Stanford in order to determine whether executing the mentally
retarded was unconstitutional.'9 In order to define the contemporary
meaning of 'evolving standards', the Court looked to the States.93
Finding no national consensus against the execution of the mentally.
retarded, the Court held that the mentally retarded could be sentenced
to death as long as the sentencing jury first had been instructed in the
mitigating aspects of the individual's retardation:
In sum, mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a
defendant's culpability for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude
today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any
mentally retarded person... simply by virtue of his or her mental
retardation alone. So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to
186. Streib, supra note 78, at 219.
187. Author's note: the phrase 'mentally retarded' is used throughout this section in
recognition of the legal terminology used in these cases.
188. See Steve Lash, Supreme Court to Hear Second Appeal by Penry, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
189. See Warren Richey, Can Low IQ Convicts Be Put on Death Row?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2001, at 1.. See also Charles Lane, Court Hears Death Penalty Case;
Justices to Rule if Jury got Proper Instruction on Retardation, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2001,
at A8.
190. See Warren Richey, Can Low IQ Convicts Be Put on Death Row?, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2001, at 1. Author's note: On June 4, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned Penry's death sentence for a second time. The court did not specifically
address the question of executing the mentally retarded, ruling only that the jurors in Mr.
Penry's case received insufficient instructions on how to consider his retardation as a
mitigating circumstance. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reverse Death Sentence of
Retarded Man, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2001 at Al.
191. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
192. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
193. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
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mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence, an
individualized determination whether 'death is the appropriate
punishment' can be made in each particular case. While a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday
emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a
consensus today.'9
It is possible that the 'national consensus against the practice' that
was lacking in 1989 could now be found to exist. In 1989, only one state
clearly forbade the execution of mentally retarded defendants.' 95 In the
years since, the number of jurisdictions prohibiting it has grown to
thirteen." Those thirteen states, in addition to the twelve states that
have abolished the death penalty in all forms, can be seen as indicative
of a 'national consensus' against the practice as referred to in Penry.19 7
The parallel of the mentally retarded has already indirectly
benefited one juvenile offender. Antonio Richardson was scheduled for
execution by the state of Missouri on March 7, 2001 for his role in the
1991 rapes and murders of two sisters.198 In addition to the fact that he
was only sixteen at the time of the crime, Richardson also has been
classified as mentally retarded with an I.Q. of seventy.'99 Numerous
individuals, including the mother of the victims, had urged for clemency
in Richardson's case, citing his age and his mental capacity.2 Missouri
Governor Bob Holden had indicated he would not grant clemency in the
case, and Richardson had already finished his last meal and said
goodbye to his friends and family when the United States Supreme
Court announced a stay of execution. 20'
According to Gino Battisti, Richardson's lawyer, the stay of
execution was granted so that the court could consider the single
question of whether a national consensus has developed against the
execution of the mentally retarded.22 A similar stay in the scheduled
execution of another man, Ernest Paul McCarver, seems to indicate
that the Court may be considering just such a conclusion. 23 According
194. Penry. 492 U.S. at 340.
195. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. Although only Georgia specifically banned the practice,
Maryland's law prohibiting it took effect just five days after the Penry case was decided:
July 1, 1989. See id.
196. Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmr.html (last visited May 21, 2001).
197. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-334.
198. See Sara Rimer, Missouri Set to Execute Retarded Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Bob Herbert, Cruel and Unusual, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at Sec. A.
202. Id. A decision in Richardson's case was still pending at the time of publication.
203. See Stan Swofford, Critics Attack Easley Over Clemency Issue, NEWS & RECORD,
Mar. 3, 2001 at Al.
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to Duke University law professor Jim Coleman, "this has to be very
significant.. .the court might be about to say that our evolving standard
of decency has reached the point that it is cruel and unusual to put to
death the mentally retarded."'
Moreover, Court acknowledgment that the 'evolving standards of
decency' are in fact 'evolving' and thus open to new interpretation could
pave the way for a similar case involving juveniles. However, such a
case would only be successful after steady progress on the state level to
the point where a majority rather than a minority of states prohibited
the execution of juvenile offenders. Although the Florida case described
above still leaves seventeen-year-olds vulnerable to a death sentence,
the decision is cause for hope that more states will follow Florida's lead
and raise the minimum age for capital punishment.
Committed abolitionists believe that the use of the death penalty
must be attacked on numerous fronts: as a violation of international
law; as morally unthinkable, particularly when it involves executing
children or the mentally handicapped; as racist; as ineffective and
expensive; and increasingly, as likely to kill innocent men and women.
Each of these arguments may reach a different person in a different
way, particularly those people 'on the fence', so to speak, who often
change their views with additional information or an emotional
connection to the controversy. Together, these various arguments form
a flexible but persuasive campaign to end the use of the death penalty
in the United States completely.
By educating the public and legislators about the United States'
obligations under international law, and by building pressure on the
state and federal government to comply, the practice of executing
juveniles can come to end. Various international organizations have
waged economic boycotts and advertising campaigns aimed at
discouraging the use of the death penalty in the United States., with
varying degrees of success.2' The death penalty is also currently a
prominent issue in the United States, due to the number of overturned
convictions based on new evidence and the nationwide push for a
moratorium on executions. 20 Hopefully, these various campaigns and
international influences will lead to a cessation of executions across the
spectrum, and a strengthened appreciation for the most fundamental
204. Id.
205. See Carol J. Williams, Europeans Baffled by U.S. Support of Death Penalty, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000 at Al.
206. See Rimer, supra note 178. In January 2000, Governor George Ryan declared a
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois, citing concerns with the death penalty
process there after thirteen innocent men were released from Death Row. Since 1997, the
American Bar Association has called for a moratorium to examine death penalty system
nationwide, and numerous cities and counties have passed resolutions calling for
moratoriums in their states. See id.
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human right of all: simply, the right to live.
"It was important to Steve Roach that he be remembered... not just
as the teenager who committed a horrible crime, but also as the adult
who accepted responsibility for it and begged the forgiveness of those he
caused to suffer; and not just as someone who ended a life for no reason,
but also as someone whose own life was ended to no one's benefit...
Mary Hughes did not deserve to die. But Steve Roach wanted us who
live after his death to know that he was not a monster: he was a human
being, a young man, with flaws and with promise, who deserved to
live."2
207. Statement by Steven M. Schneebaum, Steve Roach's lawyer after his execution
(Jan. 13, 2000).
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INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
GENETIC INFORMATION:
THE PROGRESSION OF THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT AND THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINES
Jennifer Elle Tauer*
INTRODUCTION
The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an international project to
sequence and map the human genome as well as to document
humanity's genetic resources.1 It has the potential to impact human
rights and public health by creating perpetual structural inequalities in
society.2 Yet despite this impact on society as a whole, legislation on the
regulation of information gathered from the HGP is almost non-
existent. The only current instrument in effect that discusses both the
human genome and international human rights is the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (Declaration).3
The Declaration addresses research on the human genome, the rights of
persons concerned, and the duties of states to advance the international
dissemination of information on the genome. Since the Declaration
deals with the issues of protecting genetic information that will possibly
be revealed by the HGP, its implementation is essential to protect the
individuals who risk the exposure of their genetic information.
However, implementation depends on the will of states and it is up to
" J.D. Candidate, 2002, Univeristy of Denver, School of Law. LLM Candidate, 2003,
Univeristy of Denver, School of Law, Graduate Tax Program. B.A., 1997, University of
Colorado, Boulder. M.A., 1999, University of Colorado, Boulder.
1. See Maha F. Munayyer, Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation:
Constructing a New Language for International Human Rights, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POLY 687, 688 (1997).
2. See Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an
International Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
479, 479 (1999); see also Alastair T. Iles, The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the
Human Rights Framework, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 27 (1996).
3. GA. Res. 152, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/625/Add.2 (1998) (adopting
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, at
http://www.unesco.org/ibc/en/genome/project.index.html (visited Dec. 18, 2000)
(hereinafter Human Genome Declaration).
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them to incorporate the principles of the Declaration into their
legislation where appropriate. 4 More importantly, the Declaration
encourages states without any legislation to legislate within the
boundaries established by the principles of the Declaration.'
A genome is an organism's entire genetic material6 and the human
genome is specifically all of the genetic information of the entire human
race.7 The HGP is therefore an effort to decode the entire genetic make-
up of human beings. Once the HGP is complete and the genome is
mapped, sequenced and identified, individual genetic compositions will
be knowable. The questions then become: who is entitled to this
information, how will this information be used against individuals, and
most importantly, will the use of this information violate their human
rights? In 1997 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) enacted the Declaration, which takes
steps to protect the human rights of individuals with specific regard to
genetics as it relates to dignity, rights and research. This Declaration
has been effectively adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.8
In order to properly understand the nature and breadth of this
inquiry and what solutions may present themselves, a comprehensive
understanding of the HGP is required. This article will discuss the
legal and ethical issues surrounding the HGP as well as the
shortcomings of traditional international human rights law on this
particular issue, including the Declaration and how its implementation
will protect the human rights concerns of individuals.
The Declaration needs effective implementation on a state-by-state
basis to protect the privacy, autonomy and dignity of individual human
rights. However, there is a significant lack of current and uniform
legislation throughout the world protecting these rights in local
governments! Although there is some national legislation in a few
industrialized countries, there are inconsistencies and other countries
that have no legislation are being exploited due to their lack of
safeguards.'1 Such loopholes encourage international regulation of
4. See Noelle Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights: The First Legal and Ethical Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 537, 575 (1999).
5. See Noelle Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights: The First Legal and Ethical Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 537, 575 (1999).
6. Anne Lawton, Regulating Genetic Destiny: A Comparative Study of Legal
Constraints in Europe and the United States, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 365, 369 (1997).
7. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 484.
8. This Declaration was adopted by the U.N. on December 9, 1998. G.A. Res. 152,
U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/625/Add.2 (1998).
9. See Lenoir, supra note 4, at 537.
10. See id.
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bioethics by effective implementation of the Human Genome
Declaration.
I. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
Before understanding how this issue will exist within the legal
framework of international human rights, one must first comprehend
the background of the HGP. The HGP is an international collaboration
of the world's best scientific minds created to identify the form and
content of the human genome." The HGP began in 1988 and is the
result of three individuals who independently and publicly proposed to
sequence the entire human genome. 2  Robert Sinsheimer, the
Chancellor of the University of California of Santa Cruz (UCSC),
planted the idea of sequencing the human genome, although it did not
succeed in attracting money for a genome research institute on the
campus of UCSC. 3 Renato Dulbecco of the Salk Institute, a Nobel Prize
winning molecular biologist, was the first to expose his ideas publicly
and gave impetus to the idea's third independent origin. 4  Charles
DeLisi, who knew of neither the Santa Cruz workshop nor Dulbecco's
lectures, conceived of a concerted effort to sequence the human genome
under the aegig of the Department of Energy (DOE).15
A. Mapping the Human Genome
The HGP will result in information in the format of high-resolution
genetic linkage and physical maps of all the human chromosomes as
well as human deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence data, which
scientists will then be able to use as a resource for studies of gene
structure and function. Many see this completion of the HGP, and the
fruits that it will bear for the field of genetics, as tantamount to the
power of understanding "ourselves." 6 Such profound understanding is
11. See James D. Watson and Eric T. Juengst, Foreward, Doing Science in the Real
World: The Role of Ethics, Law, and the Social Sciences in the Human Genome Project, in
GENE MAPPING: USING LAw AND ETHICS AS GuIDES XV (George J. Annas and Sherman
Elias, eds., 1992).
12. See Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Genome Project, in 5 RISK HEALH
SAFETY & ENV'T 97, 108 (1994).
13. See id at 102.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Allison Morse, Searching for the Holy Grail: The Human Genome Project and Its
Implications, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 219, 230. Allison Morse emphasizes that the theory that
human behavior can be understood through our genes is reductionist by its nature and
such claims go beyond what science can support. She asserts that genetics and molecular
biology can tell us about our genes and not all that much about people. To fully
understand the nature of human behavior, it is essential to go beyond the genetic
compositions and pre-dispositions of individuals and look at their surrounding
environments. Id. at 231.
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anticipated to be available after the genome is completely "mapped." To
those for whom the HGP has become the "Holy Grail of Biology" and a
quest for the all-revealing "Book of Man"7 the results of the HGP will
include a complete set of genetic instructions. Such details will give
researchers basic information about how human cells work as a system,
such as how the cells of the brain or heart work together or how a single
fertilized cell develops into a fully formed baby. 8
The HGP began as a scientific endeavor to attempt to discover the
roughly four thousand known diseases. 9 Scientists are now able to
predict those diseases that are caused by a single genetic defect through
genetic technology. 20  One of the main objectives of the HGP is the
promotion of medicine through three stages. 2' First, the ability to
screen for genetic disorders; second to provide possible predictions of
the onset of certain diseases or behavioral disorders; finally to be able to
eventually eradicate unwanted genetic disorders through the use of
gene therapies.'
The scientific community has determined that the goal of
identifying genes that cause defects will be best advanced through
procedures known as gene mapping and gene sequencing. Gene
mapping assigns genes to specific chromosomes." Once researchers are
aware of where the genes are located, they are able to tell when certain
traits are being inherited together.2' Next, gene sequencing informs
researchers where genes are located and how they are ordered with in
the DNA double helix." Finally, gene identification offers researchers
insight as to which gene is actually responsible for the disease.6 Often
these three stages get lumped together under the title of "gene
17. See Report of the Secretary to the President, Health Insurance in the Age of
Genetics in PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN GENETICS 11 (Comm.
Print 1997). (Hereinafter Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics); see also ROBERT
COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME 9 (1994)
(Hereinafter, COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS).
18. See Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics, supra note 17, at 11.
19. See Iles, supra note 2, at 27.
20. Michael R. Costa, Genetic Testing: International Strategies to Prevent Potential
Discrimination in Insurance Risk Classification, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 109, 109
(1996).
21. See Morse, supra note 16, at 232-33.
22. Id.
23. See Costa, supra note 20, at 111-12.; see also COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra
note 17, at 34-35 (explaining how the physical mapping of chromosomal DNA is complete
through seven separate stages, which are a combination of fragmentation and cloning).
24. See Costa, supra note 20, at 111-12.
25. See Lawton, supra note 6, at 376.
26. Id. "To date, more than 60 genes that lead to disease have been identified,
including genes for early-onset breast and ovarian cancer, cystic fibrosis, Huntington's
disease, hereditary colon cancer, and the most common form of skin cancer." Beverly
Merz, Reading the Human Blueprint: The Human Genome Project, at
http://www.hhmi.org/genetictrail/readinglread.htm.
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mapping."7
The HGP began with efforts to produce a complete physical map of
the human genome. By the late 1980's, the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the National Institute of Health (NIH) emerged as the
leaders in the quest to complete the map of the human genome.3 The
Howard Hughes Medical Institute joins these two United States federal
agencies as the major fundraisers for the HGP in the United States to
form the overall "initiative" on genome mapping.0 According to James
Watson, the co-discoverer of DNA and head of the National Institute of
Health Human Genome Initiative, the Human Genome Project has four
phases:
One, we map all the genes; two, we sequence all the genes, or break
them down into their chemical components, which is the ultimate map;
three, we distribute this information to scientists around the world
through 'in-formatics' that are easily understood and useful; and
fourth, we build in ethical safeguards so that the information is
properly used and not exploited to discriminate against anyone.30
A physical genetic map is useful because it provides the necessary
information regarding the relative location of genes along the 46 h~iman
chromosomes."' Once a gene has been located and isolated, researchers
sequence the base pairs of the DNA to understand the nature of the
protein codes and to identify mutations that are related to diseases.32
The further goal of dissemination and the requirement to build in
ethical safeguards are given recognition in the Declaration.
Gene mapping is achieved through gene linkage and physical maps
of the genome3 Physical mapping of DNA is completed through a
27. See Costa, supra note 20, at 112.
28. COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra note 17, at 167. "NIH and DOE signed a
memorandum of understanding in the fall of 1988, to avoid the threatened Chiles-
Kennedy-Domenici bill. The memorandum ratified an existing informal arrangement, but
grew into substantially more, as bona fide joint planning came to seem advantageous to
both agencies." Id.
29. George J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster
Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 637 (1990). (Hereinafter Annas, Monster Mythology).
30. Id., at 638;
James D. Watson set in motion the whole chain of events that led to the
Human Genome Project when he and Francis Crick discovered the double-
helical structure of DNA in 1953. The longtime director of Cold Springs
Harbor Laboratory, he served as the first head of the NIH human genome
program from October 1988 to April 1992.
COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra note 17, at 162.
31. See Lawton, supra note 6, at 375-76; see also COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra
note 17, at 34-35.
32. See Merz, supra note 26.
33. See Human Genome Declaration, supra note 3, articles 9 & 23.
34. See Lawton, supra note 6, at 374.
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series of seven stages, which may be summarized as three more general
steps. 5 The DNA is cleaved into chromosomal fragments, which are
cloned, and then cleaved again.36 According to the International Human
Mapping Consortium, this clone-based approach to mapping will
eventually produce a series of overlapping clones and these overlapping
clones will create a map of the entire genome .3  Researchers are able to
reconstruct the order of DNA fragments by looking at the fragments
from common clones.3' Scientists will assemble a complete physical
map by placing the DNA fragments in the correct order.3 9 This stage of
the HGP is essential because "roughly 50% of the human genome is
repetitive. Some regions have DNA sequences that are ninety-eight
percent identical to one another even though they are millions of base
pairs apart or on different chromosomes.""0
Gene sequencing is the process by which scientists determine the
order of the nucleotides that comprise double stranded DNA.4' The
sequencing of three billion base pairs of nucleotides that comprise the
human genome is a monumental endeavor.42 The Office of Technology
Assessment of the United States Congress argues five points in favor of
the sequencing of the human genome.43 They are as follows:
[1)] The informatioh in a genome is the fundamental description of a
living system... and so is of fundamental concern to biologists.
[2)] Genome sequences provide a conceptual framework within which
much future research in biology will be structured [such as] ... control
of gene expression.
[3)] [Nlearly 90 percent of total DNA content [is likely to have no
function] ... Without a complete DNA sequence of several genomes, it
will be impossible to determine whether such sequences have meaning
or are "ancestral" junk sequences.
[4)] Genome sequences are important for addressing questions
concerning evolutionary biology. The reconstruction of the history of
life on this planet, the definition of gene families... and the search for
35. See COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra note 17, at 34.
36. See id. at 34-35.
37. International Human Genome Mapping Consortium, A Physical Map of the
Human Genome, 409 NATURE 934 (Feb. 15, 2001), at http://www.nature.com.
38. See COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra note 17, at 34-35.
39. See id.
40. Geoff Spencer, International Human Genome Mapping Consortium Publishes
Physical Map of the Human Genome, at
http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/NEWS/physical-map.html.
41. Lawton, supra note 6, at 376.
42. See id.
43. See Annas, Monster Mythology, supra note 29, at 638.
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a universal ancestor all require an understanding of the organization of
genomes.
[5)] Genomes are natural information storage and processing systems;
unraveling them may be of general interest to computer and physical
scientists."
The human genome is 25 times larger than any other genome
sequenced to date, and is the first vertebrate to be sequenced fully.
5
B. Possible Uses for Information Provided by the HGP
A complete map of the human genome will allow interested parties
eventually to be able to discover whether or not an individual has a
predisposition to one disease or another.6 However, the tests that
would discern such genetic information cannot reveal the extent to
which a disease may manifest itself in one patient versus another.
Even though vast amounts of information will be supplied through
"gene mapping," genes do not operate in a vacuum, but instead, they
interact with the environment surrounding each individual. Inevitably,
every person's habitat will have an influence, on the expression of
specific genetic traits within each human being and these facts must be
remembered when examining genetic make-up and an individual's
genetic predisposition. 8
1. Therapies for Genetic Disorders
The HGP is targeted towards helping the treatment of genetic
disorders, such as spontaneous genetic mutations in the germ cell49 and
inherited genetic anomalies. Every person has an estimated five to
thirty serious "misspellings," or alterations, in his or her DNA, which
means that every individual may be subject to some form of "genetic"
discrimination if there is not adequate protection of genetic
information."0 The roughly thirty genetic mutations, which are not
44. Id.
45. International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing and
Analysis of the Human Genome, available at httpJ/www.nature.com.
46. See id.
47. See Munayyer, supra note 1, at 691.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 145 to 150.
49. A Germ cell is either a Sperm or egg cell or their precursors. Germ cells are
haploid and have only one set of chromosomes (23 in all), while all other cells have two
copies (46 in all). Genome Glossary, at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/glossary/
glossary-g.html.
50. Prepared Statement of Francis S. Collins, in PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
DISCRIMINATION AND GENETICS 17 (Comm. Print 1997), supra note 17.
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 29:3
inherited, occur due to mistakes in DNA copying or cell division or
environmental damage." "A significant number of genetic disorders,
approximately 1,050 as of 1995, have been correlated with specific
chromosomes and even particular genes."52
Each human cell, with the exception of red blood cells, contains
genetic data in its DNA. 3  Genes are stretches of DNA that produce
something and often contain instructions to make a biological molecule,
usually a protein.4  There are roughly six feet of DNA tightly coiled in
every one of the trillions of cells in the human body, with the exception
of red blood cells.5 However, a gene is not some "master molecule"
sending out orders to be completed by the rest of the body.6
There are currently two types of therapies available for such
genetic disorders, somatic and germ line, both of which can be
developed in response to genes that contribute to disorders.5 Somatic
cell therapy allows for the alteration of cells that make up a person's
tissues and organs, known as somatic cells, and results in changes to
only that individual.' Germ-line manipulation (GLM) replaces missing
or defective genes with perfect normal copies of the same genes by
inserting them into the sex cells of the patient or the undeveloped cells
of an early embryo that is fertilized in vitro.59 Inserting the missing or
defective genes in this manner either cures the defect entirely or
alleviates the effects of a genetic disease.'5 While somatic cell therapy
51. Maya Pines, Why So Many Error in Our DNA? 30 New Mutations per Lifetime,
available at httpJ/www.hhmi.orgGeneticTrailerrors/wyso.htm.
52. Iles, supra note 2, at 30.
53. Honourable Justice Michael Kirby, The Human Genome Project - Promise and
Problems, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 1, 8. Egg and sperm cells, as germ or sex
cells, are different from other types of cells because they carry one copy of each gene of
twenty-three single chromosomes.
54. Pines, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Morse, supra note 16, at 230.
DNA, in order to send a message for the production of a certain
protein replicates itself onto RNA. RNA then transports this message
of the DNA to another part of the cell, the ribosomes, where the
production of the protein occurs. This message system, however, does
not go only one way. It has been discovered that enzymes, called
reverse transriptase, can copy the message of the RNA and send it
back to the DNA. Furthermore, this entire process can be quickened
or stopped by other proteins. Id.
57. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 487.
58. Jason T. Corsover, The Logical Next Step? An International Perspective on the
Issues of Human Cloning and Genetic Technology, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 697, 710
(1998); see also Munayyer, supra note 1, at 692-93.
59. See Munayyer, supra note 1, at 692-93.
60. See Corsover, supra note 58, at 710. The ideas of what constitute health and
disease are generally determined by society and should not be manipulated for future
generations on this basis alone. For a further discussion of the ethical issues involved in
this debate, see infra notes 81 to 90 and accompanying text.
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has this effect for the individual whose genes are altered, GLM prevents
passing the same genetic disease on to future offspring.6' Germ-line
manipulation raises issues of informed consent because the embryo and
future progeny, for obvious reasons, are not available to consent to this
procedure6 2 Furthermore, the issue of eugenics6 comes to the forefront.
If the procedure of simply changing a known gene can be performed,
then it likewise becomes possible to do the same procedure for a gene
that merely needs to be improved, such as altering the gene in a child to
cause him to be born with blue eyes inside of brown or vice versa.
2. Potential Social Ramifications for Application of Information
Provided by the HGP
The availability of this genetic information has potential to affect
the lives of individuals in a variety of meaningful ways and for this
reason should not be overlooked. For example, a successful HGP
purportedly could supply predictive and socially usable information in
the following four areas:
1. Individual propensities to contract diseases, with varying
degrees of medical. therapy available to moderate or
overcome any such disease,
2. An individual's status as a carrier of harmful or defective
genes, even though not personally affected,
3. An individual's propensity to engage in anti-social behavior,
based on theories of inherited characteristics having effects
independent of nurture or environment,
4. An individual's likelihood of having various exceptional
abilities based on theories of superior inherited mental or
artistic talents.'
Once this information is made available, there are both legal and
ethical implications as to how it may be used. The overarching legal
61. Id.
62. See Munayyer, supra note 1, at 698. The issue of informed consent and "genetic"
discrimination for the embryo - or unborn fetus - leads into a human rights argument
under traditional human rights instruments of the International Bill of Rights; (UDHR)
(ICCPR) & (ICESCR). See generally id. at 698-700.
63. "A science that deals with the improvement (as by control of human mating) of
herediatary qualities of a race or breed." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(Merriam Webster, Inc., Electronic Dictionary Version 1.5, 1994-96).
64. Alan Westin, Privacy and Genetic Information: A Sociopolitical Analysis, in THE
GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 53, 66 (Mark S. Frankel and Albert Teich
eds., 1994).
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concern is the individual's right to privacy concerning genetic
information. In the event that the knowledge is not kept private, the
specter of possible "genetic" discrimination arises. The ethical concerns
are more numerous because they deal with questions of screening and
counseling, eugenics, reductionism and determinism. There are also
privacy issues associated with possible policies such as mandatory
genetic testing in the interest of public health.
The availability of this information raises significant concerns
regarding who will have access to the information and how they will use
it. Five major stakeholders have been identified with regard to this
process: individuals, employers and insurers, researchers and
scientists, business corporations, and governments.6 All of these
parties will place an economic value on this information and the main
question is whether they will have equal rights to access the
information given the wide-ranging impact it may have.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
A. The Legal Issues
Once the mapping, sequencing and identification process of the
HGP is completed, inquiry on the legal implications of how the
information is to be used will develop. As one scholar has noted, "the
revolution in molecular biology that is producing a human DNA map
and sequence of genetic material is fundamentally a scientific
information revolution in the arena of personal identity."" Information
is rapidly becoming available through the mapping and sequencing of
the genome and this increases awareness of certain genes and the
resulting characteristics that individuals may manifest as a result. For
example, there is now an increasing ability to test for genes that
indicate the presence of seriously debilitating ailments such as
Alzheimer's and Huntington's disease. 7 Now that the ability to access
this type of information is becoming more available, the implications to
individual privacy are severe. In addition, the ability to examine DNA
for genetic alterations that may indicate the presence of diseases and on
the basis of this knowledge people may make different decisions than
they would have otherwise. In this manner the new information
65. See Iles, supra note 2, at 32.
66. Philip R. Reily, Introduction: Reading the Human Genome: Gothic Tale or Happy
Ending? 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 181, 182 (1998).
67. For instance, it is now known that Alzheimer's disease type 3 is located on
chromosome 14, while Alzheimer's disease type 4 is sited on chromosome 1 and
Huntington's disease is on chromosome 4. Available at
http://www.ncbunlm.nih.gov/c/s.dll
SCIENCE96/genelist.
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provided by the HGP may allow for a new twist on an old injustice by
creating "genetic discrimination."6 People, as groups or as individuals,
may be treated unfairly based on the different content of their DNA.69
The application of human rights principles to these legal issues will
help to shield genetic information from inquisitive third parties.
"Information privacy" is an individual's right to determine what
information about him or her should be shared with others.
Objectively, a society should respect individual privacy rights because a
violation of privacy rights may cause harm to the person." So long as
the culture as a whole esteems the principle of individual privacy, then
members of society are wronged by any invasion of their privacy, even if
no actual harm results from the intrusion.72 The United States has
historically looked at privacy in four ways: private information, private
relationships, private decisions, and private places. 3 The personal
knowledge that will become available upon a successful completion of
the HGP will cross all four of these areas. Genetic information is
inherently private since it is distinctly individual and disclosure may
harm a person. These highly sensitive facts are often revealed in trust
to physicians or health care providers or to intimate friends and family
members. The results of genetic testing are often revealed in private
places, such as a doctor's office, and will lead to personal decisions on
the part of the individual.
A successful genome project may produce usable information with
regard to an individual's ability to contract disease as well as his or her
status as a carrier of harmful or defective genes." Regulations need to
be established to protect individual privacy rights regarding the most
personal information and to keep the decisions about this information
68. See Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics, supra note 17, at 11.
69. Id.
70. See Westin, supra note 64, at 54. JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
3 (1994).
71. See Ruth Macklain, Privacy and Control of Genetic Information, in GENE
MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 157, 159 (George J. Annas and Sheman
Elias, eds., 1992).
72. See Macklain, supra note 71, at 159.
73. See Westin, supra note 64, at 54. However, not every culture considers privacy
with such deference.
When Victor Sidel, a physician well known for his national and
international work in public health visited the People's Republic of
China some years ago, he encountered common public-health practices
that required people to reveal highly personal information, which was
then posted in a public place. Sidel asked, "Don't people consider this
an invasion of their privacy?" and his Chinese interpreter could not
translate the question. The Chinese language apparently lacked a
concept of privacy in the sense that makes it an ethical value in
Western society. Macklain, supra note 71, at 157.
74. Westin, supra note 64, at 66. See also Macklain, supra note 71, at 159-60.
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in the hands of the individual rather than other interested third
parties. An absence of appropriate protection would allow outcomes
that challenge existing ideas of privacy in five areas. 5 First, in the
management of intra-personal boundaries, an individual makes
decisions concerning what to know or not know about him or herself."6
Will individuals retain their right to expand or limit the knowledge of
their own selves? Second, in the setting of intimate relationships, the
genetic testing of one family member may reveal a condition that will
have potentially limiting effects on the life opportunities of other family
members.7 Does the family member have a right to reveal that
information? Third, in confidential communications individuals reveal
aspects of their private genetic information and other personal facts to
providers of medical and health services. 8 Who is to be bound by the
confidence and trust of their patients to keep such data confidential?
Fourth, regarding qualifications for social benefits, the availability of
genetic information may restructure qualification systems, and key
benefits or opportunities in society may become conditioned upon
obtaining or providing new genetic information about individuals. 9
Who will have access to information and on what basis will individuals
be required to grant releases of this information? Fifth, in the realm of
social contrbl and public policy, with the advent of genetic technology,
the standards for government programs and operations will change
since such information may aid with disease control and criminal
justice programs.' Should the government be allowed to keep DNA
data banks on convicts, as proposed by the FBI in the United States and
the federal government of Canada, or is this a violation of inherent
privacy rights?
In conjunction with the possible breaches of individual privacy
rights, there exists the more insidious dilemma of "genetic
75. Westin, supra note 64, at 66.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Westin, supra note 64, at 66.
80. Id. at 68. The FBI has proposed to create a national database for the purpose of
law enforcement which includes the following types of indices: a statistical DNA
population database, devoid of any personal identifiers; open-case DNA profiles obtained
from body fluid stains found on evidentiary materials recovered from violent crime cases
having no suspects; convicted violent offender DNA profiles; and missing
persons/unidentified bodies DNA profiles. Macklain, supra note 71, at 166. The federal
government of Canada has also proposed that a genetic data bank of serious offenders,
particularly dangerous sexual offenders, be established, in order that repeat offenders
more promptly be identified by genetic testing of tissue samples such as blood and semen
found at the sites of serious crimes and recoverable from the bodies of victims. Bernard
Dickens, Choices, Control, Access - The Canadian Position, in HUMAN DNA: LAW AND
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, at 73 (Bartha Maria Knoppers,
ed., 1997).
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discrimination." The possibility for this discrimination is given force by
the reverence with which society regards health. "Much of what we
expect, aspire to, need or choose is seen as dependent on our state of
health, however defined."" The HGP will yield tremendous benefits in
the advancements of health by allowing for disease detection through
screening, which may then be treated with currently available medicine
or possible gene therapies.82 The British Medical Association (BMA) has
offered estimates that "Genetic and pre-genetic diseases affect one in
every twenty people by the age of 25 and perhaps as many as two in
three people in their lifetime."83 While the BMA asserts that these
statistics are morally neutral, the numbers and their applications may
be manipulated and, therefore, the holding of such knowledge becomes
an ethical as well as a legal concern.'
Genetic facts may be complicated and confusing to the average
person, thereby making him or her highly amenable to
misinterpretation and abuse." Linking a high rate of disease to a race
or a class may further entrench social disparities and create a
"biological underclass."86 Although it is widely believed by the scientific
community that the expression of genetic traits involve many factors,87
the danger exists that greater attention will be paid to the genetic
explanation than to the more complex environmental factors. 8  Such an
approach will further serve to the impairment of the vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups.89 Regulation of the application of HGP outputs
is essential because, "(h)istory teaches that one must be wary of a
nation's institutions and social strategies when it comes to situations
when genetic information is linked with racial, ethnic and class
differences."'
Governments play a key role in the legislative and regulatory
framework of the HGP by restricting the uses of genetic information,
the marketing of genetic tests, and the dissemination of genetic
information by private entities.91 However, one of the largest problems
surrounding the privacy implications of the HGP is the different
81. SHEILA MCLEAN, OLD LAW, NEW MEDICINE, MEDICAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, 9 (1999).
82. See supra section B 1, "Therapies for Gene Disorders", and accompanying notes
50 to 62.
83. MCLEAN, supra note 81, at 166.
84. See id. at 167.
85. See Patricia King, The Past as Prologue: Race, Class and Gene Discrimination, in
GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 95, 99 (George J. Annas and Sheman
Elias, eds., 1992).
86. See id. at 99-100.
87. MCLEAN, supra note 81, at 178.
88. See id., at 102.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 95.
91. See lies, supra note 2, at 34.
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viewpoints adopted by individual countries on how to handle the
interplay between privacy rights and newly discovered genetic
information. In the United States, the assumption exists that people
possess the freedom to act absent any specific and justifiable
prohibition against such action.' Therefore, in order to protect the
genetic information that will be available after the mapping of the
human genome, protection must be statutory. 93 The Human Genome
Privacy Act was introduced to the United States Congress with a broad
safeguard of the privacy of genetic information against misuse by
agencies maintaining records for the purpose of research, diagnosis,
treatment, or identification of genetic disorders.9 The Act was referred
to the House Judiciary Committee, but never enacted.9 Unfortunately,
federal legislation on this issue is necessary for the protection of genetic
privacy. Although 19 states have enacted legislation protecting genetic
privacy through restricting the use of genetic information in insurance,
and another 31 states prohibit genetic discrimination in insurance
policies, this will not safeguard genetic privacy rights for two reasons.6
First, health plans are often exempt from state legislation under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).97 Second, the
laws are narrowly focused on genetic tests rather than on genetic
information generated by family history, physical examination, or
medical records. 98
Similarly, Canadian law does not have any legislation that is
specifically designed to protect genetic material or information." The
Canadian concepts of privacy include an individual's right to limit other
people's access to personal health information. 1  However, privacy is
considered voluntarily surrendered if the patient reveals information to
health care professionals, discusses conditions with family members or
others, and when health care professionals are under legal duties to
92. See Corsover, supra note 58, at 744-45.
93. George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
9, 9 (1999).
94.See Costa, supra note 20, at 121-22. The overarching premise of the Genetic
Privacy Act is that:
[No stranger should have or control identifiable DNA samples or genetic
information about an individual unless that individual specifically
authorizes the collection of DNA samples for the purpose of genetic
analysis, authorizes the creation of that private information, and has
access to and control over the dissemination of that information.
R. Weir, Differing Perspectives on Consent, Choice and Control, in HUMAN DNA.
LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, at 94 (Bartha Maria
Knoppers, ed., 1997).
95. See Costa, supra note 20, at 122.
96. See Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics, supra note 17, at 11.
97. See id. at 14.
98. See id.
99. Dickens, supra note 80, at 71.
100. See id. at 75.
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make patient's health information known."' This concept of privacy
does not seem to assure much protection for Canadian citizens. In 1983
the federal government of Canada enacted the Privacy Act, which has
given effect to "international standards that regulate the collection, use
and disclosure of personal information by governments and
governmental agencies." In addition, under §28 of the Act, the head of
a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal
information relating to the physical or mental health of an individual
when such a declaration would be contrary to the best interests of the
individual. 0 3 Finally, the Privacy Commission of Canada published a
report in 1992 recommending that there be no mandatory genetic
testing at the behest of the state and no denial of services or benefits to
people who refuse to submit to genetic testing for the purpose of
acquiring benefits or services."'
Human rights regulation is the proper approach because, as a
control technique, human rights ensures that all the interests of those
involved will be factored into the decisions of the development of the
law. Furthermore, the introduction of human rights methodology will
ensure that the uses of the genetic information will not be left solely to
the governments and private corporations that are funding most of the
research and development of the HGP. Since the HGP is primarily a
quest of science, those entities currently wielding power have an
additional basis of legitimacy.'0 Consideration of human rights laws
will augment peripheral voices and make other control techniques more
responsive through time, and will also be able to counter social
problems before they materialize. 10 Human rights laws protect the
interests of the individuals whose privacy is at stake and ensure that
their concerns will be heard and dealt with rather than simply ignored
in favor of those concerns of larger and more prominent figures.
This debate makes evident the fact that the current legal structure
in which the genetic developments are occurring is too slow to absorb
the scope and speed at which this technology is advancing.'0 7 Therefore,
101. See id.
102. See id. at 76. The eight principal elements of the Act require that: only personal
information can be collected that directly relates to the institution, the institution must
collect the information directly from the individual, the institution must inform the
individual, the institution cannot use information except for authorized purpose, the
institution cannot disclose information except in accordance with the Act, the information
must be accurate, the individual must have access to the information and the individual
must be able to obtain the information upon request and be able to make necessary
changes. See id.
103. See id. at 77.
104. Dickens, supra note 80, at 78.
105. See MCLEAN, supra note 81, at 15.
106. See Iles, supra note 2, at 34-35.
107. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 500.
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institutions of bioethics have been established to deal with the growth,
and have developed both a statutory and practical independence from
the existing administrative structures.'" These bioethical institutions
are confronted with issues of informed consent and the rejection of
eugenics." They also hold true to the ideals of respect for the
individual and the dignity of human beings."0  These bioethical
institutions should not be expected to function in this manner
indefinitely. A uniform set of international guidelines is necessary to
provide for explicit content and process regarding the protection of the
specific human rights that are likely to be affected by the outputs of the
HGP.
B. The Ethical Issues
Early on in the HGP, the ethical considerations became impossible
to ignore and five percent of NIH's annual budget is devoted to the
study of these inherent ethical issues."' Concerns such as the lack of
respect towards individual autonomy and uniqueness as well as the
decrease in bio-diversity once people are able to choose to enhance the
traits they desire in their offspring are only the beginning. An
international study in 19 nations has shown that human geneticists
and their patients in many nations frequently face a set of eight ethical
problems."' These areas include: fairness of access to genetic services,
abortion choices, confidentiality problems when other family members'
interests are involved, protection of privacy from institutional third
parties, disclosure dilemmas in counseling, indications for prenatal
diagnosis, voluntary or mandatory screening policies, and counseling of
incapacitated patients." While all of these are substantial interests,
the shadow looms largest over uncertainties for the futures of
individuality and human dignity.
1 4
Currently, issues of common identity are not a societal concern
because identical twins are such a rarity."' The advantages of modern
108. Id. at 501.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See Reily, supra note 66, at 182.
112. See John Fletcher, Ethics and Human Genetics Once the Human Genome Has
Been Mapped, in HuMAN GENOME PROJECT: ETHICS 265, 268 (1990).
113. See generally id. Many of these issues cross over into the legal question of privacy
rights and genetic discrimination. With respect to access to genetic services, Patricia
King suggests that it is imperative to make sure institutions that will be responsible for
providing medical services are established and operated to fairly distribute benefits so
that vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are not displaced. See King, supra note 85, at
102. She also discusses the fact that poor women receiving Medicaid are already suffering
disadvantages with regard to abortion choices and prenatal diagnosis. See id. at 103.
114. See Corsover, supra note 58, at 748.
115. Id. at 749.
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genetics will change the proportionality of individuals with the same
genetics because there will be the possibility of an infinite number of
identical embryos that can be manufactured at will.116 Legislation must
be enacted to stop this from occurring."7 When Aldous Huxley wrote
BRAVE NEW WORLD, he expressed the horror of selective genetic
engineering while describing the process of manufacturing lives to
become members of a society in which individuals were classified by
their inherent genetic characteristics."8  Huxley's social structure
reinforced genetically engineered traits to the disadvantage of bio-
diversity and individuality. Modern genetic technology will be able to
go even further because once an "ideal" individual is born or created,
the genetic information may be replicated an infinite number of times.
Utilization of splitting techniques to create multiple clones of a
particular embryo will lower feelings of self-worth because an
individual may know he or she was artificially manufactured and not
only that an identical copy exists, but that there are multiple copies."'
This concept raises issues of whether or not there is an inherent right to
individuality and if such a right would deserve specific governmental or
international protection against the copying of genetic compositions. 2
In addition, if such a right is found to exist, will it belong to the parent
or to the child whose genetic make-up is being exploited?"'. Since
cloning human beings is an issue that is no longer science fiction but
real science,"' whether the parents will have this fundamental right is
most definitely an ethical one worth considering.
Germ line manipulation and cloning are both processes that are
viewed negatively because of their wide-ranging implications for society
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ALDOuS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD, 5-6 (1932).
[O]ne by one the eggs were transferred from their test-tubes to the
larger containers; deftly the peritoneal lining was slit, the morula was
dropped into place, the saline solution poured in ... and already the
bottle had passed, and it was the turn of the labellers. Heredity, date
of fertilization, membership of the Bokanovsky Group - details were
transferred from test-tube to bottle. No longer anonymous, but
names, identified, the procession marched slowly on; on through an
opening in the wall, slowly on into the Social Predestination Room.
Id.
119. See Corsover, supra note 58, at 749.
120. See id.
121. See id. In turn, what about the child who will be born as a copy? Although the
genetic material will be identical to another person's the expression of genetic traits and
life experiences will belong entirely to the new embryo.
122. Corsover, supra note 58, at 703. Dr. Ian Wilmut at the Roslin Institute in
Scotland led a research team to the first successful cloning of an adult mammal in 1997.
This process resulted in the birth of Dolly, a sheep that "contained genetic material of
only one parent and is basically a delayed twin of the adult sheep that donated the
material." Id.
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as a whole. As human beings, it would seem as if we are "playing God"
to change what is the common heritage of mankind. While cloning
merely copies genetic information to create a new life, germ-line
manipulations have an even more sinister effect because they alter the
genetic line of a family without the informed consent of the progeny
whose genetics are also being altered.'2 3 While the trait being altered in
a germ-line manipulation may initially be considered to be in the best
interests of all parties concerned, there is simply no way to know how
such a manipulation will affect other genes given each individual's
environment. The use of genetic testing to discover abnormalities and
germ-line manipulation to make genetic conditions avoidable may
encourage narrow, socially determined standards of "health" and
"normality."1 4  Such narrow standards can also generate social
animosity towards parents who allow their children to be born
"defective" despite knowledge of a potential genetic condition." This
may lead to discrimination on many levels, beginning with the
economics of being able to afford the initial genetic testing and gene
therapies and progressing to "genetic discrimination" for being
considered unhealthy or not normal.
126
There are three different sets of issues to be considered when
discussing the ethical implications of the Human Genome Project: those
that pertain to the individual, to society, and to the species. '27 On the
individual level, the main concerns are issues of genetic screening and
counseling. 8 At the societal level, the focus shifts to population-based
genetic screening, resource allocation and commercialization, and
eugenics.29 The species level issues are related to determinism,
reductionism, normalcy and the meaning of health and disease. 0
At the individual level, the modern advances in gene screening
technology inherently raise other issues concerning genetic
discrimination and public health concerns. Genetic screening will allow
parents to evaluate their future children in their embryonic state for
genetic defects and disease.' The results of such a screening may
indicate a predisposition for a condition that will onset later in life, but
does not indicate when the onset will occur. 32 If the gene is for a late
onset condition and the embryo is prematurely aborted, the embryo has
123. See Munayyer, supra note 1, at 698.
124. See id. at 698-99.
125. Id. at 699.
126. There may be situations when public policy requires a minimum level of genetic
health.
127. Annas. Monster Mythology, supra note 29, at 639.
128. Annas, Monster Mythology, supra note 29, at 639.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 640.
131. Corsover, supra note 58, at 710.
132. MCLEAN, supra note 81, at 173.
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been denied the potential for life based solely on the indicated
"defect.""n Genetic screening is also a public health interest because the
ability to seek out asymptomatic people in this manner, many of whom
would not otherwise be aware of their condition, means that genetic
screening bridges the individual and societal levels."' The idea of
counseling follows from the effects that the screening will have on the
individual once the results of the tests become known.135  The
Stamatoyannopoulous study in Greece suggested that knowledge of
carrier status had a stigmatizing effect when provided to families in
that culture and this was enough to keep families from sharing the
information with other families in order to avoid disrupting the mate
selection process. 136  This reinforces an individual's right to privacy
regarding genetic information as well as an individual's right "not to
know."'37 People are currently being protected by bioethics legislation
that establishes the right "not to know" if they chose to not be "haunted
by the prospect of a predisposition to grave or even fatal biological
conditions.""
At the societal level, eugenics becomes an issue and can be a
positive or negative process that may be used to improve the human
species as a whole.' 39  "Negative eugenics" eliminates the weaker
genetics of a society through processes such as sterilization. This
renders a Buck v. Bell type of reasoning upon an entire society.40
"Positive eugenics" promotes the fit and healthy through possibly
offering financial incentive programs. 4 ' Eugenics may eventually lead
parents to desire to design "ideal" children, which would lead to a
133. Id. She also mentions the judgments made about pre-implanted embryos and
how this enhances discrimination.
If we are unconcerned about the embryo before implantation, then we may
chose to screen for, then screen out, a whole range of conditions which
might - were the embryo already implanted - be regarded as
inappropriate to look for or insufficiently serious to merit a pregnancy
termination, thus reinforcing discrimination against others who suffer
from the same condition.
Id. at 172.
134. Annas, Monster Mythology, supra note 29, at 640.
135. Morse, supra note 16, at 241.
136. James Sorenson, What We Still Don't Know About Genetic Screening and
Counseling, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 210 (George J. Annas
and Sheman Elias, eds., 1992).
137. Madison Powers, Privacy and the Control of Genetic Information, in THE GENETIC
FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 53, 66 (Mark S. Frankel and Albert Teich eds., 1994).
138. Lenoir, supra note 4, at 564.
139. Corsover, supra note 58, at 711.
140. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes justified the sterilization
of institutionalized mental defectives with the remark that "three generations of imbeciles
are enough."
141. Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How Fair is the Comparison?, in
GENE MAPPING 57, 60.
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socially created homogeneity, which would in turn be based on current
societal definitions of normalcy."" What constitutes an "undesirable"
trait has traditionally been determined by cultures and society.
Eugenics then places the determination of genetic make up in the
hands of the social system rather than the natural system. In addition,
eugenics supports the notion that biology determines individual talent
and disability.1 4 3  Eugenics "presents a dramatic case of how genetic
knowledge (and genetic ignorance!) can be coupled with repressive state
policy to deprive individuals of rights and liberties."" Striving for such
homogeneity obviously defeats the goals of bio-diversity, but more
importantly, may also violate human rights if extended too far. The
idea that genetics is somehow more pure than other forms of
information leads to greater justification for discrimination. The
contravention of fundamental freedoms may be hidden from view in the
guise of public health policies or the like. This impels a need for
universal protection of genetic information so that it may not be used
against people in such a manner.
Finally at the species level, the HGP by definition brings with it the
notions of reductionism and determinism because it breaks human
beings down into their most basic elements. James Watson has
characterized the Project as the search for "ultimate answers to the
chemical underpinnings of human existence," and he has also stated
"our fate is in our genes.""" However, the idea that human beings may
be broken down into parts like machines is not entirely accepted within
the medical field. "The reduction of all of biology, all of behavior
characteristics and 'fundamental living things' to molecular
mechanisms of life betrays a metaphysical ambition to demonstrate
that organisms really are machines, and that all of life may be
accounted for in this way."4 ' "Genes have become the near universal
scapegoat for all that ails the human species." 7 Human beings are
complex organisms internally and they also must interact with their
external environments. Therefore genetic conditions must be viewed as
the result of an unpredictable interplay of many factors and processes."'
Genetic predisposition studies can do little to explain epidemiological
patterns for increases in lung and breast cancer. "9 Such failure
challenges the view of biological determinism that to a large extent
142. Morse, supra note 16, at 243.
143. Proctor, supra note 141, at 60.
144. Id. at 61.
145. Evelyne Shuster, Determinism and Reductionism: A Greater Threat Because of the
Human Genome Project?, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 115, 115
(George J. Annas and Sherman Elias, eds., 1992). See also Morse, supra note 16, at 230.
146. Shuster, supra note 145, at 115.
147. Proctor, supra note 141, at 76.
148. MCLEAN, supra note 81, at 178.
149. Proctor, supra note 141, 77-78.
VOL. 29:3
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
human talents and disabilities are written in genetics. 50 Although the
final mapping of the genome will operate as a blueprint of the human
race, there is no real way to know how genes will actually manifest
themselves in any single human being.'5 For this reason as well,
individual genetic information must be fully protected. Geneetic
information may not be understood in the abstract, when it appears as
a person's genetic blueprint of predispositions for disease or other
physical characteristics, but must be seen as it manifests itself in the
actual environment.
III. THE DECLARATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
There is no current international legal framework in which to set
the HGP because the scientific developments have moved much more
rapidly than the legal system in which it exists.152 There are a number
of international instruments that deal with international human rights
generally in which the international legal debate for the protection of
an individual's genetic information sits uneasily. These international
instruments are the International Bill of Rights, which contains within
it the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant'on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and'the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).' 5' When
taken together these instruments are still too vague to ensure the
protection of human rights and the promotion of public heath with
specific regard to personal genetic information.
Although the ICCPR and ICESR documents are vague, they do
guarantee individuals the right to "enjoy... fully and freely their
natural wealth and resources."" The human genome is undoubtedly a
natural resource that, while it is shared by the entire race, deserves the
protection of these international instruments. The ICCPR, Article 12,
recognizes the right to "the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health."" Under this standard, people
are entitled to the benefits of the HGP because the outputs of the
project will eventually lead to advancements in human health. Now
that research has located genes that carry harmful diseases, such as
150. Id. at 76.
151. Shuster, supra note 145, at 123.
152. Taylor, supra note 2, at 500.
153. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., 67th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (hereinafter Universal
Declaration); International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter
ICESCR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966) (hereinafter ICCPR).
154. Munayyer, supra note 1, at 703.
155. ICCPR, supra note 153, art. 12
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Huntington's and Alzheimer's, people can be screened and treated much
earlier. ICCPR Article 15 further recognizes the right to "enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications."" When viewed at
the most basic level, the HGP is the result of scientific progress, and the
data it yields produces benefits through application in both health and
medicine. For example, one possible benefit of the HGP is that it may
become possible to produce any human protein and new molecules may
be designed specifically to block biochemical pathways that lead to
disease.'57 The information that will be available as a result of the HGP
is such a benefit of scientific progress that it would be entitled to
protection under this provision.
As of 1994, there was a Draft Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and the Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine."8 This Convention is not limited
to the genetics issue but also addresses a range of biomedical
problems."5 9 The Convention's single largest problem is that it focuses
on individual rights and disregards the impact on social inequalities as
well as the overall social effect of personal decisions regarding genetic
technology." °  The Convention addresses only the most direct and
visible consequences of.technological innovations and does not deal with
the full range of implications stemming from the HGP.'6' An
instrument that is more specifically targeted at the HGP with a broader
impact is necessary.
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states,
"Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this
declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." 62
A distinction made based on genetics, even though it is not
specifically listed in the article, falls within the other category of "other
status" and should be condemned. Individual rights and protection of
genetic information must be protected under a human rights framework
on an international level. Results of the HGP have already identified
more than 60 genes that lead to disease.ln Human beings inherit
genetic mutations and DNA undergo an estimated additional 30
mutations during an individual's life span.'6 The HGP will make
156. Id, art. 15.
157. Merz, supra note 26.
158. 36 I.L.M. 817 (1997); see also Iles, supra note 2, at 42.
159. Iles, supra note 2, at 42.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Universal Declaration, supra note 153, art. 2.
163. Merz, supra note 26.
164. Pines, supra note 51.
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available this most profoundly personal information about an
individual's genetic make-up, including whether or not he or she
possesses an abnormal gene or one that indicates a disease. The
possibility for the abuse of such knowledge is endless. Therefore, the
HGP does not raise new issues in medicine and human rights, but
exacerbates old ones, especially regarding privacy, disclosure of
personal information, and freedom of reproductive choices."
UNESCO was established in 1945 and has the primary
constitutional directive of promoting collaboration among nations in
education, science, and culture. In 1993, UNESCO formed the
International Bioethics Committee (IBC) to respond to ethical concerns
raised by progress in genetic science and to promote international
debate and worldwide dialogue." In determining what type of
instrument would best serve the interests of individuals and science
regarding the Human Genome Project, the IBC determined that there
was:
[A] need to establish general principles and to assert the ineluctable
respect for dignity, freedom and human rights, while remaining
flexible in order not to interfere with scientific progress but respecting
ethics and responsibilities which- come with it. Therefore it is
necessary to conceive of a document which can remain timely and in
accordance with progress and scientific changes in the future.67
The IBC finally decided that a declaration was the most
appropriate form of document because this format would take into
account the evolution of the actual state of practice and would have
immediate applicability, binding legal effect and a procedure to verify
its use and its efficiency.'6 The Declaration was therefore drafted,
focusing on the needs of the individual while being sufficiently specific
with regard to individual dignity, rights and research. It also takes into
account the rapid rate at which biotechnology in this area is developing.
The main idea that fuels the Declaration is that there is inherent
dignity, and equal and inalienable rights bestowed in all members of
the human family." The Declaration also recognizes that research,
which keeps open the "vast prospects for progress in improving the
health of individuals and of humankind as a whole," must be balanced
against the possibility that further understanding of genetics may lead
to "discrimination based on genetic characteristics.7
165. Taylor, supra note 2, at 490.
166. Id. at 507.
167. Hector Gros Espeil, Project of an International Instrument for the Protection of the
Human Genome, at http://www.unesco.org/ibc/uk/genome/juridique/instrument/html.
168. Id.
169. Human Genome Declaration, supra note 3.
170. Id.
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In Articles 1 through 3, the Declaration discusses the dignity of the
individual and holds that the genome is the heritage of humanity and
out of the respect for human dignity, individuals should not be reduced
to their genetic characteristics.17" ' In addition, the Declaration
recognizes that genetic potentialities are expressed differently based on
varying states of health, living conditions, nutrition and education.'72
These holdings are important because they offer broader protections for
the individual than one may currently possess. Under current scientific
theories, individuals are the sum of their genetic parts.'73  The
Declaration denies this genetic reductionalism and reinforces the
dignity of the individual. Article 3 further protects the individual from
discrimination for being merely a carrier of a gene by recognizing that
external conditions will have an effect on genetic expression.
Articles 5 through 9 focus on the rights of the individual. Article 5
specifically deals with the right to grant the use of genetic information
for research, the necessity to deliver prior, free and informed consent,
the right of each individual to decide to be fully informed, the necessary
protocols required for research, and the requirement that when there is
no capacity to consent, the research will only be allowed for the direct
health benefit of the individual.'74 Each one of these aspects of consent
and use of genetic information specifically protects the rights of the
individual because they must be informed of the procedures ahead of
time and then they have the choice to consent or refuse to consent.
Article 6 requires that no discrimination infringe upon human rights or
fundamental freedoms of human dignity. Article 7 requires that genetic
data for identifiable people must be kept confidential. This is a key
aspect of the Declaration because it would protect people from having
their employers and insurers look into their genetic information
without their express consent. Article 8 offers reparations for damages
to individuals.
Article 9 is perhaps the most important of these five articles
because it deals with changes that may be advanced by local
governments. It states that "limitations to the principles of consent and
confidentiality may only be prescribed by law for compelling reasons
within bounds of public international law and international law of
human rights." 7' This wording allows room for states to legislate on
this issue as they see fit, so long as they are not in direct conflict with
public international law or the international law of human rights and
they show compelling reasons. Although it is necessary to allow states
to retain some control over this issue, the boundaries here are very easy
171. Id., arts. 1 & 2a, b.
172. Id., art. 3.
173. Morse, supra note 16, at 230.
174. Human Genome Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5.
175. Human Genome Declaration, supra note 3, art. 9.
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to push.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION AND THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
International human rights laws assert direct access onto the
international legal system.' Traditional international human rights
laws posit that an individual will need protection of their rights against
the abuses of the government. The current situation resulting from the
HGP outputs will require that groups of people, the "genetic
underclass," who are discriminated against, be protected both from
their governments as well as from private agencies. ' Since
international human rights law is only made effective by each nation
enacting rules and adopting the instrument as part of its own
democratic legal system, the Declaration will need an implementation
device stronger than the one currently in place.
International human rights law is a relatively recent development,
having truly come to the fore since World War II to replace the idea of
natural rights. 78 Traditionally, human rights were within the realm of
the domestic countries to determine when wrongs occurred and to
decide how to handle them, with some minor exceptions.'
International human rights law can be made effective only if each
nation chooses to adopt the rules as part of its own domestic legal
system. 8" The content of international law comes from five sources, one
of which is an international declaration. 8' Since the Declaration is an
international declaration, it qualifies as a source of international law.
Furthermore, based on the basic operating principles of international
law, implementation is essential to the survival of the principles that it
purports. If the Declaration is not implemented and enforced at local
levels, the human rights it attempts to protect will go unguarded and
the tool will become virtually useless.
Sometimes the domestic implementation of human rights norms
may be achieved by pressuring and embarrassing governments.
8 2
There are four ways to domestically implement human rights law:
constitutionalism, treaty application, domestic judicial enforcement,
176. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (3rd edition,
Aspen) (1999).
177. Costa, supra note 20, at 110.
178. Weston, Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 862, 862 (Barry Carter and
Phillip Trimble, eds., 1999).
179. Hurst Hannum, Guide to International Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
844, 845 (Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble, eds., 1999).
180. Id. at 844.
181. Id. at 847.
182. Hannum, supra note 179, at 880.
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and diplomacy. 18 3  The theory of constitutionalism suggests that a
nation's constitution traditionally guarantees to some extent the rights
covered by the international instruments.'8 Treaty application looks to
the terms of a treaty to see whether or not each one is self-executing or
not. '85 An example of domestic judicial enforcement is the Filartiga
case. 186 Filartiga strengthens the movement for human rights in the
countries where the abuses take place and in the United States by
strengthening and expanding international human rights law.'87 Since
the Declaration has been adopted in the form of an international
declaration, the main question is now one of how the individual states
will choose to implement it domestically. UNESCO and other non-
governmental organizations have tremendous influence, however,
through both empowering and exclusionary effects.'88 Although the
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) raise consciousness about the
issue, the fear is that they will not be as effective for prevention and
treatment. 189
The enforcement of international obligations is a concern for any
issue in the arena of human rights.'" Implementation of human rights
may present a jurisdictional problem if the states involved in a dispute
have not properly consented to the authority of the court asserting the
power to decide the case. 19 The international courts are open only to
nations and not to individuals, and with the HGP it will be the genetic
information of the individual that will need the protection.' Finally,
there is no international police force to effectively enforce the decisions
of an international court, but the parties must rely on voluntary
compliance. 9 3 If a decision is implemented, there are three possible
levels of implementation. First, the decision may be implemented only
within the national system of the state concerned. Second, a
determination may be implemented by other states in the course of
183. Id.
184. Id. at 881.
185. Id. at 882.
186. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, (2nd Cir. 1980). The United States court
recognized a cause of action for "wrongful death" even though the victim and the
defendant were both citizens of Paraguay based on the U.N. Charter, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture; the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents
and practiced constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law
of nations.
187. INTERNATIONAL LAW at 885-87 (Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble, eds., 1999).
188. Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Social Construction of Legal
Rules, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 853, 861 (Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble, eds., 1999).
189. Id.
190. Hannum, supra note 179, at 849.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 850.
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international relations. Finally, international bodies may implement
the judgment.
HGP is a human rights topic because the information that will be
available once the genome is finally mapped and sequenced will relate
to all human beings, since the genome is the collective heritage of the
human race. The new information will also allow for special
considerations in reproductive choices that must be made in light of the
new technology and therefore raises concerns of human rights." Most
significant are the following questions: what information should be
released, how is it to be collected, by whom should it be collected, on
whose authority should it be collected, to what purpose may it be
collected, and how and to whom is the information to be disclosed?'95
Issues including autonomy, privacy and informed consent are raised by
these sorts of questions and will be borne out through the improper use
of genetic information.'9 6 Third parties such as insurers, employers,
private corporations, governments and individuals may desire to gain
access to this information and may use it in a discriminatory fashion.'97
This would then be the first step to creating a "genetic underclass"
through group classification based on common ties of heredity and
disease. This process of classifying could redefine groups that are
already marginalized by society because of other characteristics.!
These groups must be protected from discrimination in the same way
that an individual receives protection under the traditional human
rights paradigm. They risk the same types of discrimination based on
their genetic heritage and the new technology that is developing. All
individuals will be at risk of discrimination if the Declaration is not
properly implemented. The Declaration is the only international
document of its kind that protects individual privacy with respect to
genetic information.
The basis for human rights laws is the concept that every nation
has an obligation to respect the human rights of its citizens and other
nations. The international community bears both a right and
responsibility to protest this when countries that profess to uphold the
values of human rights are not upholding this obligation.'" It is an
inherent right of people that they should not be discriminated against
on the basis of their genetic compositions. Therefore, human rights
laws should necessarily protect the issues raised by the HGP.
International human rights law can be made effective in practice
only if each nation makes these rules part of its own domestic legal
194. Taylor, supra note 2, at 490.
195. Id. at 491.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 493-94.
199. Hannum, supra note 179, at 845.
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system, which is why there needs to be state by state implementation of
the Declaration. UNESCO needs to set up an effective mechanism for
the implementation of the Declaration. The IBC recognizes their role in
promoting the broadest possible dissemination of information about
fields covered by the Declaration.2 However, in order to effectively
take action and move from a rhetorical promotion to authentic
advancement of international norms, UNESCO must develop a
supervisory system by which they can monitor the advancement of the
goals detailed in the Declaration."1
CONCLUSION
So the Genome Project I think deserves its current status as
perhaps the most important organized scientific effort
humankind has ever mounted. When you think about it, this is
an adventure into ourselves. This is learning about our biology,
reading our own blueprint, and its potential to transform
medicine for the better is enormous.
- Francis S. Collins, Dir. National Human Genome ResearchInstitute 202
The HGP is making significant advances in the biological world to
the benefit of the entire human race. How we choose to use the
information is crucial and we cannot leave this area entirely
unregulated. Genetic information will hold the blueprint to individuals.
Whether or not each individual will manifest each genetic
predisposition is impossible to know, but to allow dissemination of this
information into the wrong hands would be catastrophic. There must
be safeguards on the privacy rights of individuals to protect them from
wrongful discrimination and this should start at the international level
with effective implementation of the Declaration.
The HGP has developed into a worldwide effort to map, sequence
and identify the entire human genome. As of February 13, 2001, the
entire genetic sequence was made public and placed online. Although
the human genome contains more than 3 billion letters, the genome
itself is composed of only roughly 30,000 genes and not the originally
estimated 100,000. Despite the lower number of genes present in the
genome, the legal and ethical implications do not diminish. The legal
200. Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UNESCO, Doc. 154 EXI41 (1998).
201. Taylor, supra note 2, at 524.
202. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105TH CONG., in
PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN GENETICS (Comm. Print. 1997), supra
note 17.
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concerns of privacy and "genetic discrimination" make the results of the
HGP issues for human rights. The ethical concerns with respect to
individuality and human dignity are also within the traditional arena of
human rights. However, the International Bill of Human Rights does
not offer adequate protection for these new and difficult situations.
The Declaration is the only international instrument with the force
of law that would protect people worldwide from some of the legal and
ethical violations that are possible. The Declaration, however, has not
yet been implemented and the effects of the protection offered cannot be
realized. An international agreement of this sort is appropriate because
it will serve to protect human rights on a worldwide scale. Once the
Declaration is implemented, it will become difficult to discriminate or
violate human rights on a genetic basis because there will not be any
way to effectively shift from one country where regulations on genetic
privacy exist to another where they don't. The same idea would apply
to the ethical safeguard against reductionalism within the Declaration.
The implementation of the Declaration is of the utmost importance and
needs to be inaugurated as early as possible.
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THE REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER
PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
Present and Futuret
Alexander B. St John
The European Union (E.U.)' has witnessed dramatic progress in
recent years in terms of both monetary integration and the fortification
of its position as a financial and economic powerhouse with the
commencement of the European Monetary Union (E.M.U.), the
introduction of the Euro as the European Union's single currency, and
the formation of a European Central Bank.2 While the E.U.'s success
with monetary integration has been impressive, one area that remains
incomplete is the integration of the E.U.'s various equity markets into a
cohesive and singular capital market that would facilitate simpler
capital-raising efforts by way of securities issuances.3
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1. The E.U. currently consists of fifteen Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See European Union in
the U.S., available at httpJ/www.eurunion.org/statesfhome.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
2. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 9 (1999).
3. See id. See also Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial
Markets: Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6, available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/cornm/
imternalmarket/en/finances/generallactionen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Financial Services Action Plan]; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, 2001 O.J. (C240E) 272, 272 (recognizing the
need to completely overhaul the two existing and out-dated E.U. prospectus directives)
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Those practicing in the European securities industry acknowledge
that the directive-based regulatory framework currently in place does
not produce the requisite efficiency to make pan-E.U. public offerings a
reality. The European Commission attempts to rectify that with its
Proposed Prospectus Directive submitted in June 2001.4 Recognizing
the deficiencies that segmented financial markets create for capital-
raising by companies wishing to offer securities to the public of more
than one Member State and the changing financial landscape in
Europe, the E.U. Commission first proposed ways to ease the raising of
capital on an E.U.-wide basis in its 1999 Financial Services Action
Plan.5 The Committee of Wise Men produced Initial and Final Reports
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets in November 2000
and February 2001, respectively, spelling out the shortcomings of
current European regulation and the benefits of greater capital markets
integration. Additionally, the Forum of European Securities
Commissions (FESCO)7 produced a report in December 2000 for the
European Commission's consideration 8 proposing concrete steps that
would allow European issuers to make E.U.-wide public offerings
"without having to produce duplicative sets of documentation or to
respond to numerous additional national requirements."9  In
consideration of the need for investor protection, the FESCO proposal-
also provided particulars for how best to facilitate the access to
[hereinafter Proposed Prospectus Directive].
4. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at 272.
5. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6.
6. See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Nov. 9, 2000) at 4 & 15, available at
http'J/europa.eu.int/comninternal-
market/enlfinances/banks/report.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Initial
Report]. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketen/finances/
lamfalussyen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
7. FESCO was a body made up of the chairmen of seventeen statutory securities
regulators of the European Economic Area and works to improve the cooperation between
Europe's securities regulators. See FESCO's Organisation, available at
httpJ/www.europefesco.org/vllpOrganisation.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001). FESCO's
work has been taken over by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), a
body that was established by European Commission Decision issued in June 2001,
following recommendations contained in the Final Report of the Lamfalussy-chaired
Committee of Wise Men published in February 2001. See Presentation of CESR, What is
CESR? available at http-//www.europefesco.org/vllPresentation-ofCESR.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2002).
8. See A "European Passport" for Issuers, A Report for the EU Commission,
Fesco/00-138b (Dec. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.bwa.at/download/European-passport-issuers.
doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter European Passport Report].
9. Id. at 3.
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approved documents to all European investors.'" The end result of
these reports and proposals is the European Commission's Proposed
Prospectus Directive, a document that adopts the notion of a European
'passport' for issuers, but has been the subject of serious debate and
criticism, and will be discussed in greater detail later.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: (i) to clearly and concisely
address the relevant legislative directives currently applicable to a
public offering of securities (whether listed or unlisted) in multiple E.U.
Member States, and (ii) to examine how recent proposals, including the
Proposed Prospectus Directive, attempt to reconcile their faults to
better facilitate cross-border securities offerings without sacrificing
investor protection in the process. The paper focuses exclusively on
those issuers incorporated under the laws of an E.U. Member State and
examines the public offering of equity securities, as opposed to bonds, or
other security instruments." PART I examines the structure of the
E.U.'s directive-based regulation of the capital markets. PART II
examines the applicable directives and procedures involved in
facilitating cross-border offerings by distinguishing the requirements
for offering exchange-listed securities from unlisted securities. PART III
examines the perceived shortcomings of the E.U. directives currently in
force in this area that have resulted in a scarcity of cross-border
offerings in practice. PART IV examines the proposed procedures under
FESCO's European Passport Report, and the current legislative status
surrounding the harmonization of E.U. law pertaining to cross-border
offerings, by focusing on the Proposed Prospectus Directive. This part
also examines further hurdles that implementation of a harmonized
system that will need to be overcome based on the realities of the
current system and the outcry from the securities industry. Finally, a
brief conclusion is provided.
PART I:THE E.U. SYSTEM OF REGULATING SECURITIES OFFERINGS
The E.U.'s current system of securities regulation, a product of over
twenty years of directive drafting and implementation, differs
significantly from that of the United States in that it lacks any sort of
legal uniformity in terms of laws that apply to pan-E.U. securities
offerings."2 While one commentator has described the E.U. as "the
world's primary actor in accomplishing multinational regulatory
10. Id. These "particulars" involved the creation of procedures whereby the
prospectus and disclosure documents provided to the primary listing authority would be
valid in other jurisdictions where the offering was to be made subject only to a notification
requirement. Id.
11. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1933) (providing an exhaustive
definition of the term "security").
12. See Giovanni Nardulli and Antonio Segni, EU Cross Border Securities Offerings:
An Overview, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 887, 887 (1996).
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harmony in the field of securities regulation," 3 the E.U. has not been
successful in fully integrating its capital markets. Generally speaking,
the U.S.'s interstate sale of securities calls for the application of
uniform federal laws and regulations - primarily by the Securities Act
of 193314 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" - and involves the
jurisdiction of a single compliance and enforcement supervisor: the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).16  On the other hand,
under the E.U. system, there lacks both a uniform system of laws that
apply generally to pan-E.U. securities offerings and a supervisory
agency, or "super-regulator," to ensure compliance with and
enforcement of laws pertaining to financial markets.' In place of an
over-arching regulatory scheme, E.U. Member States maintain
jurisdiction over securities offerings occurring within their borders,
which means that cross-border securities offerings are forced to
"conform with diverse national rules and regulations" and creates
certain regulatory inconsistencies insofar as providing information is
concerned. 8
The E.U. rules relating to the securities industry and, more
specifically, to the public offering of securities consist of various
directives, a form of binding legislation upon each Member State to
which the directive is addressed as to the result that it is to achieve, but
which leaves to the discretion of national authorities "the choice of form
and methods." 9 Directives are considered the most flexible of the
various forms of legislation that can be adopted by E.U. Member States
since the Member States must implement directives through their own
ad-hoc national legislation, thereby maintaining their own
13. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive,
15 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 181, 181 (1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
16. See A Ragbag of Reform: Europe's Ragbag of Financial Regulation: National
Governments and EU Policymakers are Reshaping Europe's System of Financial
Regulation. But They Cannot Agree on Which Shape will Make Their Markets Work Best,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7317931.
17. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888. See also Initial Report, supra note 6, at
Introduction. See generally Karme], supra note 2 (calling for the creation of a single SEC-
type regulator to watch over the E.U.'s financial markets).
18. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 887. See also Proposed Prospectus Directive,
supra note 3, at Explanatory Memorandum (recognizing that differences in terms of
practices and interpretations based on "distinct traditions within the European Union
regarding the content and layout of prospectuses" and the time required to check
information contained in those prospectuses cause inconsistencies, thereby fragmenting
the E.U.'s financial markets).
19. Article 249 (ex Article 189), CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1997),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec-cons-treaty-en.pdf [hereinafter
EC TREATY].
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jurisdiction. 2' Therefore, the various directives related to the E.U.
securities markets cannot and do not represent a superior system of
legal authority for multi-state transactions.2' Rather, in the words of
two commentators, the aim of the E.U. securities offering directives is:
to form a common background of provisions in order to create uniform
local laws based on the following priorities: (1) to ensure the existence
of minimum standards of quality and information concerning the
securities traded, the issuers and the offerors involved; (2) to ensure
thorough supervision of the securities market at a local and global
level, by fostering cooperation among national regulatory bodies; and
(3) to make national markets accessible to issuers and intermediaries
who have been admitted and are regulated in other Member States
through the elimination of regulatory barriers that are not justified by
material interests and de facto impede the free circulation of services
and products.2
Accordingly, the European Union's use of directives still requires
legal counsel to examine and comply with the varying national laws of
the Member States in which their client-issuers wish to list or offer for
sale securities, and prevents issuers from obtaining a single "passport"
that would allow an issuer to offer its securities in. multiple Member
States, without having to comply with the local regulations of each
Member State in which it offers the securities.n Thus, while an issuer
may technically offer its securities to investors in some or all of the
E.U.'s Member States, not only will that issuer have to check the
specific directives that will apply to it depending on whether the
issuer's securities offered are (i) listed on a stock exchange (in which
case the Listing Particulars Directive' applies), or (ii) unlisted (in
which case the Public Offering Prospectus Directiven applies), but will
20. See TOM KENNEDY, LEARNING EUROPEAN LAW: A PRIMER AND VADE-MECUM 114
(1998) (stating that directives are considered to represent the "collective will of the
Member States to achieve certain objectives" but leaves to those Member States to whom
the directive is addressed the implementation means by which they are to achieve that
result "in accordance with their own legal, constitutional or social circumstances.").
21. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888.
22. Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888 (emphasis added).
23. The concept of a single issuer "passport" has gained popularity since being
introduced by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, recommended by FESCO in
its report to the European Commission "A European Passport for Issuers" and adopted by
the European Commission in its Proposed Prospectus Directive as a means of
"simplify[ing] regulatory compliance for issuers" and ensuring investor protection. See
Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at Explanatory Memorandum.
24. Council Directive 80/390/EEC, 1980 O.J. (L100) 1, amended by Council Directive
87/345/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 15/81), Council Directive No. 90/211/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 112/24),
and Council Directive No. 94/18/EEC, 1994 O.J. (L 135/1) [hereinafter Listing Particulars
Directive].
25. Council Directive 89/298/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L124) 8 [hereinafter Public Offering
Prospectus Directive].
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have to check each Member State's specific laws on public offerings and
disclosure of information.26
PART II:THE DIRECTIVES CURRENTLY APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN PAN-
E.U. PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Some commentators attribute the surge in popularity among
European companies deciding to "go public" by issuing equity securities
stems to two sources: under-capitalization and the privatization of state
entities. Others attribute the popularity of securities issuances to the
introduction of the Euro as the lone currency across the Member States,
which effectively created a single market for cash, as well as to the
technological developments now available for equity research and
electronic trading.' Generally speaking, a public offering is undertaken
in one of two ways:
[F]irst, securities can be listed on one or more stock exchanges in the
same or in different countries. Second, securities can be distributed
without using the market created by the stock exchange, but by
offering the securities directly into the large financial market of
Continental Europe.29
Employing the latter method, as opposed to using a market created by
the stock exchanges, allows direct distribution of securities into
Europe's large financial market without jumping through the dual
regulatory hoops required by the stock exchange rules and applicable
directives when undertaking an exchange listing. Both methods are
discussed below, beginning with the offering of securities on multiple
stock exchanges.
A. Public Offerings of Exchange-Listed Securities
In Europe, the national law of the stock exchange governs
securities trading activities on a stock exchange. 3' As a preliminary
matter, it is the law of the stock exchange that "will decide whether the
financial instrument in question is a security and is therefore qualified
26. See Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63
LAW & CON'TEMP. PROBS. 82 (2000).
27. Gerhard Wegen and Christian Lindemann, The Law Applicable to Public
Offerings in Continental Europe, in THE LAW OF CROSS-BORDER SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS 153 (Hans Van Houte ed., 1999). See also Initial Report, supra note 6, at 9
(pointing out that the use of equity financing and corporate bonds by European companies
has overtaken the traditional reliance on bank credit for corporate financing).
28. See Ragbag of Reform, supra note 16.
29. Wegen, supra note 27.
30. Wegen, supra note 27, at 154.
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to be listed.""1 However, while the national law of the stock exchange
governs, the legal regime for listing equity securities is not purely
national: an over-arching concept that governs cross-border offering of
equity securities is "mutual recognition," (sometimes referred to as
"reciprocal recognition"12 ) a concept prevalent throughout E.U. law as a
means of harmonizing the laws of its Member States, and in simplest
terms means that what is acceptable in one country is recognized as
acceptable in a second country.' As applied to exchange-based offerings
of securities, mutual recognition simply means that a prospectus used
for a "primary listing" in one Member State (the home state) is
sufficient for the "secondary listing" on the stock exchange of a second
Member State (the host state), subject to minor differences in the
States' legal regimes.' The policy choice behind employing mutual
recognition in European securities law is and was of course to produce
some form of harmony in the Member States' securities regulations,
thereby facilitating greater efficiency in Europe's fragmented securities
markets and keeping the cost of multi-state offerings reasonable. With
an understanding of mutual recognition in mind, the context behind the
directives most relevant to offering securities on stock exchanges of two
or more Member States becomes somewhat easy to understand.3 5
1. The Admission Directive
As its title pronounces, Council Directive 79/279/EEC Coordinating
the Conditions for the Admission of Securities for Official Stock
Exchange Listing, 3 has the purpose of outlining the conditions for
listing on a stock exchange of a Member States, taking into account the
dual goals of (i) ensuring maintenance of adequate investor protection
and (ii) allowing greater "interpenetration of the national securities
markets" and thereby "contribut[ing] to the prospect of establishing a
European capital market."3' The Council recognized that coordination
by the Admission Directive was limited to the establishment of
"minimum conditions for admission" and this partial coordination
"constitute[d] a first step towards subsequent closer alignment of the
rules of Member States in this field."3 Article 3 of the Admission
31. Id. at 156.
32. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 890.
33. Cf id.
34. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 154.
35. For comparative summaries of the three exchange listing directives described
below, see generally Nardulli, supra note 12; See also Todd A. Sulger, Harmonization of
the Securities Market Regulations in the European Union: Is the Price Tag too High?, 29
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 224-228 (1998).
36. Council Directive 79/279/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, amended by Council Directive
821148/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22 [hereinafter Admission Directive].
37. See id., at Preamble.
38. Id.
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Directive requires Member States to ensure that "securities may not be
admitted to official listing on any stock exchange situated or operating
within their territory unless the conditions laid down by this Directive
are satisfied" thereby establishing minimum common listing criteria for
equity and debt securities that list on E.U. Members' stock exchanges.39
It is important to note that since the Admission Directive defines only
minimum standards, the specific requirements of each country's stock
exchange need to be consulted and adhered to as well. The Admission
Directive provides Member States with discretion to impose more
stringent requirements than those set forth in the Directive, so long as
these requirements are applied on a non-discriminatory basis to all
issuers who seek admission for listing of securities on a Member State
exchange. For example, Article 5(4) of the Directive states that Member
States are free to, "in accordance with their own national rules, require
issuers admitted to official listings to inform the public on a regular
basis of their financial position and the general course of their
business.4 Thus, due to the Admission Directive's adherence to
mutual recognition, the content of the admission requirements for
listing securities for trading on a stock exchange in each E.U. Member
State, though not uniform, are very similar.
2. The Interim Reports Directive
Following closely on the heels of the Admission Directive and the
Listing Particulars Directive (discussed below), the European Council
adopted in February 1982 Council Directive 82/1211EEC on Information
to be Published in a Regular Basis by Companies the Shares of Which
have been Admitted to Official Stock Exchange Listing.41 Commonly
referred to as the Interim Reports Directive, this Directive complements
the Admission Directive's requirements on the publication of
information, and requires company-issuers of equity securities listed on
Member State stock exchanges to produce half-yearly reports to relate
the company's activities and profits and losses for the relevant six-
month period in both explanatory and tabular formats.4 The report
must indicate both current financial figures and figures from the
preceding financial year showing, at a minimum, the issuer's net asset
turnover and the issuer's before-tax profit or loss, so that investors can
make an informed assessment as to the trends of the company's
activities and profits and losses.43 An explanatory statement must also
be included indicating the company's business prospects for the
39. See id., at art. 3.
40. See Admission Directive supra note 36, at art. 5(4).
41. Council Directive 82/121EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26 [hereinafter Interim Reports
Directive].
42. See id., at arts. 4 and 5.
43. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at arts. 4 and 5.
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remainder of the financial year as well as "special factors" that would
shed light on the company's activities."
These continuing reporting requirements are akin to the annual
10K and quarterly 10Q forms that must be published by issuers in the
United States under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4" Again, the
purpose of the notice requirements is to allow investors to make
informed appraisals of the security issue. The notice requirements
fulfill the Directive's goal of providing equivalent investor protection for
the entire E.U. "throughout the period during which the securities are
listed" and "contributing towards the establishment of a genuine
Community capital market by permitting a fuller interpenetration of
securities markets."46
Additionally, in light of the fact that the E.U. currently lacks
uniform accounting standards, 7  determining which accounting
standards have to be met in these reports "is not resolved by the
application of mandatory national standards or regulations of the stock
exchange involved, but by using conflict of law rules."" Therefore, the
law governing the company determines the law applicable to accounting
standards, and "the law governing the company is determined by the
rules of conflict of laws of.the Member State in which the listing is
sought."9 The different accounting systems employed by each Member
State are and remain a major impediment to "ensur[ing] the effective
protection of investors and the proper operation of stock exchanges " "
envisioned by the Council in this Directive. Furthermore, heightened
disclosure standards employed by certain Member State exchanges
means that what may be appropriate for one exchange is lacking in
detail for another exchange.
3. The Listing Particulars Directive
Of the directives described herein, the Listing Particulars Directive
is perhaps of greatest significance in terms of what is currently going on
legislatively in the E.U. securities field. This directive was adopted in
1980 in order to "safeguard ... actual and potential investors" by
requiring that Member States "ensure that the admission of securities
44. Id.
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1933) ("Periodical and Other Reports").
46. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at Preamble.
47. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 16. See also Karel Van Hulle, Accounting &
Auditing: Developments in the EU, AccT. IR. 10 (Apr. 4, 2001), available at 2001 WL
15067274 (explaining that the E.U. is undergoing efforts to converge its accounting
directives in order to produce accounting standards that are in line with International
Accounting Standards (IAS)).
48. Wegen, supra note 27, at 156.
49. Id.
50. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at Preamble.
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to official listing on a stock exchange situated or operating within their
territories [be] conditional upon the publication of an information sheet"
referred to as "listing particulars".51 Though it does not use the term
"prospectus" anywhere within the Directive, the Listing Particulars
Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive (discussed
below) are the E.U.'s two "Prospectus Directives," and are the subjects
of reform in the European Commission's Proposed Prospectus Directive.
The Listing Particulars Directive applies to those securities that are
"the subject of an application for admission to official listing on a stock
exchange situated or operating within a Member State."52 Article 4 of
the Listing Particulars Directive requires that the listing particulars
contain information on the particular issuer and securities of which
application is being made "necessary to enable investors ... to make an
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of the rights
attaching to such securities."3 At a minimum, the listing particulars, or
information sheet, contains: information concerning the issuer, the
security, the corporation's capital position, business activities and
financial position, the officers and directors of the corporation, and the
corporation's recent developments, as well as current business
prospects.5
To reiterate, the Listing Particulars Directive, like the other
Directives relating to the listing of securities on stock exchanges in the
E.U., requires only that Member States adopt the minimum standards
and guidelines set out in those Directives. Member States remain free
to supplement the minimum requirements with more extensive
information disclosure requirements and have done so." Consequently,
levels of disclosure vary from Member State to Member State; while all
States meet the minimum threshold level of disclosure required by the
Listing Particulars Directive, others require a heightened standard of
disclosure from issuers wishing to list in their forum.
As one commentator points out, the Listing Particulars Directive
serves as a limitation on an issuer's ability to "forum shop" for favorable
disclosure rules within the E.U. by requiring that the issuer list in the
country of its registered office, i.e., its home state if it will be listing its
securities there at all.' By way of example, this commentator points
out that this limitation serves as a mechanism to prevent a French
company seeking to list its securities on the Paris Bourse and other
exchanges from first listing its securities on another Member State's
51. See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 24, at Preamble & art. 3.
52. See id. at art. 1.
53. See id. at art. 4.
54. See id. at art. 8.
55. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 2 & 16.
56. See Scott, supra note 26, at 82.
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exchange which might have less disclosure requirements than those in
France." The French issuer would have to list in Paris first, with the
result that its securities would be subject to French disclosure rules
throughout the E.U.5 This bars a circumvention of home state
disclosure regulations in states with more stringent disclosure
regulation, and is consistent with the notions of investor protection, an
overriding principle among all securities regulation in the E.U.
In summing up the three E.U. Directives relating to stock
exchange-listed securities, the mutual recognition-based directives fail
to harmonize securities listing requirements in the Member States.
While the principle of mutual recognition again applies to a substantial
part of the conditions for a secondary listing (e.g., a listing on a second
or third stock exchange),59 the fact that the directives spell out only
minimum requirements and require that domestic law in each Member
State where listing is sought be consulted to determine the additional
requirements that the State mandates above and beyond those
contained in the directives means that issuers are required to incur
additional trouble and expense to facilitate multi-stock exchange
listings.
B. Public Offerings of Unlisted Securities
A second way to publicly offer securities is through open market
transactions whereby an issuer, care of an underwriter or underwriting
syndicate, offers the securities to the public by direct purchase, as
opposed to listing them on a stock exchange.' As discussed above,
when securities are going to be listed on an official stock exchange the
prospectus, or "listing particulars," must conform to the minimum
specifications of the Listing Particulars Directive as adopted by the
Member States.
The purpose behind the Public Offering Prospectus Directive," on
the other hand, is to set out how prospectuses should be prepared where
unlisted securities, or transferable securities, which include securities
admitted to trading on a regulated market, but not listed on an official
stock exchange, are offered to the public.6 Like the Listing Particulars
Directive,6 the Public Offering Prospectus Directive sets out the
framework for information disclosure when transferable securities are
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 157.
60. See id., at 160.
61. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25.
62. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 160.
63. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 24.
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offered to the public." Article 1 of the Public Offering Prospectus
Directive establishes that the Directive applies to "transferable
securities which are offered to the public for the first time in a Member
State provided that these securities are not already listed on a stock
exchange situated or operating in that Member State."" Article 4
requires that Member States ensure that a prospectus be published by
an issuer offering transferable securities to the public within their
territories, with certain exceptions to this rule listed in Article 5.6
Adhering to the mutual recognition concept, Directive 90/211/EEC
amending the Listing Particulars Directive points out that Article 21 of
the Public Offering Prospectus Directive provides that "where public
offers are made simultaneously or within short intervals of one another
in two or more Member States, a public-offer prospectus drawn up and
approved in accordance with Article 7, 8 or 12 of that Directive must be
recognized as a public-offer prospectus in the other Member States. "'8
Furthermore, Directive 90/211/EEC points out that:
where application for admission to official listing in one or more
Member States is made and the securities have been the subject of a
public-offer prospectus drawn up and approved in any Member State
in accordance with Article 7, 8 or 12 of the Public Offering Directive in
the three months preceding the application for admission [to the stock
exchange), the public-offer prospectus shall be recognized, subject to
any translation, as listing particulars in the Member State or States in
which application for admission to official listing is made, without its
being necessary to obtain the approval of the competent authorities of
that Member State or those Member States and without their being
able to require that additional information be included in the
prospectus.6'
The competent authorities may, however, require that the prospectus
include information specific to the market of the country of admission
"concerning, in particular, the income tax system, the financial
organizations retained to act as paying agents for the issuer in the
country of admission and the ways in which notices to investors are
published." 9 Here again, Member States remain free to make issuers
supplement their prospectuses with additional information, thereby
hindering the goal of capital market integration.
PART III:SHORTCOMINGS OF THE E.U. DIRECTIVES AND POSSIBLE
64. Her Majesty's Treasury, Public Offers of Securities 17 (1998), available at
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/html/posec.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Public
Offers Report].
65. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25, at art. 1.
66. See id. at arts. 4 & 5.
67. Council Directive 90/211/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L112) 3.5.
68. Id. at art. 2(1).
69. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25 at art. 21.
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REASONS FOR THE SHORTAGE OF CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS
While the mutual recognition principle contained in the directives
summarized above allows offers of securities in multiple Member States
of the E.U., few cross-border offers have been effectuated in reality.0 In
fact, one commentator points out "that the 1999 and 2000 Deutsche
Telekom distributions are the only instances of a European-wide public
offering."7  A 1998 United Kingdom Treasury report "proposing
amendments to the U.K. legislation on the public offer of securities and
seeking views on reforming public offers of securities within the E.U."
7 2
recognized that, theoretically at least, mutually recognized prospectuses
provided companies with the advantage of being able to access the
widest possible range of investors across the European Union.73  The
economic benefits of a cross-border offering system are obvious. On the
one hand, it allows investors the opportunity invest in a wider range of
companies and diversify their risk more easily across the economies of
several Member States. On the other hand, companies would be able to
access a much wider pool of investors.74 Furthermore, with a single
framework in place, European issuers should - theoretically, anyway -
be able to access capital markets in multiple states at a low cost. Thus,
in its ideal form the directives on the listing and offering of securities
were to benefit both investors and issuers.
Various theories exist for the infrequent use of cross-border
offerings, but all focus on the complexity75 , uncertainty, cost and lack of
a harmonized securities law under the current directive-based system.76
The specific reasons are varied and are a product of "unnecessary
differences in the various jurisdictions of the E.U."77 The reasons
include: translation costs, 78 compliance with individual countries'
70. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(pointing out that unless the directives in place undergo revision, "the European financial
market will remain fragmented ... [and] cross border capital raising will remain the
exception, rather than the rule - the antithesis of the logic of the single currency"); see
also Scott, supra note 26, at 82; Initial Report, supra note 6, at 15-17.
71. Scott, supra note 26, at 83 (citing A. Ostrovsky & U. Harnishfeger, Deutsche
Telekom in Global Balancing Act, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2000 at 33).
72. See Public Offers Report, supra note 64.
73. See id at 18. See also Scott, supra note 26, at 82.
74. Public Offers Report, supra note 64, at 18.
75. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 17 (arguing that the large quantity of
regulatory authorities creates inefficiency, unnecessary cost and confusion for issuers).
76. See id. at 16 (pointing out that issuers are required to comply with differing
requirements "in order to gain the approval of local Regulatory Authorities" and that the
absence of a generally agreed definition of "public offer" across the E.U. means that
'public offers' may in fact be defined as 'private placements' depending on the regulations
of a particular Member State jurisdiction).
77. Id. at 2.
78. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(pointing out that a requirement to "fully translate the content of a prospectus does not
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information and disclosure requirements, 79 and legal expenses incurred
to determine how investors in each Member State need to be notified.0
The predominant theory holds that transaction costs incurred by using
the mutual recognition procedure are too high and pose a stumbling
block for issuers, especially for small and medium-sized issuers who
typically have limited finances."' A frequent commentator in the
securities field also theorizes that the cross-border offering directives
are infrequently utilized due to "the wide scope for private placements
within the [E.U.] and the relative ease of the resale of privately
distributed securities to public investors."
82
PART IV:PROPOSALS TOWARD HARMONIZING THE CROSS-BORDER
OFFERING SYSTEM
A. The FESCO Issuer Passport Proposal
While the E.U. has discussed perfecting its cross-border offering
system of regulation in past years,"3 not until recently had concrete
corrective measures been advanced by the European Commission."
Prior to the publication of the Proposed Prospectus Directive, proposals
suggested retaining the current structure, under which the receiving
state competent authorities recognize "incoming" prospectuses, but
removing the ability of these authorities to require some or all
additional information or translation.' The Forum of European
Securities Commission's (FESCO) 2000 European "Passport" for Issuers
provides the most concrete plan to improve and at the same time to
simplify the system of cross-border securities offerings. 6 FESCO was
founded in 1997 with the mission of developing uniform standards of
regulation in Europe's financial markets." Drafted at the bequest of
the European Commission, FESCO's European Passport Report
recognized that the system is meant to facilitate cross-border offerings,
and that the level of disclosure should be the same for both listed and
encourage multinational offerings or admission to trading").
79. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that production of
multiple sets of documentation to conform with national requirements in order to offer
securities in a second or third Member State is costly and inhibits pan-E.U. capital-
raising activity).
80. See Scott, supra note 26, at 83.
81. Public Offers Report, supra note 69, at art. 5.6.
82. See Scott, supra note 26, at 83.
83. See generally Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3.
84. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3.
85. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3.
86. European Passport Report, supra note 8.
87. See FESCO's Organization, supra note 7.
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unlisted securities.' But FESCO goes on to boldly suggest that "the
level of disclosure should be the same throughout the E.U. market and
therefore no difference should exist between domestic and cross-border
issues." The incorporation of this specific proposal would be a
dramatically positive step towards complete harmonization of securities
regulation because the disclosure standards would be uniform
throughout the E.U. Complete harmonization in the information
disclosure requirements would remedy the twin reasons for the lack of
cross-border offerings: it would create greater efficiency in terms of
issuers' abilities to disclose once to one regulator, and by lowering the
transaction costs associated with disclosure and multi-State offerings or
listings. Under the current system, the level of securities market
regulation varies dramatically from one Member State to another. The
directives described above after all stipulate only the minimum
required disclosure standards, allowing Member States, if so inclined,
to require greater disclosure. Consequently, the level of regulation runs
the spectrum from the minimum directive requirements to highly
complex regulatory disclosure systems.
FESCO proposed the creation of a uniform regulatory system
thereby creating certainty vis-&-vis the treatment of investors in all
jurisdictions. The rationale behind the FESCO proposal is
simplification of the steps issuers wishing to extend offers to other
Member States need to undertake. This requires replacing the "mutual
recognition principle with a procedure based on 'simple notification.'"9
The notification would be based on enhanced European disclosure
standards that follow those disclosure standards created by
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).91
FESCO's Issuer Passport balances the dual needs for investor
protection on the one hand with issuer efficiency on the other. The
advantages to European investors under this proposal are that
investors will: (i) have access to securities offered by other European
companies, and (ii) have the same information throughout the E.U. The
advantages for issuers of the European Passport are the reduction of
bureaucratic work, while at the same time gaining access to all of the
E.U. Member States with little more effort than is currently necessary
to obtain approval for a domestic offering. Additionally, the "Issuer
Passport" minimizes the risk that an issuance gets to the market after
market conditions have changed, courtesy of the optional shelf
registration system.
Under the FESCO proposal, the home country authority (where the
88. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 5.
89. Id.
90. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 3.
91. Id.
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issuer has its registered office or its primary listing) would fully control
the entire set of documents relating to the securities offering.' Once
the prospectus is approved by the home country authority, the issuer
may make an offer or list its shares in other Member States by simply
notifying its intention to the competent authorities where it is making
the offer.93 The notification would be accompanied by the approved
prospectus, the approval certificate, and if required, a translation of the
summary of the prospectus. Under the proposal, the host country
authority would not be allowed to ask for further information. Adoption
of the enhanced European IOSCO-based disclosure standards would
replace the current disclosure requirements provided in the Listing
Particulars Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive,
thereby creating greater uniformity.9
Finally, while the FESCO proposal deals with creating uniformity
in the notification and disclosure system, a major part of creating that
uniformity will require the adoption of uniform accounting standards.'
Like the varying degrees of securities regulation employed by Member
States, there is not a uniform accounting standard to which all
Members adhere.97 Under the current system, preparation of disclosure
documents is burdensome because of the lack of universally accepted
accounting practices. IOSCO has "urged the development of
internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards" to remedy
this problem. 9' However, adoption of international accounting
standards, though necessary to the success of harmonizing system of
cross-border offerings, will not be without hurdles and such standards
"will need to be flexible enough to support variations resulting from
peculiarities in legal, tax, and regulatory structure, differing economic
environments", and other country-specific circumstances.'
B. Other Developments in the Sphere of Capital Markets Integration
In February 2001, the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy,
urged the creation of a single Committee of European Securities
Regulators with the specific mandate of drafting legislation to facilitate
an improved and better integrated pan-E.U. securities market for the
92. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 16.
97. See id.
98. See Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 347, 402 (1995).
99. See Sulger, supra note 35, at 236.
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European Commission's review." The Lamfalussy Report, to which it
is referred, envisioned that the legislation would be the product of the
advice of a second independent committee of European regulators, made
up of Member State representatives from "competent authorities in the
securities field."'' Over some disagreement in the European
Parliament regarding the powers of the proposed Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR), the European Commission set
up the CESR in May 2001.'0 It takes over the work of harmonizing
securities offerings once undertaken by FESCO.'0 3 FESCO created the
Constitution for the CESR whose role is laid out as (i) improving
coordination between securities regulators, (ii) advising the European
Commission in regards to the drafting of measures in the securities
industry, and (iii) working to ensure "more consistent and timely day-
to-day implementation of community legislation in the Member
States."" Some have criticized the creation of committees such as the
CESR because of the likelihood that it will be slow in implementing
changes.° 5
C. The Proposed Prospectus Directive
On May 30, 2001, the European Commission produced its Proposed
Prospectus Directive. In view of the urgency surrounding the upgrade
of the two existing Prospectus Directives - namely the Listing
Particulars Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive, both
discussed above - and in view of the "extensive consultation" already
undertaken by FESCO (especially in its European Passport for Issuers),
the European Commission produced its Proposed Directive without
"delay[ing] it through recourse to a more formal consultation process as
foreseen in the Lamfalussy Report."'06
Broadly stated, the Proposed Prospectus Directive adopts many of
the ideas laid out by FESCO in its European Passport Report. The
Proposed Prospectus Directive is very 'pro-passport' in terms of the
information to be contained in each prospectus issued to each Member
100. See John Willman, New Pledge on Securities Plan, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2001,
available at http'/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
101. See John Willman, New Pledge on Securities Plan, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2001,
available at httpJ/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Continuity and orderly functioning of markets in Europe, M2 PRESSWIRE,
Sept. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26353828.
105. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(expressing the view that to application of the "more formal process" envisioned in the
Lamfalussy Report would be to merely "delay" a proposal, unappealing to the Commission
in light of the "urgency' of a new framework and the extensiveness of consultation already
carried out).
106. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
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State, and the features of the Proposed Prospectus Directive were based
on (i) introduction of enhanced disclosure standards in line with
international standards, (ii) introduction of a registration document
system so as to ensure annual update of key issuer information, (iii) the
possibility of offering securities to trading on the basis of simple
notification of the prospectus approved by the home competent
authority, and (iv) concentration of responsibilities in the home
administrative competent authority.' 7  The Proposed Prospectus
Directive would do away with the "existing mutual recognition system"
and replace that with a "simple notification system," akin to that used
by those E.U. directives involving financial services' and as envisioned
in FESCO's European Passport Report.'O' Therefore, under this system,
host or secondary Member State, authorities would be unable to request
additional information in a prospectus."0 Furthermore, the Proposed
Prospectus Directive tackles the issue of multiple translations, a
transaction cost that some consider a deterrent to cross-border offerings
and stock exchange listings."' The Proposal states that "host Member
States competent authorities shall only be entitled to ask for a
translation of the summary of the prospectus provided that the full
prospectus is drafted in a language which is customary in the sphere of
finance (normally English)"."' Thus, the key feature of the Proposed
Prospectus Directive is a single set of disclosure documents, regardless
of the size of the issuer, to be filed with the home Member State
competent authority, and thereafter notified to host Member State
competent authorities as appropriate. This has proved to be a
significant point of contention, with several European securities
industry groups arguing that small- and medium-sized enterprise
issuers (SMEs) will be adversely affected by such a requirement."'
In September 2001, in advance of the first scheduled meeting of the
Committee of European Securities Regulators held on September 11,
107. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
108. Id.
109. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 3.
110. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Jonathan Todd, Letter to the Editor: Prospectus Proposal Would Lower Cost of
Raising Capital, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, available at www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2002).
114. See Andrew Crooke, Brussels Study Deepens Divide over EU Prospectus Laws,
available at www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2002); see also London Stock
Exchange, Comments from the London Stock Exchange on the Proposed Prospectus
Directive, (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/presspdfs/pdwebstory.pdf (last visited Feb. 11,
2002) (arguing that mandatory prospectus filing and annual updates for all issuers will
significantly burden SMEs in terms of increasing the cost of raising capital) [hereinafter
LSE Comments].
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the Financial Times reported in two separate articles on European
banks' and securities firms' opposition to the Commission's Proposed
Prospectus Directive. 5 Three associations - the International Primary
Market Association, the International Securities Market Association,
and the Bond Market Association - accused the European Commission
of failing to "consult widely enough" in the securities industry prior to
its publication and demanded the E.U. to either drop its proposal or
turn it into a consultation paper, which could be watered down or
blocked."'6 In terms of membership, these three entities encompass
virtually all of Europe's banks and securities firms."' In spite of their
claims to support a single European "passport" for issuers, the
associations said that the proposal failed to address key issues and
needed to be fundamentally rewritten to correct a number of errors and
omissions which could have been avoided had market consultation
taken place before the draft directive was published."' Specifically, the
associations alleged inadequate treatment of "common liability
standards, due diligence, common definitions of a public offer, nor did it
accelerate the time for approval of prospectuses to meet securities
deadlines."" 9 Critics point out that a "one size fits all" regime would be
too burdensome on SMEs looking to access the capital markets because
they would need to incur unnecessary costs to produce the requisite
documentation and opinions." Others point out that:
Requirements that issuers file a prospectus with the competent
authority of the Member State in which they have their registered
office would fragment the markets and distort competition, they say.
Regulators would impose varying levels of disclosure, stunting the goal
of a single passport. And the Commission's shelf registration system
would require issuers to expend the cost of registering an update of a
large part of their prospectus for scrutiny every year, regardless of
whether or not they access the capital markets."'
Finally, the associations allege that the Proposal would increase the
115. See Vincent Boland, Call to Scrap Share Reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001,
available at http://www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); see also Vincent Boland,
Opposition Mounts to EU Securities Directive, FIN. TIMES Sept. 7, 2001, available at
http'/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); Andrew Crooke, Securities Markets Attack
EU Prospectus Reforms, Legal Media Group, Sept. 9, 2001, available at
httpJ/www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
116. See Call to Scrap Share Reform, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. See Securities Markets Attack EU Prospectus Reforms, supra note 115.
119. See Trade Associations Want EC to Drop or Redo Directive, SEC. IND. NEWS, Oct.
1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6554070.
120. Andrew Crooke, Brussels Report to Suggest 60 Changes to Prospectus Directive,
Dec. 2, 2001, available at httpJ/www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
See also LSE Comments, supra note 114.
121. Trade Associations, supra note 119.
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cost of raising capital in Europe.2
The criticism to the proposed Directive was met with a vigorous
defense launched by the European Commission's Spokesman for the
Internal Market and Taxation Jonathan Todd and published in the
Financial Times as a letter to the editor.In Attempting to clear up some
of the "misunderstandings" about the Proposed Prospectus Directive,
Mr. Todd addressed the fact that the Proposed Prospectus Directive
created a single definition of both "public offer" ' and "home member
state" and called the Proposed Prospectus Directive a "framework
directive," akin to that proposed in the Lamfalussy Report's
recommendations, and stated that more detail would be produced in
subsequent and more technical directives.' Insinuating that certain
critics wish to maintain the status quo, Mr. Todd maintained that the
door remained open for "constructive and informed comments" on the
proposal.'6
The Proposed Prospectus Directive has suffered another setback.
On December 2, 2001, it was announced that a draft report,
commissioned by the European Parliamentary Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs, and to be presented on December 4, proposed
.around sixty amendments to the Proposed Directive. 2 ' The report,
prepared by Mr. Chris Huhne, a member of the British Parliament,
features prominently reduction of the burden on SMEs, "making the
'shelf registration' system optional, and leaving a degree of choice of
competent authority to issuers," m a proposal that the London Stock
Exchange favors very much. 129 It remains to be seen what effects this
report and the numerous comments, reports and criticism that abound
will have on the viability of the Proposed Prospectus Directive.
CONCLUSION
To truly appreciate what has been done in terms of improving the
securities regulation to its current form in the E.U. and the direction in
which it is heading, one must consider the history of such regulation in
the E.U. This aside I think will better explain regulation as it stands in
the E.U. presently as well as the susceptibility and proclivity for future
122. See id.
123. Todd, supra note 113.
124. Until the Proposed Prospectus Directive arrived, a common definition of the term
.public offer" had eluded the European Commission. See Public Offering Prospectus
Directive, supra note 25, at Introduction (stating that "so far, it has proved impossible to
furnish a common definition of the term 'public offer' and all its constituent parts").
125. See Todd, supra note 113.
126. See Todd, supra note 113.
127. See Crooke, supra note 114.
128. Id.
129. See LSE Comments, supra note 114, at art. 4.2.
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changes. "[In the 1980s, seven of the twelve E.U. countries did not
require prospectus disclosure to investors in public offerings. 30
Furthermore, no Member States "had a securities regulatory agency to
enforce the laws that did exist."'' As late as 1990, "nine of the twelve
Member States failed to impose any criminal penalties for insider
trading of securities." 132  These figures demonstrate that while
regulatory agencies are now in place, these agencies are not
particularly well-established, as opposed the United States' own SEC,
which was created over sixty years ago.' Arguably, the lack of
foundation and deep-rooted history among the various E.U. securities
regulators makes the propensity for modification care of a "passport"
approach laid out in the Proposed Prospectus Directive that much
higher. Furthermore, associations made up of Member State securities
regulators - FESCO, for example - have recognized the need for a
better system and endorsed proposals.
While the European Commission's Proposed Prospectus Directive
provides definitive steps towards effectuating the true harmonization of
the E.U.'s capital markets, there exists some doubt as to the likelihood
that these steps will be taken in their entirety, as evidenced by the
recently published opposition to that Proposal. While there is some
credibility to the claim that individual Member States would prefer not
to lose control over their markets, and that different "attitudes towards
corporate governance and investor protection" may hamper
integration,' the E.U. has had substantial success in the integration of
its Member States in the economic and financial arenas. As was the
case with the controversy over adoption of the Euro as Europe's
singular currency, one will note that the Euro was so adopted.
Furthermore, the commencement of the European Monetary Union
(E.M.U.) and the formation of a European Central Bank also exemplify
E.U. Member States' willingness to evolve into a more unified economic
powerhouse, because doing so is in both of their individual and
collective interests. With much of E.U. corporate financing shifting
from a dependency on bond issuances, bank lending and other credit-
based mechanisms to a reliance on equity markets and the recognition
that there are better ways for European companies to raise such
capital, the tide is moving in the direction of legislative changes. The
advantage to companies of a cost-effective means of raising capital
through access to the widest range of investors is of course great. And,
130. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive,
15 U. PA.. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 181, 185 (1994).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 186.
133. The U.S. Congress created the SEC in 1934. See Introduction-The SEC: What
We Do, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtnl (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
134. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 20.
DENV. J. IN'L L. & POLY
with general recognition that so-called "patchwork of regulation 1 5
currently in place creates uncertainty and increased costs for issuers 136
the current system cannot remain in place for much longer. The
simplicity behind the notion of a passport-based system in which one
prospectus approved by an issuer's home country authority, which
would have to be accepted throughout the EU for public offer and/or
admission to trading on regulated markets is certainly an attractive
one. Whether the Proposed Prospectus Directive will undergo a greater
degree of revision or not, especially with regards to the concerns about
SMEs, remains uncertain. However, with the Committee of European
Securities Regulators now in session, and recognition on the part of not
only the European Commission, but by the. industry commentators and
players that the system of cross-border offerings calls for greater
efficiency, improvements in the efficiency and integration of the E.U.'s
financial markets are certainly forthcoming.
135. See Ragbag of Reform, supra note 16.
136. See id.
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THE INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF
STATE IMMUNITY:
PROBLEMS OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF ULTRA VIRES
CONDUCT
MIZUSHIMA TOMONORI"
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a truism among international lawyers that the state immunity
principle might bar a domestic legal action brought against a foreign
state. There has been much discussion about the extent to which a
foreign state is immune from domestic jurisdiction. No matter what
answer is given to this still controversial issue, the fact remains that a
state can act only through natural persons, who do not ordinarily enjoy
immunity from suit. Partly for this reason, several actions have been
brought against individuals who acted on behalf of a foreign state Can
they, and to what extent, invoke and enjoy state immunity?
We can hardly say that this question has received an answer based
on a comparative law analysis. The scope of past observations on
beneficiaries of state immunity other than a foreign state itself was
mainly limited to non-natural persons such as state-owned corporations
or political subdivisions of the state. Thus, even were they to enjoy
state immunity, we could pose the same question as above with regard
to individuals who acted for these entities. The purpose of this article is
to clarify case law concerning individuals' entitlement to state
immunity from the standpoint of the attribution of an act to a state.'
Particular emphasis is placed on problems of ultra vires conduct of state
officials.
Some preliminary remarks are useful. This article focuses upon
state immunity from foreign civil proceedings. Certainly, a number of
* Doctoral Candidate, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University; LL.M., London, 1999;
LL.M., Kyoto, 1995; LL.B., Tokyo, 1993. The writer wishes to thank those who
commented on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for their painstaking editorial work. Needless to
say, it is only to the writer that any remaining errors are attributed.
1. In this article, except in the asterisked footnote, "to 'attribute' an act to someone"
means, "to regard, for the purposes of law, an act of a natural person as an act of a legal
subject." Other possible terms, such as "impute" or "ascribe," are used only in the case of
direct citations.
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(quasi-) criminal cases exist in which immunity was granted to a
foreign state or its agency.2 However, most domestic criminal rules are
intended to apply only to natural persons. In such cases, it is neither
necessary nor possible to prove the immunity of foreign states, and the
position of individuals who acted on behalf of a foreign state is at best
unclear.!
Let us take the four criminal cases that Bothe cited in 1971 in
support of his argument that state officials are, in certain
circumstances, immune from foreign criminal proceedings.4 In regard
to the McLeod case,5 it should not be ignored that, contrary to the
diplomatic correspondence between the two countries concerned, which
was in favor of McLeod,' the court, in fact, denied immunity.7 Horn v.
Mitchell" is also a case in which immunity was denied. The court found,
"no ground for extending to him any of the privileges or exemptions
which might result from a finding that his act was a national act."9
The two other cases, in which immunity was granted, concern
members of foreign armed forces and do not imply the extension of
immunity to non-members. In In re Gilbert', Judge de Azevedo stated
that, "if the crime were devoid of any military aspect, the case would
undoubtedly fall under the local jurisdiction."" In the Scordalos case,12
the defendant was a Greek marine. Although this Egyptian case was
decided without an applicable treaty between Egypt and Greece, it has
been pointed out that the Egyptian courts of those days were influenced
by the Anglo-Egyptian convention, which provided for the immunity of
members of the British Forces. 3 It is also to be noted that, in a similar
2. E.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952);
Australia v. Midford (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., 86 I.L.R. 640 (Malay. Sup. Ct. 1990).
3. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61, 110 (Eng. 1998)
[hereinafter Pinochet (No. 1)] (Lord Nicholls); Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, (No. 3)
[2000] 1 App. Cas. 147, 283 (Eng. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet (No. 3)] (Lord Phillips).
4. See Michael Bothe, Die strafrechtliche Immunitat fremder Staatsorgane, 31
ZEITsCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 246 (1971).
5. 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
6. Correspondence between Great Britain and The United States, respecting the
Arrest and Imprisonment of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline,
29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1126 (1840-1841).
7. People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). For a comment to this
effect, see also PASQUALE DE SENA, DIRITO INTERNAZIONALE E IMMUNITA FUNZIONALE
DEGLI ORGANI STATALI 45 (1996).
8. 232 Fed. 819 (1st Cir. 1916), affg 223 Fed. 549 (D. Mass. 1915).
9. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
10. 13 Ann. Dig. 86 (Braz. Sup. Fed. Ct. 1944).
11. Id. at 90.
12. Cass., Feb. 7, 1944, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX MIxTES, No. 3308, May 19/20, 1944,
at 2 (Egypt).
13. E.g., Alexandre Pathy, Bulletin de la jurisprudence 6gyptienne, 67-72 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 390, 391 (1940-1945); See G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces:
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agreement with the United States, Egypt reserved the right to
prosecute civilian employees. 4
Recent practice points to, if anything, non-immunity from criminal
proceedings" and provides no authority in favor of immunity.' In order
to avoid unnecessary confusion, it would be advisable to exclude
criminal cases unless light can be shed, in one way or another, upon
this study.
Further, given the subject matter of this article, i.e. the
relationship between individuals who do not ordinarily enjoy immunity
from suit and state immunity, some other cases fall outside its scope.
One of them concerns some specific categories of individuals, e.g.
diplomats or heads of state, who ordinarily enjoy immunity irrespective
of whether their acts are attributed to the state." Cases in which these
individuals are involved will be dealt with only where attribution might
matter. Another is a case that took place before the state immunity
principle was undoubtedly established."
The final preliminary remark concerns the so-called act of state
doctrine. Chief Justice Fuller provided the classic definition of this
doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez,9 when he said, "[Tihe courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 341, 351 (1954). The
Convention concerning the Immunities and Privileges to be enjoyed by the British Forces
in Egypt, Aug. 26, 1936, provides, '4. No member of the British Forces shall be subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Egypt, nor to the civil jurisdiction of those Courts
in any matter arising out of his official duties." 173 L.N.T.S. 433.
14. Agreement concerning Immunity from Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters of
Members of the United States Forces in Egypt, Mar. 2, 1943, 204 L.N.T.S. 425. Moreover,
the immunity regime under this agreement was intended to cease at the end of the war.
15. E.g., R. v. Mafart and Prieur, 74 I.L.R. 241 (N.Z. High Ct. Auckland Registry
1985).
16. In Pinochet (No. 3), Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, "As to the charges of murder
and conspiracy to murder, no one has advanced any reason why the ordinary rules of
immunity [ratione materiae] should not apply and Senator Pinochet is entitled to such
immunity." [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 205. As will be seen, however, this reasoning is open to
objection.
17. E.g., Luigi Condorelli, L'imputation ez l'ttat d'un fait internationalement illicite:
solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances, 189 RECUEIL DES COUiLs 9, 76 (1984).
18. In Waters v. Collot, the governor and commander in chief of a French island was
sued before a U.S. court. Win. Bradford, U.S. Att'y Gen., stated, "With respect to his
suability, he is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a public minister) who comes
within the jurisdiction of our courts. If the circumstances stated form... a sufficient
ground of defence, they must, nevertheless, be regularly pleaded;...." 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
45, 46 (1794). After the court held Collot to bail, this action was discontinued. 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 247 (1796). The opinion of Lee, U.S. Att'y Gen., concerning the Henry Sinclair
cases, apparently of a civil nature, is couched in slightly different terms, "[A] person
acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not amenable for
what he does in pursuance of his commission, to any judiciary tribunal in the United
States." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797).
19. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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another done within its own territory."20 Needless to say, "[this]
doctrine is peculiar to Anglo-American law,"2' and distinct from the
state immunity principle. While state immunity is a matter of
procedural law, the act of state doctrine is arguably one of substantive
law.' Hence, "the act of state doctrine exempts no one from the process
of the court."' However, it is not always easy to recognize which
principle was applied. For instance, in regard to Underhill v.
Hernandez,' the U.S. Supreme Court itself later comments that,
"sovereign immunity provided an independent ground".' Thus,
mention of cases in which the act of state doctrine was at issue is not
necessarily excluded.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY
As already mentioned, the question whether, and under what
circumstances, individuals can invoke state immunity has attracted no
particular attention. As a result, the provisions of national legislation
give little guidance in this respect.2 Section 14 of the U.K. State
Immunity Act 1978, for instance, provides, "(1)... [R]eferences to a
State include references to-(a) the sovereign or other head of that
State in his public capacity; (b) the government of that State; and (c)
any department of that government".2 The other possible beneficiaries
of state immunity specified in that section are any entity (a "separate
entity") which is distinct from the executive organs of the government of
the state and capable of suing or being sued, and the constituent
territories of a federal state. In the recent Argentine legislation, no
definition or explanation is given to the term "foreign State" (Estado
extranjero).28 The Australian Foreign State Immunities Act of 1985, in
accordance with which "a natural person" who fulfills certain conditions
20. Id. at 252.
21. F.A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS 164 (1986).
22. In Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., the English courts have dealt with
these two principles at separate stages. Compare the judgment of the House of Lords
[1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317 with that of the Court of Appeals [20011 1 Lloyd's Rep. 161
(2000). See also SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, THE PLACE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 12 (1988).
23. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba et al., 425 U.S. 682, 726 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. 168 U.S. 250 (1897)
25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
26. For principal pieces of national legislation, see Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, at 1-70 (1982).
27. U.K. State Immunity Act, §14 reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
28. Law 24.488, Inmunidad de jurisdicci6n de los Estados extranjeros ante los
tribunales argentinos [1995-B] Legislaci6n Argentina 1500. The Argentine Supreme
Court, in eventually denying immunity, applied this statute to a foreign state agency.
Saravia v. Agencia de Cooperaci6n Internacional del Jap6n, Corte Sup. [1999-Il J.A. 509
(1998).
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is to enjoy immunity as a "separate entity" of a foreign state, can be
regarded as an exception.2
Most instruments of an international character are equally not free
from such ambiguity. It does not seem that the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) has clarified this point. A number
of writers 30 have suggested a broad interpretation of "representatives of
the State acting in that capacity" as one of the beneficiaries of state
immunity under the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property. It is questionable, however, whether all
the individuals who act on behalf of a foreign state can be considered
"representatives of the State."32
On the other hand, the International Law Association Draft
Convention on State Immunity makes its position quite clear. Georg
Ress, in his final report to the Association, stated:
[The term "foreign State" in this Draft Convention] is not intended to
cover individuals, because the reasons underlying the concept of state
immunity do not apply. Court action against an individual (who would
then be liable with his personal estate only) does not implicate
sovereignty or sovereign equality.... [Tihe problem of state immunity
arises only if a state is named as party tO a suit.
33
29. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act §§ 3(1), 22, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715
(1986).
30. Christian Tomuschat, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property:
The Draft Convention of the International Law Commission, in VOLKERRECHT, RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN, WELTWIRTSCHAFTSRECHT: FESTSCHRIFr FOR IGNAZ
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN 603, 621 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel et al. eds., 1988); Burkhard HeB,
The International Law Commission's Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269, 279 (1993).
31. Art. 2(1)(b)(v), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1565 (1991). The other beneficiaries in the
ILC Draft Articles are, "(i) the State and its various organs of government; (ii) constituent
units of a federal State; (iii) political subdivisions of the State...; (iv) agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and other entities". Id. at art. 2(1)(b).
32. In the commentary, the ILC states, "[This] category of beneficiaries of State
immunity encompasses all the natural persons who are authorized to represent the State
in all its manifestations ..... Thus, sovereigns and heads of State in their public capacity
would be included under this category .... Other representatives include heads of
Government, heads of ministerial departments, ambassadors, heads of mission,
diplomatic agents and consular officers, in their representative capacity." Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-third Session [1991] 11-2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
33. Georg Ress, Final Report on Developments in the Field of State Immunity and
Proposal for a Revised Draft Convention on State Immunity, International Law
Association, Report of the 66th Conference 452, 466 (1994). See also Jurgen Brohmer,
STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50, 55 (1997); Karl Doehring and
Georg Ress, Diplomatische Immunitat und Drittstaaten: Uberlegungen zur erga omnes-
Wirkung der diplomatischen Immunitat und deren Beachtung im Falle der
Staatensukzession, 37 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 68, 97 (1999).
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The first question is whether such a denial of individuals'
entitlement to state immunity is in accordance with case law. Initially,
a number of cases are examined which have been, or might be, taken to
constitute authorities in favor of the absence of immunity. This is
followed by an examination of those in which immunity was granted.
Setting this aside momentarily, we ought to bear in mind that the
denial of jurisdictional immunity does not necessarily amount to the
existence of responsibility as a matter of substantive law. Indeed, it has
been argued that, whether or not individuals are immune from suit,
they are not held responsible vis-A-vis the plaintiff for their acts on
behalf of a foreign state." Therefore, it must be noted that Ress'
statement contains two distinct propositions.
A. Denial of State Immunity to the Individual?
(1) Belgium: Mesdag v. Heyermans, decided in the nineteenth
century, deserves to be mentioned." Heyermans's painting, displayed
at an exhibition in Brussels, was withdrawn without her consent at the
request of Mesdag, a Dutch official. The Court of Appeal of Brussels
denied its competence for two reasons.3 First, the Court states that
Mesdag enjoys immunity, at least for acts done in his official capacity,
because he is an "envoy of foreign governments" within the meaning of
the Belgian decree at issue. Second, the Court found that the acts in
question did not fall within the judicial power of the government since
they were purely administrative acts. In both respects, the Court of
Cassation annulled this judgment.37  It seems that the denial of the
second point by the Court of Cassation suggests the absence of the
immunity of the state itself under the circumstances of this case.
(2) Danzig: In the Polish Officials in Danzig case,3 the defendant
was sued for damages allegedly arising out of his activity as a Polish
customs officer. The High Court rendered a judgment to the effect that,
"[tihere was no reason whatsoever to assume that a foreign official on
duty in Danzig who did not come within [the domestic law provisions at
issue concerning persons invested with diplomatic character] should be
able to claim immunity from any action arising in connection with his
34. E.g., Soc. Vivai industriali Roma v. Legazione dell'Arabia Saudita, Trib. Roma,
Nov. 20, 1953, 38 RWiSTA DI DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE 79 (Italy); GAETANO MORELLI,
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE 201-02 (2d ed. 1954).
35. See also Dreyfus fr~res et Cie v. Godderis fr~res, CA Bruxelles, Aug. 4, 1877,
Pasicrisie belge 1877, II, 307. This Dreyfus case is virtually identical, in its facts and its
holding, with a French case, Isidore Dreyfus v. Dreyfus fr~res. See infra text accompanying
notes 40-42.
36. CA Bruxelles, June 25, 1897, PANDECTES PERIODIQUES 1897, 615.
37. Cass. 2e ch., May 23, 1898, 26 J. DU DROIT INTL PRIVE 618.
38. 6 Ann. Dig. 130 (High Ct. 1932).
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official function." 9
(3) France: In Isidore Dreyfus v. Dreyfus frres,0 subscribers sued
French bankers who dealt with loans on behalf of the Peruvian
government. According to the Court of Appeal of Paris, "the Peruvian
government not being a party [of the appellants' personal undertaking
in question], the appellants cannot invoke... the principle of the law of
nations (viz. state immunity]".41 On the other hand, the Court states,
"[In the issue and the service of the loans [the appellants] acted only as
mandataries and financial agents of the government of Peru;... [Iun
this capacity, they are not personally obliged towards the third
subscribers,..... The court, while denying the application of state
immunity, did not hold the defendants personally responsible for their
acts as agents of the Peruvian government. The Court of Cassation
rejected the appeal. As seen below, other French cases have not denied
state immunity to individuals or private companies.
(4) Ireland (Eire): In the de las Morenas case,43 the head of a
commission appointed by the Spanish government to purchase horses
for its army was sued for breach of contract. Justice O'Byrne, for the
Supreme Court, said:
He is sued in his personal capacity and the judgment... will bind
merely the appellant personally,.... I am not aware of any rule of
international law under which mere agents of a foreign State can claim
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which they
are carrying out their duties .... Where the Sovereign is not named as
a party and where there is no claim against him for damages or
otherwise, and where no relief is sought against his person or his
property, I fail to see how he can be said to be impleaded either directly
or indirectly."
Unusual circumstances in this case, however, are not to be ignored.
Due to the war situation, the defendant could not procure information
directly from the Spanish government. Had such information been
available, the result might have been different. 5 Furthermore, as will
be seen, the above approach has not been adopted in recent Irish cases.
(5) Netherlands: In Church of Scientology v. Herold, 4 Herold, the
39. Id. at 131.
40. Cass. ch. civ., Aug. 14, 1878, Dalloz, RECUEIL PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE [D.P.]
1879, I, 57.
41. Id. at 57 (the writer's translation).
42. Id. at 59 (the writer's translation).
43. [1945] I.R. 291 (H. Ct. and S.C. 1944).
44. Id. at 300-03.
45. Indeed, the High Court adjourned the proceedings due to lack of this information.
Id. at 293-94.
46. 65 I.L.R. 380 (Dist. Ct. Amsterdam 1980). See also Edwards v. Bureau
Wijsmuller, 94 I.L.R. 361 (C.A. Amsterdam 1987).
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Chief of the German Federal Police, was sued in a defamation case
because the article in question allegedly was based on a police report.
For certain procedural reasons, the court regarded Herold as a litigant
only in his private capacity, and said, "Thus, exceptions under
international law limiting the Dutch Court's jurisdiction over sovereign
states... do not apply to him."47 This judgment a contrario suggests
that the problem of immunity would arise if he appeared in his official
capacity. Indeed, the court noted that Herold, "correctly stated that, in
his official capacity, he should in law be identified with the German
Federal Republic." Moreover, the court eventually found this claim
inadmissibile and did not deal with the merits of the case. For while
Herold appeared before the court only as a private person, the act in
question was carried out in his official capacity.
(6) U.S.: In Arcaya v. Pdez,49 an action for libel against the Consul
General of Venezuela, immunity was not granted despite the
Venezuelan Ambassador's note to the effect that Pdez wrote the letter
at issue in pursuance of his duties. The court states, "[A] consul's
duties are commercial but.., they may be enlarged by special
authority. To be effective such an enlargement must, however, 'be
recognized by the government within whose dominions he assumes to
exercise it'."0 If this is the case for a consul, far less likely is the
immunity of other individuals in these circumstances. It is
questionable, however, whether "it" in the court's citation could be so
extended as to apply in this case since originally "it" referred to,
"authority to represent [a sovereign] in his negotiations with foreign
states, or to vindicate his prerogatives.""l Be that as it may, as seen
below, this case does not represent consistent U.S. case law prior to the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (FSIA).
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 2 a case under the FSIA, concerns
the motion to quash a subpoena served on Ordonez, the Philippine
Solicitor General. Judge Orrick states:
[TIhe sovereign immunity doctrine may not serve as a basis for
Ordonez' immunity... because it is not applicable to individual
government officials.. .. The terminology of [§ 1603(a) of the FSIA]-
"agency," "instrumentality," "entity," "organ"-makes it clear that the
statute is not intended to apply to natural persons, except perhaps to
the extent that they may personify a sovereign.'
47. Herold at 381.
48. Id.
49. 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affdper curiam, 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957).
50. Id. at 470.
51. The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 446 (1818).
52. 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
53. Id. at 797.
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Since the motion was eventually granted on the grounds of
Ordonez's diplomatic status, the above remark is dictum. Furthermore,
as will be seen, other U.S. courts have not followed this reasoning.
B. Grant of State Immunity to the Individual
(1) Australia: The question, as already mentioned, has been settled
by legislation. It is worth remembering, however, that the court in
Grunfeld v. United States of America,' where the termination of a
contract was at issue, already had granted immunity to an officer
commanding a certain U.S. office. The court stated that, "[iut is well
settled that an entitlement to sovereign immunity is not limited to the
foreign sovereign himself."
5 5
(2) Canada: Walker v. Bank of New York, 6 which followed a number
of precedents,57 is of particular importance. The Ontario Court of
Appeal granted immunity not only to U.S. government employees,
whose immunity was not disputed, but also to bank employees, because,
"[tihey acted at the request of U.S. government law enforcement officers
for the purpose of assisting them in their investigation of possible
criminal activities."" According to the court, "the use of the broad word
'organ' in the [Canadian State Immunity] Act ... indicates the intention
of parliament to protect individuals ... who act at the request of a
foreign state in situations where that state would enjoy sovereign
immunity."5 9
(3) France: A number of cases, while decided in earlier periods,
have not lost their significance.' The most illustrative among them is
54. [19681 3 N.S.W.R 36.
55. Id. at 37.
56. 16 O.R.3d 504 (1994).
57. E.g., Tritt v. U.S., 68 O.R.2d 284 (High Ct. 1989); Jaffe v. Miller, 13 O.R.3d 745
(C.A. 1993). In Jaffe u. Miller, the court found no difference, with regard to individuals'
entitlement to state immunity, between the Canadian State Immunity Act 1982 and the
common law principle. See Jaffe, 13 O.R.3d 745 (C.A. 1993).
58. Walker at 508. The court thus reversed the decision of Day, J., who had stated,
"In no decided cases which were argued, has ad hoc assistance to a foreign government
served to transform an individual or private corporation into a governmental agency for
the purposes of state immunity." 15 O.R.3d 596, 601 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1993).
59. Id. at 508. The Ontario Court of Appeal recently confirmed, while reserving its
decision about, "whether the immunity enjoyed by functionaries of the sovereign is
independent of or derives from that enjoyed by the sovereign itself", that, "[elven if the
immunity enjoyed by the individual defendants is merely derivative, they are protected
from the claims.., by virtue of the immunity enjoyed by the USA." U.S. v. Friedland, 46
O.R.3d 321, 329 (1999).
60. E.g., Luchmann v. Heymann, CA Nancy, Aug. 31, 1871, D.P. 1871, II, 207;
Saabrok v. Soci6t6 maritime auxiliaire de transports, CA Rennes, le ch., Mar. 19, 1919,
18 REVuE DE DROIT INT'L PRIVt 743; Lakhowsy v. Gouvernement f~dral suisse, CA
Paris, le ch., Mar. 16, 1921, 48 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL. 179. Esnault-Pelterie
v. The A. V. Roe Cy Ltd. is also instructive, though the defendant is a private company
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Bernet v. Herran, where the members of a commission appointed to
supervise a Honduran loan were sued for negligence and fraudulent
manipulations. The Court of Appeal of Paris said:
Considering that.., the members of the commission received their
appointment only from the government of Honduras, and that they
worked only by its will, by virtue of its delegation, and by subjecting
their acts to its ratification, it results from the principle of the
reciprocal independence of States that, as for the said acts
accomplished in the exercise of these functions, they cannot, any more
than the government... be subjected to the jurisdiction of the French
tribunals, and that any action brought against them in this regard
must be declared not admissible;.. 62
The Court of Cassation found the appeal inadmissible.
(4) Germany: In the Church of Scientology case,0 the plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the defendant, a senior officer of the
London Metropolitan Police, from making allegedly false accusations.
Accepting the submission for the defendant, the court announced:
The acts of such agents [as the defendant] constitute direct State
conduct and cannot be -attributed as private activities to the person
authorized to perform them in a given case. Any attempt to subject
State conduct to German jurisdiction by targeting the foreign agent
performing the act would undermine the absolute immunity of
sovereign States in respect of sovereign activity."
(5) Ireland: In McElhinney v. Williams,' the question apparently
remained unanswered whether Williams, a corporal in the British
Army, can invoke state immunity. Herron v. Ireland' provided a clear
answer. Two British officers were included among the defendants, as
this action concerned an English court's refusal to order the return of
the plaintiffs child who was wrongfully abducted by the father.67 In
regard to the Attorney General for England and Wales, the Irish
Supreme Court definitively stated, "[T]here is no doubt that he is
entitled to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity."' The court
rather than an individual. Trib. civ. Seine, 3e ch., Apr. 1, 1925, 52 JOURNAL DU DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 702.
61. Cass.ch.civ., Apr. 21, 1886, D.P. 1886, I, 393.
62. Id. at 394 (the writer's translation).
63. 65 I.L.R. 193 (Fed. Sup. Ct. 1978).
64. Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
65. [19951 3 I.L.R.M. 276 (S.C.).
66. 242/1997 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997) (LEXIS, IRELND Library, CASES File). See also
Schmidt v. Home Sec., 103 I.L.R. 322 (High Ct. 1994).
67. In re M. (A Minor) (Abduction) [19941 2 Family Law Reports [F.L.R.] 126 (C.A.
1993).
68. Herron v. Ireland, supra note 66.
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reached the same conclusion for the British Official Solicitor in saying:
[H]e was acting as an officer of the British Courts at the request of the
English Courts to furnish them with his view as an amicus curie
[sic] ... He was also acting as head of the child's abduction unit and
again it appears to be beyond doubt that he acted throughout in his
official capacity and he performed a function which was entrusted to
him by the Court.'
(6) Philippines: The case law of this country is firmly established.0
The position, which has invariably been taken, is summed up by the
following view of the Supreme Court in United States of America v.
Guinto":
While the doctrine [of state immunity] appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same... the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 2
(7) U.K.: Propend Finance Pty. Lid. v. Sing3 confirmed that the
U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978 did not affect a number of
precedents." Documents relating to alleged tax evasion by Propend
were seized through mutual judicial assistance at the request of
Australia. Contrary to Sing's undertaking to the court, extracts from
the documents were sent to Australia. Proceedings for contempt of
court were brought against Sing and the Commissioner of the
Australian Federal Police Force. As Sing was granted diplomatic
immunity, what interests us is the immunity granted to the
Commissioner. Finding that the police function is essentially a part of
governmental activity, the Court of Appeal held:
69. Id.
70. E.g., Syquia v. Lpez, 18 I.L.R. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Johnson v. Turner, 21 I.L.R.
103 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Baer v. Tizon, 57 Supreme Court Reports Annotated [S.C.R.A.] 1
(1974); Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 S.C.R.A. 88 (1988). See generally Florentino P.
Feliciano, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity from Suit in a Developing and Liberalizing
Economy: Philippine Experience and Case-law, in JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 173, 178-79 (Nisuke Ando ed., 1999).
71. 182 S.C.R.A. 644 (1990).
72. 182 S.C.R.A. 644, at 653-54 (1990).
73. 111 I.L.R. 611 (Q.B. 1996 and C.A_ 1997).
74. E.g., Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605 (C.A. 1877); Rahimtoola v. Nizam of
Hyderabad, 1958 App. Cas. 379 (1957). For a succinct account of these cases, see C.A.
Whomersley, Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individuals for Official Acts, 41 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 848, 849-50 (1992). See also Godman v. Winterton, 11 Ann. Dig. 205 (C.A.
1940).
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The protection afforded by the Act of 1978 to States would be
undermined if employees, officers... could be sued as individuals for
matters of State conduct in respect of which the State... had
immunity. Section 14(1) [of the Act] must be read as affording to
individual employees or officers of a foreign State protection under the
same cloak as protects the State itself.75
It went on to say, "Where [a 'separate entity' (section 14)] exists
and is entitled to immunity, then its servants or officers would of course
benefit by immunity .... Further, an individual might possess status
as a corporation sole or similar status which could constitute him in
that capacity a 'separate entity' ... 7 This position has been
7maintained in subsequent cases.
(8) U.S.: In Heaney v. Government of Spain,"8 the court, making
reference to a provision of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law, granted state immunity to Gomero without taking
account of his consular status. 7' Then, and only then, the court
considered, "perhaps unnecessarily, whether Gomero's actions could be
considered as exceeding his consular functions"80 and confirmed
consular immunity as well.
The FSIA has brought about little change in this respect. Republic
of Philippines v. Marcos, cited above, is rather isolated, and a number of
district courts, both before and after this case, admitted the
applicability of the FSIA to individuals." In Chuidian v. Philippine
75. 111 I.L.R. at 669.
76. Id. at 670.
77. In In re P. (Diplomatic Immunity: Jurisdiction), the defendant was able to enjoy
state immunity notwithstanding the denial of diplomatic immunity, [1998] 1 F.L.R. 1026
(Fain. and C.A.). See id. the decision of President Sir Stephen Brown. The Court of
Appeal did not address the issue of immunity. In Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, it was
confirmed that, whether the applicable law was the State Immunity Act or the common
law, "[wihere [state] immunity applies, it covers an official of the state in respect of acts
performed by him in an official capacity." [20001 1 W.L.R. 1573, 1583 (H.L.) (Lord Millett).
For an analysis of the latter case, see Mizushima Tomonori, One Immunity Has Gone...
Another...: Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, 64 MOD. L. REV. 472 (2001).
78. 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Underhill v. Hernandez, supra note 19;
Bradford v. Director General of Railroads, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Oliner v.
Can. Pac. Railway Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div. 1970).
79. Hearney at 505.
80. Id.
81. E.g., Mueller v. Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513 (CBM), 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16970
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983); Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr.,
653 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990), affd without opinion, 946 F.2d 1564
(D.C. Cir. 1991). Rios v. Marshall ought to be cited with a brief comment. The court held
that, "insofar as Edwards is sued in his official capacity as agent of the instrumentality,
he is equally protected by principles of foreign sovereign immunity." Rios v. Marshall, 530
F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is not clear whether his immunity is based upon the
FSIA or other grounds.
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National Bank,82 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed
these decisions. The Bank was sued for its refusal to make payment
under a letter of credit. Daza, an official of the Philippine government,
was later added as a defendant. Observing that, "[ilt is generally
recognized that a suit against an individual acting in his official
capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign
directly," the court concluded that, "section 1603(b) [which defines an
'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'] can fairly be read to
include individuals sued in their official capacity."3
Also to be noted in this case is the United States government's
"Statement." The United States argues, "Daza is not covered by the
[FSIA] because he is an individual rather than a corporation or an
association, but he is nevertheless entitled to immunity under the
general principles of sovereign immunity expressed in the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 66(b)."" Although the court did not
take this approach, the difference between this "Statement" and the
court's finding is immaterial for the purpose of this study.
Despite some negative views on this judgment,5 courts in other
circuits also have found the FSIA applicable to individuals in
subsequent cases," so that, as was recently stated, "maintenance of a
coherent practice regarding foreign sovereign immunity weighs heavily
in favor of applying the FSIA to individuals."87
82. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
83. Chuidian, 912 F.2d. at 1101 and 1103 respectively.
84. Id. at 1099. It seems that § 66(b) was wrongly quoted and § 66(f) should replace it.
The relevant part of § 66 reads, "The immunity of a foreign state.. . extends to ... (b) its
head of state and any person designated by him as a member of his official party;... (f)
any other public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in
his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state; .... "
85. E.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The Claim to Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Individuals
Sued for International Human Rights Violation, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 465, 469 (1994);
Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INr'L L. 403, 405 (1995). Ress'
statement is in part a reaction to this case. See Ress, supra note 33, at 465-66.
86. E.g., Granville Gold Trust v. Commissione del Fullimento, 924 F. Supp. 397 and
928 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd without published opinion, 111 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
1997); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ortega Trujillo v.
Banco Central del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fl. 1998). A mention of some other
cases might be appropriate. For example, Xuncax v. Gramajo reached its conclusion,
"[wlithout deciding whether the scope of FSIA immunity should be thus extended".
Xuncax v. Granmajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175 (D. Mass. 1995). Dewhurst v. Telenor Invest
AS denied the application of the FSIA to the individual defendants, but this was simply
because the corporations which employed them were not considered to be "agencies or
instrumentalities" of a foreign state and consequently the individual defendants never
acted on behalf of the foreign state. Dewhurst v. Telenor Invest AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D.
Md. 2000).
87. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998). See also
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C. Some Observations
In the past, a number of cases existed that suggested a negative
answer to the question of individuals' entitlement to state immunity.
Yet, it is evident that they did not correctly reflect case law as it stands
today. The vast majority of cases in various jurisdictions have
recognized the individual as a beneficiary of state immunity. It is thus
submitted that Ress' view mentioned earlier is clearly against the
weight of authority.
The question might be posed whether such a practice is compatible
with the argument that, for instance in the U.K., "[t]he immunity of the
Crown was only tolerable because it did not extend to ministers and
Crown officers, who were liable personally in law for anything unlawful
that they did; and it made no difference that they were acting in an
official capacity."88 An affirmative answer is suggested. State immunity
under international law is no more than immunity from legal
proceedings before foreign domestic courts, and it does not make states
immune either from their own legal proceedings89 or from any sort of
responsibility. 90 In other words, to grant state immunity prescribed by
international law does not mean the end of the rule of law.
We ought not to lose sight of the problem of the extent to which
such alternative measures are practical. This, however, falls well
outside the scope of this article. If this study can shed any light, it is
upon the question of whether the withholding of state immunity from
individuals would result, in return for making state immunity
"illusory,"9' in more satisfactory protection of the plaintiffs claim. An
affirmative answer does not automatically follow. Several authorities,
which are necessarily rare due to the very practice of according state
immunity to individuals, suggest that, as a matter of substantive law,
individuals are not held personally responsible vis-A-vis the plaintiff for
their acts on behalf of a foreign state. If this argument is correct, the
plaintiffs claim fails even if state immunity is not granted and the
Bolkiah v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 547 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1999).
88. Sir William Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and
Liability, in THE NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITIcAL ANALYSIS 23, 25-26
(Maurice Sunkin & Sebastian Payne eds., 1999).
89. See, e.g., G.G. Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts,
14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 122 (1993); Nacci v. Bari Institute, 114 I.L.R. 539, 554 (Italy
Ct. Cassation Plenary Session 1994).
90. See, e.g., Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States before National
Authorities, 149 RECUEIL DES CouRs 87, 96 (1976); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State
Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES CouRs 235, 268 (1986).
91. Diplock, L.J., says, "[Tihe immunity to which [a foreign sovereign government] is
entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory unless it extended also to its agents in
respect of acts done by them on its behalf." Zoernsch v. Waldock [1964] 1 W.L.R. 675, 692
(Eng. C.A-).
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court has jurisdiction. While jurisdictional immunity for those who are
legally responsible might be open to criticism, the same cannot be said
for those who are not.
Individuals' entitlement to state immunity would be all the more
permissible in cases where they are sued not for their own acts, but on
the grounds of vicarious liability. For vicarious liability to arise, it is
required that a person stands in a particular relationship to the actor
and that the act is referable in a certain manner to that relationship.'
In cases of our concern, it is a state institution that makes such a
relationship conceivable. It would then be far from persuasive that a
plaintiff, bringing a legal action on this basis, attempts to deny the
immunity which the state, if sued, could enjoy.
III. ATTRIBUTION TO THE STATE OF ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT OF ITS
OFFICIALS
If individuals having no immunity ratione personae could enjoy
state immunity, it would be safe to seek the grounds of the immunity by
attributing their conduct to a foreign state. As state immunity is
arguably a rule of international law, this is attribution under
international law. Certain acts might not provide the basis of
immunity for an individual even if they are attributed to the state: e.g.
commercial activities.9 Even then, the analysis of attribution still has
more than academic interest, for the burden of proof could be shifted.
It would be apposite to compare suits against a foreign state with
those against an individual. In the former, insofar as a presumption of
immunity exists for foreign states, neither party needs to prove
attribution. Consequently, state immunity usually is granted or denied
without touching upon the problem of attribution. Only in unusual
cases could it matter. For instance, a court might find an otherwise
applicable exception to state immunity inapplicable due to non-
attribution, according immunity as a result." The paucity of such cases,
however, makes further analysis premature. On the other hand, in the
latter, the attribution of conduct to a foreign state plays a critical role
as a precondition for the operation of the state immunity principle, for
individuals would otherwise enjoy no immunity. From these cases,
therefore, we could obtain some meaningful observation on problems of
92. E.g., WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 693 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 15th ed. 1998).
93. See, e.g., the Philippine Supreme Court's view with regard to the individual
defendants in G.R. No. 76607, Guinto at 662.
94. E.g., Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983);
First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989);
Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1994); Storr v. National Defence
Security Council of the Republic of Indonesia-Jakarta, 95 Civ. 9663 (AGS), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15890 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997).
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attribution.
Herein lies another question to be asked, "Where are the outer
limits of attribution?" More specifically, "Does an individual's
entitlement to state immunity extend to his ultra vires conduct?"
What makes this apparently straightforward question debatable is
in part the argument in the field of state responsibility under
international law that ultra vires conduct of state officials is, at least to
some extent, attributable to the state. A number of writers, in their
analyses of the immunity granted to some specific types of individuals,
refer to a provision concerning the attribution of ultra vires conduct in
the ILC's work on state responsibility.95 Thus, although we could
simply argue that no analogy is permissible because attribution for the
purposes of state responsibility is not intended to serve other
purposes,9 it would not entirely be meaningless to see some problems of
the attribution of ultra vires conduct in state responsibility. Partly for
the same reason, the analysis in the following section is mainly confined
to the work of the ILC, though, needless to say, its work is not all that
counts for the arguments of state responsibility.
A. Attribution of.Ultra Vires Conduct in State Responsibility
It has incontestably been stated that, "[ilt is the national legal
order, the law of the state, which determines under what conditions an
individual acts as an organ of the state."97 That is why this question is
qualified as "apparently straightforward" in the preceding paragraph.
It is to be conceded that, since we are discussing responsibility under
international law, the ILC is undeniably correct in saying, "[Tihe
attribution of conduct to a State for the purpose of establishing the
possible existence of an internationally wrongful act by that State can
take place only in accordance with international law."9 Yet, it is
completely conceivable that international law delegates to domestic law
the decision of what is to be regarded as an act of the state.9 From this
standpoint, one can naturally ask why ultra vires conduct can
nevertheless be attributed to the state, if not for every purpose of
international law.
95. Jean Salmon, Immunitos et actes de la fonction, 38 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 314, 348 (1992); Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International
Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 56 n.90 (1994). See also MONIKA LOKE, DIE IMMUNITAT STAATLICHER
FUNKTIONSTRAGER 184-85 (2000).
96. See [1973] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 189.
97. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 117 (1952).
98. [19731 II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 181.
99. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 97, at 117; 1 DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, CORSO DI DIRrIrrO
INTERNAZIONALE (4th ed.) in 1 OPERE DI DIONISIO ANZILoTrI 1, 224, 387 (1955).
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Traditional arguments on state responsibility were centered on the
treatment of aliens. In line with such a tradition, Garcia Amador, the
ILC's first Special Rapporteur on this topic, limited the scope of his
work to, "international responsibility of the State for injuries caused in
its territory to the person or property of aliens". State responsibility for
injuries caused by ultra vires conduct has long been a controversial
issue. In this respect, the revised draft prepared by Garcia Amador
provided that ultra vires conduct was attributed to the state if the
officials, "purported to be acting in their official capacity" and if the
conduct was not "totally" or "manifestly" outside the scope of their
competence."l As is well known, this draft did not come to fruition.
The ILC afterwards decided to deal with, "the rules which govern
all the new legal relationships which may follow from an
internationally wrongful act of a State, regardless of the particular
sector to which the rule violated by the act may belong."10 ' This change
in approach carries two implications. First, the ILC did away with the
traditional limitation to the treatment of aliens. Second, and no less
significantly, the ILC limited its work to "state responsibility for its
wrongful act," excluding "state responsibility without its wrongful act"
such as responsibility for damage caused by the fall of space objects.
1 °0
Insofar as this approach is maintained, it is not objectionable that
the ILO has addressed problems of attribution in the work on state
responsibility for its wrongful act, i.e. the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.ln For, as a matter of elementary logic, if a state is held
responsible for an internationally wrongful act of the state, there exists
"an act of the state" which is to be qualified as "internationally
wrongful,""°4 and it is necessary to know what constitutes such an act.
What is and what is not attributable to the state under international
law is provided for in a fairly detailed manner in Articles 5 to 15. For
instance, the conduct of a state organ having that status under
domestic law is, irrespective of the position of the organ in the state's
organization, attributed to the state (Articles 5 and 6), and the conduct
of persons not acting on behalf of a state is not attributed to the state
(Article 11).
Article 10, which addresses ultra vires conduct, provides, "The
100. Art. 12(2)-(4). See [1961] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47-48.
101. [1973] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 170.
102. The ILC subsequently began its work on, "international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law."
103. As the second reading of these Articles has not been completed at the time of
writing, use is made of those adopted in 1996. For the text, see 37 I.L.M. 440 (1998).
104. Art. 3 of the ILC Draft Articles provides, "There is an internationally wrongful act
of a State when: (a) conduct... is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." For the
text, see 37 I.L.M. 440 (1998).
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conduct of an organ of a State,... such organ having acted in that
capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State under international
law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence
according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its
activity." This provision attributes broad, if not unlimited, scope of ultra
vires conduct to the state. The broader scope than that in Garcia
Amador's draft can be confirmed by the ILC's comment that, "[tihe
limitation to exclude from qualification as acts of the State the actions
of organs in situations of 'manifest' lack of competence has no place in
the rule defined in [Article 10]."'
As in the case of the other Articles, the ILC referred to numerous
relevant precedents in accordance with its "preference for an essentially
inductive method, rather than for deduction from theoretical
premises."'6 The writer entirely agrees with the result of the ILC's
induction from these precedents that a state is held responsible for
ultra vires conduct of its officials. Yet, the correctness of its inductive
argument ends there. If the conclusion of the attribution of ultra vires
conduct is to be reached, it has to be confirmed that state responsibility
arising from such conduct is state responsibility for its wrongful act,
rather than state responsibility without its wrongful act. Needless to
say, it is only the former that necessarily presupposes the existence of
an act of the state.
In order to a posteriori confirm this, it is essential to ascertain, in
advance, features which are peculiar to state responsibility for its
wrongful act, and which state responsibility without its wrongful act
does not possess, and then to examine whether the responsibility at
issue conforms to them. It is not feasible, however, to ascertain the
features of state responsibility for its wrongful act without identifying
acts of the state. In other words, for this a posteriori method the
purpose of which is to prove the attribution of acts, we need to identify
acts attributable to a state.
This would mean that, if we are to decide acts of a state for the
purposes of state responsibility, we must resort to an a priori method at
some stage. One possible way would have been to a priori consider that
specific acts, e.g. acts of the state in accordance with domestic law, are
acts of the state under international law. Instead, the ILC a priori
considered that state responsibility for certain conduct, e.g. ultra vires
conduct, is state responsibility for its wrongful act, and deduced the
attribution of the conduct from this premise. Whether such a method
brings about appropriate results is another matter.
No matter how the conclusion is drawn, one wonders whether any
useful purpose is served by qualifying intra vires acts and ultra vires
105. [1975] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69.
106. [1973] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172.
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acts equally as acts of the state, if, all other conditions being equal,
different legal consequences ensue in terms of state responsibility.
Viewed from such a standpoint, the opinion of the European
Commission of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom17 requires
reconsideration. This opinion is cited in support of the argument that
Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles conforms to practice under the
European Convention on Human Rights." This argument is based upon
the Commission's observation that, "[a state's] existing obligations can
be violated also by a person exercising an official function vested in him
at any, even the lowest level, without express authorisation and even
outside or against instructions."1' 9
The Commission shows, however, neither a theoretical basis nor
any authority for considering that a person acting ultra vires can violate
an obligation that the state owes. Be that as it may, later in this
opinion, the Commission states, "[Tihe elements constituting a practice
[in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention] are repetition of
acts and official tolerance . ... "" It also says, "The question
remains, ... whether or not [the acts] were officially tolerated with the
consequence that... the violations established are to be regarded more
serious.""' These passages plainly indicate that state responsibility
arising from ultra vires acts, in the absence of official tolerance, is
different from state responsibility arising from intra vires acts, which
are necessarily accompanied by official tolerance.
Another example is "assurances and guarantees of non-repetition"
of the wrongful act provided for in Article 46 of the ILC Draft Articles
as a form of, "rights of the injured State and obligations of the State
which has committed an internationally wrongful act.""2 Undoubtedly,
with regard to intra vires conduct, a state could give assurances or
guarantees of non-repetition by promising to no longer authorize the
conduct at issue. However, from the nature of things, without
excessively extending the meaning of the terms, a state could not give
"assurances" or "guarantees" of non-repetition of the same sort of ultra
vires conduct any more than it could do as regards non-repetition of the
fall to Earth of one of its space objects. This ,in addition, illustrates a
similarity between state responsibility for ultra vires conduct and state
responsibility without its wrongful act.
The considerations outlined above lead us to doubt whether the
attribution of ultra vires conduct can satisfactorily explain state
107. 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 8 (1976).
108. HARITINI DIPLA, LA RESPONSABILITE DE L'ETAT POUR VIOLATION DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME: PROBLEMES D'IMPUTATION 36-39 (1994).
109. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 393-94.
110. Id. at 466.
111. Id. at 478.
112. 37 I.L.M. 440, supra note 103, at art. 46.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
responsibility for such conduct. Rather, the theory of risk,"3 based upon
the risk that a person entrusted with a certain state activity, which is
as such lawful, causes injuries by acting ultra vires, is less artificial and
more cogent. It is less artificial in that this theory does not regard ultra
vires acts as acts of the state, and more cogent in that it can explain
differences between ultra vires acts and intra vires acts as well as
similarities between state responsibility for ultra vires conduct and
state responsibility without its wrongful act. As regards state
responsibility for ultra vires conduct, Anzilotti refers to the, "necessity
for each State to give others a guarantee against the danger that its
internal organization, with regard to which it enjoys the broadest
freedom, could represent to them.""4 From today's standpoint, this is
nothing but a justification for state responsibility without its wrongful
act," though, for Anzilotti, this was a reason for the attribution of ultra
vires conduct to the state.
B. Functional Immunity and Ultra Vires Conduct
The above analysis on state responsibility does not obviate the need
to examine whether state immunity is granted to individuals for ultra
vires conduct. As seen below, a view exists which affirmatively answers
this question without touching upon the argument of state
responsibility. Before addressing this issue, however, the problem of
ultra vires conduct is examined in the context of functional immunity,
i.e. jurisdictional immunity under international law to be granted in
respect of a specific function of states (or international organizations)."6
Jean Salmon's suggestion that case law has retained functional
immunity even for ultra vires conduct 7 might have a bearing upon
individuals' entitlement to state immunity for conduct of a similar sort.
Strictly speaking, each functional immunity provision should be
interpreted and applied in accordance with its own object and purpose,
and no generalization ought to be lightly assumed. It is submitted with
respect that some of the Law Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) made a
misconceived interpretation. As is widely known, whether Pinochet
113. E.g., Charles de Visscher, La responsabilitd des Etats, 2 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA
89, 91-92 (1924); Maurice Bourquin, Rgles gdndrales du droit de la paix, 35 RECUEIL DES
Cous 1, 215-16 (1931).
114. ANZILOrI, supra note 99, at 388 (the writer's translation).
115. See, e.g., Art. 1 of the current ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, which
provides, "The present articles apply to activities not prohibited by international law and
carried out in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of a State which
involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical
consequences." For the text, see, for example, (1995] HI-2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89.
116. For instance, Art. 43(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides
for consular immunity, "in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions."
117. Salmon, supra note 95, at 348.
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was to enjoy immunity or not depended upon, subject to, "any necessary
modifications, "" Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, which provides for subsisting immunity for diplomats after
leaving post "with respect to acts performed ... in the exercise of his
functions as a member of the mission." 9 The qualification of this
immunity as immunity ratione materiae is correct in that this immunity
is accorded for the reason of subject matter. Indeed, it is suggested that
Article 39(2), "applies only to acts performed on behalf of or imputable
to the sending State."'20 However, nowhere is it provided that immunity
ratione materiae of this sort, "applies not only to ex-heads of state and
ex-ambassadors but to all state officials who have been involved in
carrying out the functions of the state."'
By way of illustration, while Article 39(2) does not exclude the
possibility of immunity from criminal jurisdiction,22 it is highly
doubtful, as pointed out at the outset, whether such immunity exists for
those to whom this provision does not apply.'2 We should rather
consider that such a rule as laid down in Article 39(2), "constitutes a
combination of immunity ratione personae and ratione materiae."24 As
Yoram Dinstein appropriately qualifies, Article 39(2) immunity is
"diplomatic" (or "head of state" if it is applicable to heads of state aswell m i mun ty r tio e • 126
well)' immunity ratione materiae. Insofar as an element of immunity
ratione personae is involved, we cannot necessarily infer the immunity
of other persons.
Consequently, even if the observation that functional immunity has
been granted for ultra vires conduct should be correct, it does not
automatically follow that state immunity is granted to state officials
118. U.K. State Immunity Act, § 20(1), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
119. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLoMATIc RELATIONS 357-63 (2d ed. 1998).
120. Id. at 363
121. Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 205 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
122. See, e.g., the Tabatabai case. In this criminal case, the court denied Art. 39(2)
immunity due to its finding that "the importation of narcotic substances... is not to be
classified as one of the official functions of a special envoy." Tabatabai, 80 I.L.R. 388, 424
(F.R.G. Superior Provincial Ct. 1986). If Art. 39(2) were inapplicable to criminal cases, the
classification would have been unnecessary.
123. Therefore, Lord Millett's observation in Pinochet (No. 3) that "any narrow
statutory immunity is subsumed in the wider immunity in respect of other official or
governmental acts under customary international law" is also open to objection. [2000] 1
App. Cas. at 270.
124. F.A. Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42 and 155,
49 (1943).
125. The Swiss Federal Tribunal says, "Articles 32 and 39 of the Vienna Convention
must.., apply by analogy to Heads of State." Marcos and Marcos v. Fed. Dep't of Police,
102 I.L.R 198, 203 (1989). But see Hazel Fox, The Pinochet Case No.3, 48 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 687, 693-94 (1999).
126. Yoram Dinstein, Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae, 15
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 76 (1966).
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acting ultra vires. We must ascertain what is the basis of functional
immunity for ultra vires conduct and whether it could also be the basis
of state immunity to individuals for such conduct. For example, if, as is
pointed to by Salmon,117 Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility is the reason for according functional immunity for ultra
vires conduct, the basis of immunity for state officials in general is
provided. For this provision applies irrespective of the function at
issue.
It is questionable, however, whether Salmon's observation is
supported by the cases cited by him and can serve as a starting point
for discussion. For instance, otherwise applicable consular immunity
was withheld from the following persons: a person who was entrusted
by a vice-consul to set in order the documents of a deceased marquis,
but who, availing himself of this occasion, entered the apartment and
burnt the will of the marquis; a consul general who converted and
appropriated the funds which his government sent to him in trust for
the plaintiff;'2 and a vice-consul who was prosecuted on account of a
sexual assault during the ordinary hours of business against a woman
who came to renew her passport.1u
As pointed out, the scope of Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles is
broad. The cases that the ILC had in mind include the Youmans case,"'
in which Mexico was held internationally responsible for the acts of its
soldiers who, contrary to the order to protect the U.S. nationals
threatened by a mob, shot and killed one of them.32 Thus, Article 10
would cover the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if it is
appropriate at all. Nevertheless, immunity has been denied in those
circumstances.
Insofar as the writer is aware of, the only case, among those cited
by Salmon, which might support his argument is Boyer v. Aldr&te.'3 In
this defamation case against the consul general of Panama, the Civil
Tribunal of Marseille stated:
[Tihis absolute incompetence [of the French courts with regard to
foreign consuls' function] would subsist even in the hypothesis in which
the acts of a foreign consul were tainted by the excess of authority or
the diversion of authority, only the Tribunals of the State which he
127. Salmon, supra note 95, at 348.
128. J.-B. Fassio et J~r~me Fassio v. Bocconi, Trib. civ. Nice, Jan. 21, 1896, 24 J. DU
DROIT INTL PRIVE 131 (Fr.).
129. Carl Byoir & Assoc. v. Tsune-Chi Yu, 112 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1940).
130. L. v. The Crown, 68 I.L.R. 175 (N.Z. Sup. Ct. Auckland 1977).
131. Youmans (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A_ 110 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
132. Id.
133. Trib. civ. Marseille, 9e ch., Oct. 18, 1956, Gazette du Palais 1956, 2,
jurisprudence, 319 (Fr.).
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represents being qualified to judge such an abuse."4
This argument bases immunity for ultra vires conduct not on the
attribution of, or state responsibility for, such conduct but on the
allegedly exclusive competence of the courts of the foreign state
concerned. Taken to extremes, this would mean that immunity is
granted for virtually all acts of a foreign consul. The result that follows
comes much closer to purely "personal" immunity, rather than
"functional" immunity. To infer from this isolated and somewhat
unpersuasive instance that, as a matter of principle, functional
immunity is granted even for ultra vires conduct would go too far. It
seems that the basis of the contrary proposition that, in principle,
functional immunity has been withheld in ultra vires cases is the
stronger.
C. State Immunity Granted to the Individual for Ultra Vires Conduct?
Since functional immunity as defined earlier and state immunity,
even where the latter's beneficiary is an individual, are not co-
extensive, the former might be available when the latter is not, and vice
versa. Accordingly, the observation in the preceding paragraph does not
a priori mean the denial of state immunity to individuals in ultra vires
cases, and separate analysis is called for.
It would not be out of place to begin this section with Pinochet (No.
3). As stated, a number of the Law Lords addressed the immunity issue,
rightly or wrongly, as a matter of state immunity ratione materiae
rather than as one of former head of state immunity. Moreover, despite
the criminal character of this case, some of the Law Lords suggested
Pinochet's immunity from civil proceedings." If Chilean law prohibits
torture, does it follow that immunity would have been granted to the
individual in civil proceedings for ultra vires acts?"
A negative answer must be given. Even if, in written law taken at
face value, torture is prohibited and therefore at first sight ultra vires
conduct, another fact should not be overlooked. In this case, it was
submitted for the government of Chile, intervening, that, "[it] deplores
the fact that the government at the time violated human rights".' 7 In
short, at least ex post facto, the Chilean government conceded the
attribution of Pinochet's conduct, rendering it difficult to see an ultra
134. Id. at 320 (the writer's translation).
135. (2000] 1 App. Cas. at 264 (Lord Hutton); 278 (Lord Millett); 281 (Lord Phillips).
136. On the other hand, Pinochet (No. 1), in which all the Law Lords dealt with the
issue as a matter of former head of state immunity, is of little assistance for the analysis
of individuals' entitlement to state immunity from civil jurisdiction for their ultra uires
conduct. [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61.
137. [20001 1 App. Cas. at 172.
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vires character in the conduct. 3 '
However, in obiter saying that, "Senator Pinochet could... claim
immunity if sued in civil proceedings for damages,"3 9 Lord Hutton had
state responsibility for ultra vires conduct in mind. 0 As noted, the
argument based upon state responsibility leads to the proposition that
immunity would be granted to individuals irrespective of whether he is
a former head of state or not.
Equally, the dictum of Lord Millett should not be ignored. He
stated:
[Immunity ratione materiae] is available whether the acts in question
are illegal or unconstitutional or otherwise unauthorised under the
internal law of the state, since the whole purpose of state immunity is
to prevent the legality of such acts [i.e. official and governmental or
sovereign acts] from being adjudicated upon in the municipal courts of
a foreign state. A sovereign state has the exclusive right to determine
what is and is not illegal or unconstitutional under its own domestic
law. 141
This argument coincides, in its essence, with the reasoning of Boyer
v. Aldr~te, i.e. the exclusive right of the foreign state concerned.'4
This study indicates that state immunity has not been granted to
individuals for ultra vires conduct on the above, or any other, grounds.
In according state immunity to individuals, some of the courts already
mentioned have stressed that the conduct at issue was carried out intra
vires. Furthermore, in a number of jurisdictions, state immunity has
been denied to individuals because of the ultra vires nature of their
conduct.
In Wright v. Cantrell"3 , a defamation action before an Australian
court, immunity was not granted because, according to Chief Justice
Jordan, "[tihe defendant is not alleged to have defamed another
member of the forces in the course of making a report about him which
it was his duty to make, but to have defamed a civilian whilst doing
something in the course of his duties."'" Although Chief Justice Jordan
assumed that the defendant was a member of the visiting forces, Justice
Roper rather considered the defendant as a civilian employee of the
U.S. and said, "If this view.., is correct the reasoning of [Jordan,
138. For a comment to this effect in the context of state responsibility, see [19751 II
Y.B. INVL L. COMM'N 61-62.
139. Pinochet (No.3), [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 264.
140. Id. at 252, 264.
141. Id. at 270.
142. Boyer, Trib. civ. Marseille, 9e ch., Oct. 18, 1956, Gazette du Palais 1956, 2,
jurisprudence, 319 (Fr.).
143. 44 N.S.W. St. R. 45 (1943).
144. Id. at 53.
284 VOL. 29:4
2001 INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY 285
C.J.,] ... applies a fortiori to show that no case of immunity... is
raised ....
Philippine case law leaves no ambiguity. In Sanders v. Veridiano
11,46 the Supreme Court said, "[Tihe mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for
an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess
of his authority."14 Applying this criterion, the Supreme Court has
denied immunity in a number of cases. 148 Of particular importance
among them is United States of America v. Reyes 49 , in that the court did
not accept the following submission: "[Elven if [the individual
defendant's] act were ultra vires, she would still be immune from suit
for the rule that public officers or employees may be sued in their
personal capacity for ultra vires and tortious acts is 'domestic law' and
not applicable in International Law.""'
U.S. case law is no less unambiguous in refusing state immunity to
those who acted ultra vires. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, in
Pilger v. United States Steel Corp., ' the Public Trustee, a corporation
sole of the U.K., was sued for the seizure and retention of the stock
purchased by Pilger. Affirming that the Public Trustee is a British
governmental agency and that he acted ultra vires, the court stated:
An instrumentality of government, whether corporate or not,.., does
not cease to be personally answerable for acts done under color of the
authority conferred upon it, but, in fact, in excess of that authority and
without legal justification. The immunity of a sovereign against suits
arising out of the unlawful acts of its representatives does not extend
to those who acted in its name, and cannot be set up by them as a bar
152to suits brought against them for the doing of such unlawful acts.
Likewise, after the enactment of the FSIA, the U.S. courts
indicated their intention to deny, or did deny, immunity on the grounds
of ultra vires conduct in various cases, whether brought under the Alien
Tort Claims Actin or not." Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesial" would
145. Id. at 54.
146. 162 S.C.R.A. 88 (1988).
147. Sanders, 162 S.C.R.A. at 94.
148. E.g., Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 S.C.R.A. 713 (1990); Wylie v. Rarang, 209
S.C.R.A. 357 (1992).
149. 219 S.C.R.A. 192 (1993).
150. Id. at 204.
151. 130 Atl. 523 (N.J. 1925).
152. Id. at 524. See also Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929).
153. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995);
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp.
1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. E.g., Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 82; Alicog v. Kingdom of
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serve as an example. This case relates to promissory notes allegedly
issued by the National Defense Security Council of Indonesia. In
respect of the individual defendant, the Court of Appeals, remanding
the case, said, "If the district court finds that Mawardi's actions were
within the scope of his authority, then Mawardi is entitled to a
presumption of immunity under the FSIA; if Mawardi acted without
authority, the FSIA cannot shield him from suit in his individual
capacity." It went on to say, "If the foreign state has not empowered
its agent to act, the agent's unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the
" 151foreign state; ....
It does not seem that any objection can be raised to these cases.
The citation of authority would no longer be required to point to
possible bases of state immunity, such as the principles of sovereignty,
independence, equality and dignity of states. Whether or not any of
them can really provide a satisfactory basis, given that ultra vires
conduct is, by definition, what the state does not authorize or even
prohibits, the denial of state immunity to individuals acting ultra vires
would be contrary to none of them.
It is true that a state might be held legally responsible even for
ultra vires conduct. Yet, this,. standing alone, does not provide any
theoretical or practical reason for making such individual actors
immune from jurisdiction or responsibility. With regard to Lord
Millett's remark,"" it remains unclear why a foreign court cannot
determine whether an act was carried out intra vires or ultra vires,
whereas it can determine, as he presupposes, whether an act was
official or not. It is submitted that the view that state immunity is
granted to individuals even where they acted ultra vires is supported
neither by principle nor by authority.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has demonstrated that the individual is recognized as a
beneficiary of state immunity. The basis for this was sought in the
attribution of the conduct to a foreign state. Problems of ultra vires
conduct were then examined from the standpoint of attribution in state
responsibility and that of functional immunity. Some views that have
been put forward in these areas, if correct, might lend support to state
immunity to individuals even for their ultra vires conduct. However,
Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Doe v. Bolkiah, 74 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D.
Haw. 1998); Shalaby v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 97 Civ. 9393 (DC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17571 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1998).
155. 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 307.
157. Id. at 308.
158. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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closely analyzed, the bases of these views are rather weak. More
importantly, state immunity has simply been denied to individuals
whose ultra vires acts were at issue, and no reason can be found for
according state immunity to such individuals. We can conclude that
there is no ground, either in theory or in practice, to consider that ultra
vires conduct is attributed to the state.
As we have seen, at present, there usually exists a presumption of
immunity for foreign states, whereas no such presumption exists for
individuals. That being the case, different results in terms of immunity
could ensue in civil proceedings concerning ultra vires conduct. If
proceedings are brought against individuals who acted ultra vires, no
room is left for state immunity to be granted. On the other hand, a
foreign state, if named as a defendant, might enjoy immunity from such
proceedings. If this does occur,"9 the immunity accorded to the state
can be explained only as a sort of immunity ratione personae,
illustrating, "the accepted position that state immunity is a personal
plea exempting a state from the jurisdiction otherwise properly
exercisable by reason of its personal status as an independent and
equal state."16
159. E.g., Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Co. v. Jamsostek, 97 Civ. 5116
(HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8181 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1998) and 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1563 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1999). In this case, immunity was denied to the individual
defendant, an employee of an enterprise owned by the Indonesian government, who
engaged in reinsurance activities without authority, whereas immunity was granted to
Indonesia and the enterprise. Id. This is not to say that immunity has been granted to a
foreign state in every ultra vires case. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419
(9th Cir. 1989).
160. Hazel Fox, Access to Justice and State Immunity, 117 L.Q. REV. 10, 13 (2001).

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union between Political
Symbolism
and Legal Realism'
THOMAS VON DANWITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea to adopt a Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) for
the European Union (EU) is a long standing demand raised over and
over again since the early nineteen seventies by national constitutional
courts, governments and community institutions, most notably the
European Parliament and many European law scholars'. But the fate
' Extended version of a lecture held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on Oct.
12, 2000. The lecture is based on the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, Convent 47, Charte 4470/00, Sept. 14, 2000. This article is based on the
final version of the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Convent
50, Charte 4487/00, Sept. 28, 2000; see also Official Journal C 364/2000, 18/12/2000, p. 1-
22.
* Prof. Dr. Thomas von Danwitz, D.I.A.P. (ENA, Paris) holds the Chair for Public and
European Law at Ruhr-University of Bochum. In the Fall semester 2000 he was a
Visiting Professor to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and taught a course in
European Union Law.
1. Gunter Hirsch, EG: Kein Staat, aber eine Verfassung?, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr (NJW) 46, 47 (2000); Udo Di Fabio, Eine europaische Charta, JURISTEN
ZEITUNG (JZ) 737, 740 (2000); Klaus Ritgen, Grundrechtsschutz in der Europdischen
Union, ZEmTSCHRIFr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK (ZRP) 371, 373 (2000); Ingolf Pernice, Eine
Grundrechte-Charta far die Europaische Union, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT (DVBL)
847, 848-851 (2000); Susanne Baer, Grundrechtecharta ante portas, ZRP 361, 362-363
(2000); Albrecht Weber, Die Europdische Grundrechtscharta - auf dem Weg zu einer
europdischen Verfassung, NJW 537, 538, 542 (2000); Gerald Hdfner, Christoph Strawe &
Robert Zuegg, In der Auseinandersetzung um eine Charta der Grundrechte der
Europdischen Union, ZRP 365 (2000); Norbert Reich, Zur Notwendigkeit einer
Europdischen Grundrechtsbeschwerde, ZRP 375 (2000); Josef F. Lindner, EG-
Grundrechtscharta und gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Kompetenzuorbehalt, DIE OFFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG (DOV) 543, 545 (2000); Erhard Denninger, Anmerkungen zur Diskussion
um Europdische Grundrechte, KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFr FOR GESETZGEBUNG
UND REHCHTSWISSENSCHAFr (KRTTV) 145 (2000); Karl A. Schachtschneider, Ein Oktroi,
nicht die gemeinsame Erkenntnis freier Menschen von ihrem Recht, 206 FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ), Sept.5, 2000, at 9; Peter J. Tettinger, Mehr als eine fleiflige
Sammiung zum Schutz vor Eurokraten?, 198 FAZ, Aug. 26, 2000, at 6; Albrecht Weber,
Eine einmalige Chance fir eine europaische Verfassungsgebung, 198 FAZ, Aug. 26, 2000,
at 6; Christian Tomuschat, Manche Rechte bediirfen der Konkretisierung, 181 FAZ, Aug.
7, 2000, at 13; Karl Schwimmer, Einheit - auch in den Menschenrechten, 62 FAZ, Mar. 14,
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of the failed projects striving for a European Constitution issued by the
European Parliament in 1984,2 19893 and 1994", each including a
significant Human Rights chapter,5  might already hint at the
considerable difficulties that the elaboration of a Charter of
Fundamental Rights will face. However at the same time it explains the
important symbolism inherent in this project.
It is indeed a breathtaking endeavor in which the EU engaged itself
following the decision of the Cologne summit in June 1999.6 The EU
called for a Convention charged with the elaboration of a Fundamental
Rights Charter to be solemnly proclaimed by the Nice summit at the
end of 1999 and eventually given full legal force thereafter by inclusion
in the treaties.7 Significant difficulties will have to be overcome to find
a consensus on the role fundamental rights should play as
constitutional limitations to legislative and executive powers, on their
inherent balance between individual and general interests and on their
judicial protection. In this respect, the legal traditions of the member
states of the EU differ considerably. In the constitutional order of the
United Kingdom, the sovereignty of Parliament is still going strong as
we have quite recently been able to witness by the way the Human
Rights of the European Convention of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms have been incorporated into British law 8 In direct opposition
to the British tradition, Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain have fully
embraced the concept of Constitutional jurisdiction 9 and have
established Constitutional Courts as intermediate bodies between the
2000, at 12; Herta Ddubler-Gmelin, Vorn Marktbirger zum EU-Barger, 7 FAZ, Jan. 10,
2000, at 11; Herta Daubler-Gmelin, Eine europdische Charta der Grundrechte - Beitrag
zur gemeinsamen Identitdt, EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTscHAFTSRECHT (EuZW) 1
(2000); Bernhard Losch & Wiltrud C. Radau, Grundrechtskatalog fur die Europdische
Union, ZRP 84, 85 (2000).
2. See JORGEN SCHWARZ AND ROLAND BIEBER, EiNE VERFASSUNG FOR EUROPA, 317
ff. (1984) [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 11.
3. Parliament Resolution Adopting the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51 [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 2].
4. Parliament Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C
61) 155 [hereinafter Parliament Resolution 3].
5. See Parliament Resolution 1 supra note 2; Parliament Resolution 2 supra note 3;
Parliament Resolution 3 supra note 4.
6. European Council Conclusion of June 4, 1999, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-
ZEITSCHRIFT (EuGRZ), 364 (1999); see also European Council Conclusion of Oct. 15, 1999,
available at http'//europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm.
7. European Council Conclusion of June 4, 1999 supra note 6, at 364.
8. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §4 (2)(4)(6), §10 (2), §19 (Eng.).
9. Ernst Benda, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN WESTEUROPA 124-5 (Christian Starck & Albrecht
Weber eds., 1986) [hereinafter VGBK IN WE]; Karl Korinek, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit
in Osterreich, in VGBK IN WE 155-9; Theo Ritterspach, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in
Italien, in VGBK IN WE 225-7; Francisco R. Llorente, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in
Spanien, in VGBK IN WE 251-4.
290 VOL. 29:4
2001 THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EU 291
legislative branch of government and the people in the way it has
already been designed in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist papers." But
this concept is far from meeting consensus on the European continent.
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands do not operate a system of
constitutional jurisdiction" and even under the French concept of
preventive constitutional control, statutory laws are still largely
conceived as volont6 gdnbral, an expression which has become famous
after Rousseau.2 Therefore the Conseil constitutionnel is generally
tempted to a significant extent to uphold parliamentary statutes
against Fundamental Right claims.'3
The difficulties of finding a common language on the adequate
degree of fundamental rights protection against statutory law-making
in Europe can nicely be illustrated by referring to a joke about our
practical experience with the linguistic difficulties occurring in the
melting pot of European legal traditions, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). One advantage of the multi-lingual character of proceedings
before the ECJ is that it sometimes provides moments of light relief.
Visitors to the Court always enjoy watching the gesticulations of the
interpreters. Something that causes interpreters particular difficulty is
jokes, since these often only make sense in the language in which they
are told. One quick-witted interpreter got round this problem by saying
"Counsel is in the process of telling a joke. It is completely impossible to
translate. However, I think it would be polite to laugh.., now!" The
judges dutifully chuckled at the appropriate moment and Counsel could
be seen preening himself on his wit.14
II. CAUSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT
In the diplomatic language of the Cologne summit" the Charter is
designed to express the overall importance of fundamental rights for
the EU's citizens by rendering them more visible in the solemnly
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
11. Author's opinion.
12. JEAN-JACQUES ROuSSEAu, Du CONTRAT SoCIAL 69 (Frangois Bouchardy ed.,
Egloff Paris 1946) (1762).
13. Cons. const. 83-162 of July 20, 1983, J.O., July 22, 1983, p. 2267; AL.D., p. 63;
Cons. const. 86-207 of June 26, 1986, J.O., June 27, 1986, p. 7978; A-L.D., p. 71; Cons.
const. 98401 of June 10, 1998, J.O., June 14, 1998, p. 9036; A.L.D., p. 258 ; Marie-Pauline
Deswarte, L'intdrft gdndral dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, REVUE
FRANCAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (R.F.D.C.) 23, 36 (1993); Laurent Habib, La notion
d'erreur manifeste d'apprdciation dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, RDP
695, 709 (1986).
14. This wit is purely fictional and not attributable to a particular incident at the
ECJ.
15. See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl. para. 4;
see also Daubler-Gmelin, Vom Marktbirger zum EU.Bilrger, supra note 1 at 11.
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declared Charter.' Starting off from this basis it has been argued that
a Charter of Fundamental Rights will enhance the citizen's
identification with the EU and will therefore - similar to the idea of
constitutional patriotism - form the nucleus for a future European
identity. 17 Without denouncing the value of a written Human Rights
Charter for the citizen's consciousness, let me express my reserves on
this point. Technically we don't need a constitutional Charter for the
EU - the treaties serve this purpose perfectly well."6 The nature of the
treaties as a constitutional statute has already been recognized by the
European Court of Justice some fifteen years ago19 and has not been
called into question ever since. Nonetheless there is an ongoing debate
about the making of a European Constitution these days." It is easy to
understand the political appeal inherent in that symbolism, but it is
difficult to grasp the substantial change of European constitution
building in a strictly legal sense. There is of course the long-standing
demand for a clear-cut catalogue of respective competences and their
division between the European institutions and the member states."
But this undertaking can easily be realized within the existing frame of
the treaties and does not require their re-labeling as a European
constitution. Given the fact that a definite transfer of ultimate
sovereignty of the member states to the EU" is politically excluded for
the foreseeable future," a European constitution could in any case only
be considered a complementary constitutional order concluded amongst
the member states in order to assure a joint exercise of sovereignty
rights. In that respect again there is little difference to the current
situation, in which member states have agreed to form an ever-closer
union without setting a time limit." Under both constructions the
member states keep the theoretical option to leave the EU while
practically continuing to create a common political identity that makes
it realistically impossible to terminate membership unilaterally. Aside
from the semantic appeal of this project, legally there seems to be little
new in the idea of a European constitution. Politically we don't need all
16. Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 15.
17. Weber, Eine einmalige Chance fair eine europdische Verfassungsgebung, supra
note 1 at 6; see also Weber, Die Europdische Grundrechtscharta - auf dem Weg zu einer
europaischen Verfassung, supra note 1 at 537.
18. Jean-Claude Piris, L'Union europdenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il
une? 35 (4) RTDE 599-635 (1999).
19. See Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365; see also
Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 6102, para. 21.
20. See di Fabio, supra note 1, at 740, 743; see also Piris, supra note 18, at 599-635.
21. THOMAS VON DANwITz, VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES SYSTEM UND EUROPAISCHE
INTEGRATION 427 (1996).
22. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech in Warsaw (Oct. 6, 2000); see also
French President Jacques Chirac, Speech in the German Bundestag (June 27, 2000).
23. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, pmbl., 1997 O.J. (C340) 145, available at
http://europa.eu.int.
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the difficulties that would undoubtedly occur in the course of a
realization or even of a possible failure of such a project. Finally, I
think the fascination for fundamental rights protection should not lead
us to an unrealistic assessment of the impact that such a Charter would
have on the hearts and minds of the average European citizen. We
should praise ourselves lucky if a significant portion of the population
will be aware of its existence once it has been adopted.
In legal reality the principal reason for elaborating a Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU is the widespread concern, if not
skepticism, of whether the level of human rights protection assured by
the ECJ is really meeting the importance attached to them on the
national level and the legitimate expectations of the citizensof the EU.
In spite of the lacking textual basis in the original treaties, the ECJ has
- after overcoming some early reserves2' - devoted much of its
jurisprudence to recognize and develop fundamental rights.' The ECJ
certainly deserves credit for this judge made protection of fundamental
rights, even when we have to bear in mind that its motivation was
certainly not exclusively the desire to protect human rights for their
own sake. A second motivation for the ECJ certainly was the need for
European fundamental rights protection in order to ensure the
supremacy of European law over national constitutional law, which was
challenged by fundamental rights claims put forward against European
legislation.8
Despite a rich fundamental rights' jurisprudence of the ECJ, the
level of protection has always remained a principal reason for doubtful
assessments by fundamental rights scholars, particularly from Italy
and Germany.27 For the academic community, particularly in these
24. See e.g. Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority, 1959 E.C.R. 17, 26-7; Joined Cases 36,
37, 38 & 40/59, Geitling v. High Authority, 1960 E.C.R. 423.
25. See e.g. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case
4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491; Case 44t79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3745; Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 E.C.R.
2609; see also ELLEN CHWOLIK-LANFERMANN, GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN UNION, 47 (1994).
26. Compare Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking
Rights Seriously?, 29 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW (CMLREV) 669, 682 (1992), with
Joseph H. H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, 'Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The
European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 32 CMLREV 51, 52-3 (1995).
27. Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, New International Law in National
Systems: Community Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 609 (1985);
Giovanni Pau, Il diritto della Comunitd economica europea nell'ordinamento italiano, 67
Riv. DIR. INT. 512 (1987); Adelina Adinolfi, The Judicial Application of Community Law in
Italy (1981-1997), 35 CMLREV 1313, 1323 (1998); RUDOLF STREINZ,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTLICHER GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ UND EUROPAISCHES
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECET 309 (1989); HANS-WERNER RENGELING, GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN
DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 209 (1992); Albert Bleckmann, Die Rechtsquellen des
Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT (NVwZ)
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countries used to strict human rights scrutiny, it remains a striking
statistical fact that fundamental rights claims against EU legislation
concerning property and professional liberty have not been successful
over the past 30 years in one single case before the ECJ.' Compared to
the high number of verdicts from national constitutional courts over
national legislation regulating property rights and professional liberty,
this practice raised doubts over the effectiveness of judicial review
exercised by the ECJ.' At the same time it has to be acknowledged
that the ECJ apparently tends to favor other legal grounds than
fundamental rights for review of European legislation." Therefore, in
the end it appears unjustified to criticize the court for a complete lack of
fundamental rights protection in such decisive fields as professional
liberties and property rights, but it explains at the same time the well-
founded skepticism on the level of fundamental rights protection
exercised by the ECJ. In both countries the constitutional courts have
explicitly reserved themselves the right to exercise a final review, but
only under the condition that the constitutionally prescribed level of
fundamental rights protection for their national citizens would
generally not be attained by the ECJ.3' Since the respective
constitutions do not contain any provision on the required level of
protection, it' becomes quite apparent that a written Fundamental
Rights Charter can do little about the level of protection that is
practically ensured by any jurisdiction. But there is a real influence the
Fundamental Rights Charter can exercise. By convincing the ECJ of
the overall importance of the protection of fundamental rights it can
lead the ECJ to accept that this is the principal mission it has to
824, 827 (1993); Martin Nettesheim, Grundrechtliche Priufdichte durch den EuGH, EUZW
106, 107 (1995); Ulrich Everling, Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement
of the Court of Justice and National Courts, 33 CMLREV 401, 413 (1996); Torsten Stein,
Bananen-Split? Entzweien sich BVerfG und EuGH uber den Bananenstreit?, EUZW 261
(1998); Ritgen, supra note 1 at 372; Gerald G. Sander, Europdischer Gerichtshof und
nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, DOV 588, 589-592 (2000).
28. See Thorsten Kingreen, art. 6 EUV, in KOMMENTAR DES VERTRAGES OBER DIE
EUROPIASCHE UNION UND DES VERTRAGES ZUR GROYNDUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN
GEMEINScHAFT 78 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 1999); Ritgen, supra note
1 at 372.
29. See Nettesheim, supra note 27, at 106; see also Everling, supra note 27, at 401,
413; Stein, supra note 27, at 261, 262; Stefan Storr, Zur Bonitat des Grundrechtsschutzes
in der Europdischen Union, 36 DER STAAT 547, 552 (1997).
30. It should not be concealed that the European Court of Justice stated a breach of
the protection of confidence which is - whereas independently guaranteed by European
Community law - tied with the property right in German Constitutional law. See e.g.
Case 170/86, Deetzen v. Hauptzollant Hamburg-Jonas, 1988 E.C.R. 2368, 2373; Theodor
Schilling, Eigentum und Marktordnung nach Gemeinschafts- und nach deutschem Recht,
EuGRZ 177, 184 (1998); Ritgen, supra note 1, at 372; Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of
Germany v. Parliament, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419, para. 50.
31. See BVerfGE 73 339 (Solange II), 387; see also BverfGE 89 155 (Maastricht), 175;
Corte cost., Dec. 27, 1973, EUR 1974, 255, 261; Riv. dir. internaz. [1989], p. 104; Riv. it.
dir. pubbl. com. [19961, p. 764.
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accomplish." Hopefully this will indirectly lead to an enhanced level of
fundamental rights protection in the EU.n
It is particularly important to convince the ECJ that fundamental
rights need to be protected in a more efficient way in the future, since
the ECJ denied the European Communities' power to enter into the
system of human rights protection established by the European
Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms some years ago."
Thereby it left the political institutions of the European Communities
without a legal option for an enhanced protection of fundamental rights.
Interestingly enough the central motivation for the ECJ's reluctance to
enter into the protection offered by the system of the Convention was
the Court's desire to safeguard its jurisdictional autonomy towards the
European Court of Human Rights. 35  This attitude is not without
delicacy since the ECJ is required to surrender a lot of this procedural
autonomy and to fully participate in the system of preliminary ruling
proceedings established by article 234 ECT from the national
constitutional courts. 6
III. THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSED CHARTER
A close look at the Charter as it has been drafted by the Convention
reveals an impressive compilation of fundamental rights already
recognized in a variety of national constitutions and international
human rights charters.37 Given the multitude of inspiring sources for
the Charter it is remarkable to see the slim product of the Convention's
deliberations: 54 short cut articles are considered sufficient legislative
out-put to accomplish the Charter's mission. In that respect the Charter
sticks to the conventional wisdom of continental tradition that
32. In order to promote this objective, additional modifications of the Court's
procedural law might appear helpful. For example, the Advocate general could be
required to give a comparative overview over the level of protection in all Member states.
Furthermore an additional Advocate general exclusively treating cases of significant
importance to Fundamental Rights might give this new mission an institutional backing.
33. See Ritgen, supra note 1, at 372.
34. See Giorgio Gaja, Annotation: Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Given on 28 March 1996, Not Yet Reported, 33 CMLREV 973, 983 (1996) (discussing ECJ
Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.C.R. 1-1759 at 1789, para. 36) and
PATRICK WACHSMANN, LEs DROITS DE L'HOMME 175 (3d ed. 1997).
35. See Giorgio Gaja, Id.
36. See Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Der EuGH und die Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten
- Komponenten der richterlichen Gewalt in der Europiiischen Union, 27 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1889 (2000).
37. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1,
8, Preamble, para. 5, http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf [hereinafter
Charter].
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constitutions have to be short and obscure, as already Abbg Siey~s3 has
put it. This rule was of course established to ensure the utmost
flexibility for the political institutions acting under a constitution. 9 In
the EU's system of constitutional jurisdiction, it is certain that the ECJ
is perfectly aware of how to take advantage of this drafting technique.
It matches perfectly well with the flexibility seeking judicial strategy, in
which the ECJ's judgments are essentially phrased."'
1. Contents and Particularities of the Charter
In general, the granted rights do not contain much of a surprise.
The Charter is based upon the traditional concept of fundamental
rights as a tool to protect citizens against public authority
interventions. The Charter is divided into seven chapters on dignity,
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, justice and general
provisions.4 1 After starting out with fundamental values such as human
dignity,42 the right to life3 and personal integrity" in the first chapter,
the chapter on freedoms contains the rights to liberty and security,45 the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, 6 expression and information.'
The economic freedoms to choose an occupation,4 to conduct business49
and the right to education ° and property"' are also laid down in this
chapter. This chapter of the Charter contains also guarantees for the
respect of private life,52 the protection of personal data3 and against
removal, expulsion and extradition." In contrast to this general
38. See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYAS, POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 1788-1790 166, n.28
(Eberhard Schmitt & Rolf Reichardt trans. & eds.) (1975). The claim for "obscurity" is
ascribed to tradition, compare Jacques Godechot, L'histoire constitutionnelle de la France
de 1789 ek nos jours, 38 JOR N.F. 45, 54 (1989), and even doubted by THOMAS HAFEN VON
WrrENBACH, STAAT, GESELLSCHAFr UND BURGER IM DENKEN VON EMMANUEL JOSEPH
SIEYES 102 n.51 (1994).
39. THOMAS HAFEN VON WITTENBACH, Id.
40. See THOMAS VON DANWITZ, VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES SYSTEM UND
EUROPAISCHE INTEGRATION 150 et seq. (1996) (providing details of the imperatoria
brevitas of the Court's judgments and a critical assessment).
41. Ch. I: arts. 1-5, ch. II: arts. 6-19, ch. III: arts. 20-26, ch. IV: arts. 27-38, ch. V: arts.
39-46, ch. VI: arts. 47-50, ch. VII: arts. 51-54. Charter, supra note 37, at 9 et seq.
42. Id. at 9, art. 1.
43. Id. at 9, art. 2.
44. Id. at 9, art. 3.
45. Id. at 10, art. 6.
46. Id. at 10, art. 10.
47. Id. at 11, art. 11.
48 Id. at 11, art. 15.
49. Id. at 12, art. 16.
50. Id. at 11, art. 14.
51. Id. at 12, art. 17.
52. Id. at 10, art. 7.
53. Id. at 10, art. 8.
54. Id. at 12, art. 19.
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approach of the Charter some far-reaching rights are granted in chapter
IV on "solidarity".5 5  They include not only the right to collective
bargaining and action" and legal protection against unfair dismissal,57
but also the right to reconcile family and professional life' and the
access to services of general economic interest.55 With the latter
guarantee, the Charter joins the French concept of the constitutional
value of the so-called service public.6 A most recent development is
reflected in the principles set out with respect to the fields of medicine
and biology, such as the prohibition of any reproductive cloning of
human beings.6' Finally, the individually granted right to an effective
remedy before a court is worth noting. In article 47 paragraph 1 of the
Charter, the concept to protect individual rights by independent courts
clearly prevails over the idea to objectively ensure the rule of law by
forms of inner-administrative control, as they subsist in British and,
though to a lesser extend, in French administrative law.6
2
In comparison to the richness of values embodied in the human
rights chapters of national constitutions, the Charter has too few, too
indefinite and too neutral notions to offer.' This is certainly not a
weakness of the Charter itself, but it reflects directly the unique nature
of the EU as a compound of national states with a great variety of
distinct societies, each of them representing a quite different set of
values. The mutual respect for their diversity in culture, tradition and
identity, as it is underlined in paragraph 3 of the Charter's preamble,"
requires a somewhat minimalist understanding of common European
55. Art. 27 (Workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking),
art. 28 (Right of collective bargaining and action), art. 29 (Right of access to placement
services), art. 30 (Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal), art. 31 (Fair and just
working conditions), art. 32 (Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at
work), art. 33 (Family and professional life), art. 34 (Social security and social assistance),
art. 35 (Health care), art. 36 (Access to services of general economic interest), art. 37
(Environmental protection), art. 38 (Consumer protection). See id. at 15-17.
56. Id. at 15, art. 28.
57. Id. at 15, art. 30.
58. Id. at 16, art. 33.
59. Id. at 17, art. 36.
60. For details see Patrick Delvolv6, Service public et libertes publiques, R.F.D.A., 1
(1985); Louis Favoreu, Service public et Constitution, A.J., June 1997 at 16, note special.
61. See Charter, supra note 37 at 9, art. 3, para. 3.
62. For the different concepts in German and French administrative law and their
respective influence on EC-law, see Thomas von Danwitz, Zur Grundlegung einer Theorie
der subjektiv-offentlichen Gemeinschaftsrechte, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 481
(1996); Jean-Marie Woehrling, Die franzosische Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im Vergleich
mit der deutschen, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 21, 23, 25 (1985); Jean-
Marie Woehrling, Die deutsche und franzosische Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit an der
Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, NEUE ZEITCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 462, 464
(1998).
63. See Charter, supra note 37 at 8, Preamble.
64. See id. at 8, Preamble, para. 3.
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values embodied in the guaranteed fundamental rights of the Charter,
even at the price of a certain meaninglessness. For sure, this dilemma
directly raises doubts as to whether an entity such as the EU deserves a
Fundamental Rights Charter. Furthermore it hints, once again, at the
questions about the final objective of the European integration process
between uniformity and diversity.
2. Remaining Problems
Beyond this structural problem of the entire project, the draft
version of the Charter contains quite a number of obvious weaknesses,
contradictions and unanswered questions both of technical and political
nature. For example, it remains undecided whether only the
institutions of the EU and the member states are subject to the
Charter's guarantees while implementing EU law, as article 51
paragraph 1 suggests,' or whether the Charter will produce horizontal
effects, thus binding private enterprises and citizens, as most of the
social rights of the Charter presuppose.'
a) The Rule on Limitations of Fundamental Rights
A point of essential importance for the evaluation of the Charter is
the scope of the granted rights. For the practical importance of an
effective fundamental rights protection, it is not so much the statutory
guarantee that matters, but the extend to which limitations of these
fundamental rights, as they are inherent in any kind of legislation, are
constitutionally permitted. Both the democratic principle and the rule
of law require in a long-standing constitutional tradition in
parliamentary systems that such a limitation can only result from a
legislative act passed by parliament.67 Only parliamentary legislation
can provide the required democratic legitimacy for any limitation of
65. See id. at 21, art. 51.
66. Article 51 paragraph 1 provides: "The provisions of this Charter are addressed to
the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall
therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in
accordance with their respective powers," (see id. at 21, art. 51); Article 32: "The
employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment
may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules
as may be more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations. Young
people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be
protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health
or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education," (see
id. at 16, art. 32); Matthias Mahlmann, Die Grundrechtscharta der Europdischen Union,
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHE STUDIEN, 419 at 438 (2000).
67. See DIMITRIS TRIANTAFYLLoU, VOM VERTRAGS- ZUM GESETZESVORBEHALT 158 et
seq. (1996).
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fundamental rights. Contrary to that tradition, the provision foreseen
in article 52 paragraph 1, only requiring a legal provision by the
competent legislative authority for any kind of fundamental rights
limitation, 69 hardly addresses the problem at all. With this provision
the Charter falsely pretends that any legislative act of EU institutions
could produce sufficient democratic legitimacy to limit fundamental
rights. This is particularly doubtful for the regulating power of the
European Commission under article 86 paragraph 3 ECT.70 Instead of
making an effort to reduce the democratic deficit of the European
Communities, the Charter merely denies its existence.71 Even without
addressing the unsolved question of the democratic insufficiencies of the
European Parliament, it would have been the least to require a
legislative act jointly passed by Council and Parliament according to
the procedure foreseen in article 251 ECT 71 for any limitation of
fundamental rights. But since this would have opened such important
fields as the common agricultural policy and the regulation of public
enterprises to the Parliament's consent, basic requirements of the
democratic principle were, once again, sacrificed on the altar of
European integrationist pragmatism.
b) The Provision on Proportionality
I have already noted that there is a widespread skepticism among
European law scholars about the level of fundamental rights protection
ensured by the ECJ. It is particularly the way in which the ECJ has
employed the principle of proportionality in conceding a wide margin of
discretion to the law-making institutions that has aroused this
68. For details see 49 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (BVerfGE) 89, 126 et seq. (1978);
53 BVerfGE 30, 56 (1979); 61 BVerfGE 260, 275; 88 BVerfGE 103, 116 (1993).
Concerning Article 34 of the French constitution, "la loi fixe les r~gles concernant les
droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales accord~es aux citoyens pour 1'exercice des
libertds publiques" (CONST. DE 1958 art. 34 (Fr.), httpJ/www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/textes/constit.pdf) see Conseil Constitutionnel, 27.11.1959, R.A.T.P.,
Rec. 67, and Cons. Const. 82-143 DC, July 30, 1982 Blocage des Prix et des Revenus, Rec.
57. The prerequisite is explicitly laid down in the constitution of the Swiss Confederation
set in force on Apr. 18, 1999 (CONST. art. 36, para. 1 (Switz.),
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/101/a36.html), as well as the Spanish Constitution set in
force on Dec. 29, 1978 (CONST. ESPANOLA art. 53, para. 1 (Spain),
http://www.valencianet.com/constitucion/consttl.htm). See supra note 31.
69. See Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 52, para 1.
70. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3, art. 86, para. 3 (1997), http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/ecsconstreatyen.pdf [hereinafter EC TREATY].
71. Even the requirement foreseen in an earlier draft of the Charter that a limitation
of fundamental rights could not result from a provision issued for mere implementation
purposes, was abandoned.
72. See EC Treaty, supra note 70 at art. 251.
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concern.73  Though the principle of proportionality is particularly
mentioned in article 52 paragraph 1," this provision does not take the
conventional doctrine into account that limitations of fundamental
rights can only pass the proportionality test, if the legitimate interest
pursued by a statutory act can out-weight the particular importance of
the fundamental right specifically concerned. Therefore we might
continue to see the unspecified and unsubstantiated reference to the
proportionality of statutory law-making by EU institutions, as it has
marked the rulings of the ECJ so far."3 By supposing that any
legitimate objective pursued by legislation must be genuinely met, this
provision at least gives the ECJ the mandate to verify in its own
competence whether the objectives pursued by EU legislation are
virtually given.6 This diagnosis shows that the Charter's provision on
proportionality is far from providing satisfactory results, if you consider
a strict application of the proportionality test desirable. To the contrary
it seems that the Charter's provision concedes a wide margin of
discretion to the legislative institutions of the EU. In sum, the
provision on proportionality cannot be considered sufficient to calm the
widespread criticism of the ECJ's current practice.
c) The Level of Protection
The provisions in article 52 paragraph 37 and article 5378 designed
to ensure an adequate level of fundamental rights protection reflect
73. See Everling supra note 27 at 419; ANGELIKA EMMERIcH-FRITSCHE, DER
GRUNDSATZ DER VERHALTNISMABIGKEIT ALS DIREKTIVE UND SCHRANKE DER EG-
RECHTSETZIUNG 365 (2000); PETER SELMER, DIE GEWAHRLEISTUNG DER UNABDINGBAREN
GRUNDRECHTSSTANDARDS DURCH DEN EUGH 108 (1998); Nettesheim, supra note 27 at
106.
74. "Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others." Charter, supra note 37 at 21,
art. 52, para. 1.
75. Walter Pauly, Strukturfragen des unionsrechtlichen Grundrechtsschutzes,
EUROPA-RECHT 242, 259 et seq. (1998); Georg M. Berrisch, Zum ,Bananen" - Urteil des
EuGH yom 5.10.1994 - Rs. C-280/93, Deutschland ./. Rat der Europaischen Union,
EUROPA-RECHT 461, 465 et seq. (1994); Nettesheim, supra note 27 at 106 et seq.
76. Author's opinion.
77. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection. Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 52, para. 3.
78. Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and by the Member States' constitutions. Id. at 21, art. 53.
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more of an indefinite political symbolism than of a reliable normative
answer to the problem. Article 53 is nothing more than a general
guideline for the ECJ not to stay behind the protection granted by
international law, international agreements signed by the EU or its
member states and their respective constitutions. Since the level of
protection offered under these different declarations is far from being
homogenous, this guideline still leaves it open to the ECJ to choose the
specific level of protection, which it considers adequate for the EU. More
precisely than article 53, article 52 paragraph 3 directly links the
fundamental rights of the EU to the corresponding guarantees of the
European Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms. 9 In view
of the current jurisprudence of the ECJ, this provision should lead to a
significant rise of the fundamental rights protection in the EU that may
not be neglected.0 Nonetheless it has to be noted that a procedural link
from the ECJ to the European Court of Human Rights is still missing.
Given the identity of substantial standards, as the Charter requires
them, the lack of any procedural link between the two jurisdictions is
particularly regrettable. Therefore a preliminary ruling procedure
designed after art. 234 ECT, as it has already been proposed,81 would be
an adequate way to fully ensure an overall accordance of fundamental
rights protection between both Courts. •
If the standard of the European Convention would generally
become the fundamental rights standard for the EU, this development
would, without any doubt, constitute a significant improvement and
reassurance for the protection of fundamental rights in the European
Union in general. Nonetheless the disparities between the
constitutionally granted rights within the member states and the
protection level of their corresponding rights on the European scale
would still persist. For the foreseeable future there is little hope in
sight that the reserves expressed by the constitutional courts of Italy
and Germany on the protection of fundamental rights by the ECJ will
be lifted. At the bottom line, these differences seem to reflect quite
distinct historical experiences in the 20' century. After national
socialism, war and communism in one part of the country, Germany,
79. Id. at 21, art. 52, para. 3.
80. For different levels of protection. see, e.g., Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst
AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, 2924, para. 17; Niemietz v. Germany, App. No.
13710/88, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, para. 31 (1993); Case 374/87, Orkem SA v. Commission,
1989 E.C.R. 3283, 3350, para. 30; Funke v. France, App. No. 10828/84, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep.
297, para. 44 (1993); Case C-260189, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v.
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 2963, para. 41 et seq.; Lentia v. Austria,
App. No. 13914/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93, para. 39 et seq. (1994); Case C-159190, Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland ltd. v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, 4741,
para. 28 et seq.; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 53, para. 70 et seq. (1992).
81. See Walter Schwimmer, Einheit - auch in den Menschenrechten, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 14, 2000, at 12.
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Italy, Spain and Portugal have considered an extended protection of
fundamental rights as a master plan to safeguard their happily
acquired democracy. 2  As Roman Herzog, who presided over the
Convention charged with the elaboration of the Fundamental Rights
Charter, put it while he was still serving as President of the German
Constitutional Court: "I have - despite the impressive jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice on Fundamental Rights - never withheld
that my colleagues of the second Senate appear to me like the evil
parents of Haensel and Gretel, who abandon their innocent children
quite unexpectedly in a forest of restricted protection of fundamental
rights, particularly because the high standard of fundamental rights
protection is not one of the typical German exaggerations, but a lesson
from bitter days."' On the contrary, the historical record of the United
Kingdom and partly of France show that an elaborated system of
judicial protection for individually granted fundamental rights is not
the only possible way to individual freedom and to stable social
conditions for a successful democracy.84 The principal difference
between the two approaches is nothing less fundamental than the
necessity of constitutional jurisdiction. While the British conception
resides on trust in the traditional, but legally unenforceable respect of
fundamental rights by political institutions • as safeguard of
fundamental rights, the mainstream perception on the European
continent favors the need for jurisdictional control as an ultimate
safeguard of an effective human rights protection.85 It seems that the
convincing results achieved by constitutional jurisdictions around the
world seem to mark the way for the future development. With the
steadily growing heritage of common experiences in the collective
memory of the European peoples, these different perceptions will only
step by step be replaced by a joint understanding for an adequate level
of fundamental rights protection.
82. See Konrad Hesse, Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 427, 430 (1978);
KLAUS STERN, DAs STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND III/l § 60 (1988);
JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART 42 et seq. (1951).
83. See Roman Herzog, Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen des
Binnenmarktes aus deutscher Sicht, in BITBURGER GESPRACHE JAHRBUCH 1990 1, 2
(Gesellschaft ffir Rechtspolitik Trier ed., 1990).
84. See Dieter Feger, Die Grundrechte in den ibrigen Mitgliedstaaten der EG
einschliefllich der Rechte der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention, JURISTISCHE
AUSBILDUNG 6, 8 et seq., 12 et seq. (1987).
85. See Hesse, supra note 85 at 429; Paula Kingston & Colin Imrie, Vereinigtes
Konigreich, in GRUNDRECHTE IN EUROPA UND USA, 715, 787 et seq. (Eberhard Grabitz ed.,
1986).
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE CHARTER IN THE FUTURE COURSE OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION
The most intriguing aspect of the Charter is without any doubt
treated in article 51 paragraph 2.86 According to this provision, the
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the European
Community or the EU and does not modify powers and tasks defined by
the treaties.87 The political message of subsidiarity is quite easy to
catch, but the substantial problem that it is designed to address merits
closer study.
This provision reflects the identical experience of such different
countries as the United States, Canada, Switzerland and Germany that
the installation of a strong fundamental rights jurisdiction on the
federal level will necessarily create uniform legal standards" and
thereby over time bear significant harmonization effects. This is as well
and particularly true for the jurisprudence of the ECJ, using
fundamental rights to review national legislation of the member states
even in fields where the Community has no powers. Quite recently the
ECJ has moreover proceeded the same way89 despite an explicit
limitation of the fundamental right in question to the tasks of the
Communities outlined in article 3 paragraph 2 ECT.' In addition to
this general experience in federal states and to the particular heritage
of the ECJ's jurisprudence, the extent to which the ECJ is able to apply
European fundamental rights in order to review legislation of the
member states is far from being precisely defined. According to the
ECJ's constant jurisprudence, national legislation is up for review, if it
is situated within the frame of the EC law.91 This notion, of course, is
86. "This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the
Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties." Charter, supra note 37 at 21,
art. 51, para. 2.
87. Id.
88. Concerning Canada see Ludwig Weber, Grundrechtsschutz in Kanada -
Ungeschriebene Grundrechte und die kanadische Bill of Rights, 40 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 727, 746 (1980), concerning the
United States see William Joseph Wagner, The Role of Basic Values in the Contemporary
Constitutional Hermeneutics of Germany and the United States, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 178, 189 et seq. (1996), and,
though euphemistically pronounced, see Weber, supra note 1.
89. See Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000 E.C.R. 1-69,
para. 17 [20001; Case C-273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board, 1999 E.C.R. I-
7403 at 7440, para. 17 [19991.
90. "In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women." EC TREATY,
supra note 70 at art. 3, para. 2.
91. See Joined Cases 201 & 202/85 Klensch v. Secretaire d'etat h l'Agriculture dt A la
Viticulture, 1986 E.C.R. 3477, 3507, para. 8; Case 5/88 Wachauf v. Bundesamt fir
Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, 1989 E.C.R. 2609. 2639, para. 19; Case C-260/89, supra
note 83 at 2964, para. 42; Florence Zampini, La Cour de justice des Communautds
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLWY
designed to give the ECJ a maximum of flexibility and to avoid any
precision on the field of application for European fundamental rights.
Therefore it seems well suited for further use under the Charter's
applicability rule in article 51 paragraph 1. In the end, we might see
things completely unchanged left to the discretion of the ECJ.
The doubts cast over the sincerity of the subsidiarity approach of
article 51 paragraph 1 and 2 are even multiplied by the simple fact that
it is contradicted by quite a number of specifically granted rights. The
prohibition of death penalty and the principles governing criminal
procedures as well as the right to collective bargaining are undoubtedly
important guarantees. But as long as the EU and the member
Communities have no power in these fields, such guarantees make no
sense under the subsidiarity approach. They seem to be designed for
powers to be acquired by the European Communities in these fields in
the future. But since powers need to be formally transferred to the EU,93
it seems no more than logical to link the grant of the corresponding
fundamental rights to the transfer of new powers. Therefore the
precipitated grant of fundamental rights seems to serve only one
purpose: to provide the frame of EU law that the ECJ requires in order
to exercise judicial review over national legislation in these fields.
V. CONCLUSION
Summing up all different aspects for a conclusion, the Charter
certainly deserves the solemn declaration foreseen by the heads of state
for the Nice summit, but it is quite clearly not ready to enter into legal
force.' Given the fundamental importance of the legal status of the
Charter, it appears quite evident that the entire project is closely linked
to the elaboration of a precisely defined catalogue of legislative and
executive powers and their division between the European institutions
and the member states. As long as this principal dispute has not been
settled, it would be legally misleading and politically unwise to enforce
harmonization effects by formally adopting a Fundamental Rights
Charter and thereby aggravate the dispute over a suitable competence
structure for the enlarged European Union. 5
europdenes, gardienne des droits fondamentaux ,dans le cadre du droit communautaire",
35 R.T.D.E. 659 (1999).
92. See Charter, supra note 37 at 21, art. 51, para. 1.
93. See id. at 21, art. 51.
94. For this judgment, see Tomuschat, supra note 1.
95. See Hirsch, supra note 1; Tettinger, supra note 1.
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SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
VED P. NANDA"
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-determination and secession pose major challenges for
international lawyers-the former for its ambiguity and difficulties of
operationalization and the latter for the uncertainty of its status, since
it is neither permitted nor prohibited under international law. This
essay is aimed at analyzing the concepts in a historical context.
Sections II and III will provide the context, followed by a general
discussion of self-determination. Section IV discusses the Canadian
Supreme Court's opinion on Quebec's claim unilaterally to secede;
Section V reviews two recent cases-Kosovo and East Timor. The
concluding section recommends a few criteria to be used in determining
the validity of claims to secede.
II. THE CONTEXT
President Bill Clinton's address on October 8, 1999, in Quebec,
Canada, illustrated the dilemma for U.S. foreign policy on these issues.
President Clinton said that the United States would "oppose the
breakup of Canada, a country with a relatively decent record of
observance of human rights, especially those of the Quebecois. .... "2 He
contrasted the situation in Quebec with that in East Timor, where
Indonesia's military and militia had slaughtered hundreds of innocent
civilians and forced expulsion of tens of thousands of others.3 He also
explained the United Nations invasion of Serbia, where Serbs had
oppressed a rebellious Kosovar population.4
President Clinton considered questionable the assertion that every
This is an adapted version of a presentation at the Americas' Regional Conference on
Secession and International Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, February 2001.
"Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director,
International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
1. See Arnold Beichman, Secessions us. Praise for Unity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1999, at A16.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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ethnic, religious or tribal group seeking secession should have the right
to secede. For both political and economic reasons he implicitly rejected
the creation of too many mini-states. He extolled instead the virtues of
federalism, that is, the sharing of power between a central government
and sub-national units such as states or provinces. I quote him at
length:
It seems to me that the suggestion that a people of a given ethnic group
or tribal group or religious group can only have a meaningful
communal existence if they are an independent nation - not if there is
no oppression, not if they have genuine autonomy, but they must be
actually independent - is a questionable assertion in a global economy
where cooperation pays greater benefits in every area of life than
destructive competition.... And so we have spent much of the 20th
century trying to reconcile President Woodrow Wilson's belief that
different nations had the right to be free - nations being people with a
common consciousness - had a right to be a state ....
When a people thinks it should be independent in order to have a
meaningful political existence, serious questions should be asked: Is
there an abuse of human rights? Is there a way people can get along if
they come from different heritages? Are minority rights, as well as
majority rights, respected? What is in the long-term economic and
security interests of our people? How are we going to cooperate with
our neighbors? Will it be better or worse if we are independent, or if
we have a federalist system?...
And the practical knowledge that we all have that if every racial and
ethnic and religious group that occupies a significant piece of land not
occupied between others became a separate nation - we might have 800
countries in the world and have a very difficult time having a
functioning economy or a functioning global polity. Maybe we would
have 8,000 - how low can you go?
President Clinton's rhetoric notwithstanding, his message was that
the right to self-determination, perhaps resulting in secession, was
appropriate in Yugoslavia and Indonesia, both authoritarian societies,
but not in a democratic Canada.
A year earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada had responded to a
Reference from the government of Canada on whether Quebec had the
right to unilateral secession under Canadian constitutional law and
international law.6 The advisory opinion rendered by the Court will be
analyzed later, but it will suffice here to note the Court's conclusion
5. Arnold Beichman, Secessions vs. Praise for Unity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at
A16.
6. See Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re Secession of Quebec, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 1340 (1998).
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that under international law neither the National Assembly, nor the
legislature, nor the government of Quebec could claim the right to
secede unilaterally from Canada. The Court observed that under the
international law principle of self-determination of peoples, a right to
secede arises only where "a people" is governed in a colonial setting,
where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation, and possibly where "a people" is denied within the state of
which it forms a part a meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination.7
It should be noted that, despite President Clinton's clear statement,
the United States finds it hard to espouse or implement a consistent
policy on sub-nationalism, or the "right" of self-determination. To
illustrate, there has been no support for the Tibetans seeking
independence from China, the Kurds seeking to establish the
independent state of Kurdistan, and people in Aceh, once an
independent kingdom in Sumatra and now part of Indonesia, seeking
independence from Jakarta for the past three decades, although each of
these claims is based on purported flagrant human rights violations.
Perhaps Russia's use of force in Chechnya has raised similarly difficult
issues.
And as to President Woodrow Wilson's declaration regarding the
right of self-determination, as noted by President Clinton, one must
recall Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing's, warning about the
"danger of... such ideas." In his often-cited words, "the phrase is
loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be realized. It
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.... What calamity that the phrase
was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"8 The continuing validity
of that statement, made originally in connection with the Versailles
Peace Conference at the end of World War I, is self-evident, as the
world community is daily confronted with ethnic and national self-
determination claims.
III. WHAT DOES SELF-DETERMINATION MEAN?
A. Introduction
The concept is multi-faceted. To illustrate, a claim may be to
external self-determination (the establishment of a sovereign and
independent state, the free association or integration with an
independent state, or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people) and/or internal self-determination (the
7. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at 1370, para. 154.
8. ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE INITIATIVES - PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97 (1921),
quoted in ALFRED COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 19 (1945).
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
pursuit of a people's political, economic and social development within
the framework of an existing state). Questions of federalism, devolution
and autonomy can also arise. In one of its incarnations-in the colonial
context-the principle was constantly and successfully invoked in the
post-World War II period. The period of de-colonization attests to its
dynamism. Since then, it has been increasingly invoked again as a
right.
It should be noted that the concept is still invoked at the United
Nations by the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization. At its
October 1999 session,9 the Committee advocated the right of self-
determination by the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. In
the general debate, most speakers urged the administering Powers to
facilitate visiting missions and to address programs to promote the
political, social, economic, educational and human development of the
Non-Self-Governing Territories. They said that the right of the Non-
Self-Governing Territories to self-determination remained unfulfilled,
emphasizing unjust treatment of indigenous peoples and the slow
progress toward self-government."
The representative of Spain said that the principle should not
always be applied.". He was referring to the case of Gibraltar, which, he
said, could not be a nation with sovereign rights, for decolonization
there had been achieved through restoration of the territorial integrity
of Spain.'
Similarly, the representative of Morocco said that Western Sahara
was not a problem of colonization but rather a question of territorial
integrity. 3  While Morocco had no objection to the referendum in
Western Sahara, it asserted that the rights of the whole population
must be respected.'
The difficulty in the non-colonial context is primarily one of
reconciling the principle of "uti possiditis, ita possiditis" (rough
translation: "you may keep what you had"), which protects the borders
of colonies achieving independence with self-determination, if it is read
to authorize secession. This is principally because of the sacrosanct
quality of the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the U.N.
Charter and embraced by states and international intergovernmental
organizations-the U.N. and regional organizations-alike.
9. For a summary report, see U.N. Special Political and Decolonization Committee
Concludes General Debate, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 8, 1999.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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B. International Legal Pronouncements
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states the principle of
"equal rights and self-determination of peoples" as among the purposes
of the United Nations.15 At the same time, Article 2 enumerates as one
of the principles, in accordance with which the U.N. and its Members
are to pursue, that "[aill Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."6
As Professor Cassese states, the principle of self-determination has
become so widely recognized in international conventions that it may be
considered a general principle of international law, conferring on the
people the right to self-determination." Aside from the second
paragraph of Article 1 mentioned previously, the United Nations
Charter embodies the idea self-determination in Article 55,"8 and it is
further enshrined in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights'9 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."
The principle of self-determination has also been addressed in
several U.N. resolutions, declarations and conventions. To illustrate,
the United Nations General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(the "Friendly Relations Declaration") states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.2'
15. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
16. U.N. CHARTER,SUpra note 15, at art. 2, para. 4.
17. A. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 171-72
(1995).
18. U.N. CHARTER,SUpra note 15, at art. 55.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360, 369 (1967).
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Annex, pt. 1, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 165,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
21. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
[Hereinafter Friendly Relations Doctrine].
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The Declaration obligates a State to refrain from any forcible action
that deprives people claiming the right to self-determination of the
exercise of such right. On the issue of territorial integrity, the
Declaration states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which will dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of people ... and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
22the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
The logical reading is that, to be entitled to protection of its
territorial integrity against secession, a State must possess a
government representing the whole people.
A similar statement was adopted ten years earlier by the U.N.
General Assembly in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and People.2 In 1993 the United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, reaffirming Article 1 of the two international
covenants mentioned above. 24  Finally, the U.N. General Assembly's
Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations emphasizes the right to self-determination by providing that
U.N. Member States will, inter alia,
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples,
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize
the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-
determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus
possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction of any kind.25
Among other international legal instruments, the Final Act of the
22. Id. at 124.
23. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People,
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
24. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. I, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (1993).
25. G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR, 50' Sess. Agenda Item 29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6
(1995).
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Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should be
mentioned, which states:
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and
their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating
to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to
determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their
26political, economic, social and cultural development.
C. The Claim of the Katangese Peoples to Independence
In 1992 the President of the Katangese Peoples' Congress
requested the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to:
-recognize the Katangese Peoples' Congress as a liberation movement
entitled to support in the achievement of independence for Katanga;
-recognize the independence of Katanga;
-help secure the evacuation of Zaire from Katanga. 2
The Commission ruled on this request in 1995. In denying the
request, the African Commission said that the claim had no merit under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, since there was no
evidence of violations of any rights under the African Charter. In its
words, the Commission noted that:
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the
point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question
and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied
the right to participate in Government as guaranteed by Article 13(1)
of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is
obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.28
26. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Final
Act), art. VIII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
27. AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Eighth Annual Activity
Report of the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 31' Sess., Case 75/92,
Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, para. 1 (1995).
28. Id. at para. 6.
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D. Quebec's Claim to Secede
In its opinion on Quebec's claim to secede unilaterally from
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, "international law
expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples
within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with
the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states. Where this
is not possible, in the exceptional circumstance ... a right of secession
may arise."29 While the next section analyzes the Court's opinion, one
more statement by the Court will be noted here:
There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the
territorial integrity of existing states, including Canada, and the right
of a "people" to achieve a full measure of self-determination. A state
whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its
own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under
international law of its territorial integrity."
E. The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia's Opinions on
Boundaries of Successor States
In the aftermath of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the boundaries of the successor states became a critical
issue. The European Community initially endorsed the uti possiditis
principle.3 1 Subsequently, the European Community (EC) Arbitration
Commission on Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission on Borders)
provided the legal justification for the EC's position. In Opinion No. 3,
the Commission responded to a question asked by the chairman of the
EC Conference on Yugoslavia, "Can the internal boundaries between
Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia and Herzgovina and Serbia be
regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?"32 The
Badinter Commission on Borders advised that, following the secession
of four of the Yugoslavian Federation's republics, former internal
federal borders would become international borders for seceding entities
once they received international recognition as states.33 These borders
29. Reference Re Secession, supra note 6, at 1370, para. 122.
30. Reference Re Secession, supra note 6, at 1372, para. 130.
31. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Declaration on Yugoslavia, Aug. 27, 1991, reproduced in
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 333-34
(Snezana Trifunovska ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994).
32. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 3, January 11, 1992, reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 1488, 1499 (1992).
33. Id.; see also European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States, U.N. Doc. S/23293, Annexes 1 & 2 (1991), reprinted in 31
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would be internationally protected and neither internal nor external
borders could be changed by the use of force.
The Badinter Commission on Borders justified its response by
reference to the principle of territorial integrity of existing
internationally recognized states and the principle of uti possiditis.
Professor Peter Radan has persuasively argued that the Badinter
Commission on Borders erred in applying these principles to
Yugoslavia's border issues.' The principle of territorial integrity was
inapplicable because federal Yugoslavia's internal borders were not
international borders and also because a prerequisite for the application
of the principle is that the borders be established by treaty or
agreement.& The principle of uti possiditis would also be inapplicable to
the resolution of the dispute in question-whether existing colonial
borders should become future international borders - because, an
"[a]greement that existing colonial borders were to be international
borders was a precondition to the application of uti possidetis juris in
the decolonization context in Latin America and Africa."36 The Badinter
Commission on Borders' response left unanswered the question whether
uti possiditis applies only to questions of dissolution of states or also to
situations of secession. As Professor Radan suggests, the Badinter
Commission on Borders should have employed a more flexible approach
in the case of secession from federal states.7
The Badinter Commission on Borders especially noted that its
reading was made in the context of Yugoslavia's being "in the process of
dissolution," a situation that the Court had already found in its Opinion
No. 1. This response was given to a question whether Yugoslavia had
disintegrated or the republics had seceded. The Commission said that
when the organs of a federal state do not meet the "criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state," when
violence is prevalent, when the federal authorities fail to "enforce
respect for ... cease-fire agreements," and when the republics express
their wish to be independent, a federal state is under these
circumstances "in the process of dissolution." I submit that this
statement is overly broad; it lacks precision and fails to provide
I.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992); see also International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
Documentation on the Arbitration Commission Under the UN/EC Geneva Conference:
Advisory Opinions Nos. 11-15 of the Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 11, July 16,
1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1586, 1587 (1993).
34. Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the
Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 50, 53 (2000).
35. Radan, supra note 34, at 58.
36. Id. at 65; see generally id. at 59-65.
37. Id. at 74-76.
38. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488,
1494 - 1497 (1992).
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workable guidelines as to when parts of a federation may secede or
when the federation is "in the process of dissolution."
In Opinion No. 2 the question asked was whether the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia had the right to self-determination. The
Commission acknowledged a lack of clarity in international law on the
subject, but added, however, that it was nonetheless clear that any such
right "must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence (uti possiditis juris) except where the states . .. could
agree otherwise."39 Here again the Commission failed to provide
guidance on what kind of self-determination rights the Serbs could have
in Croatia and Bosnia. It equated the right to self-determination solely
to secession and changes in boundaries, and thus lost an opportunity to
clarify alternatives to secession as a valid exercise of self-determination.
Perhaps the Commission could have recommended a negotiated
redrawing of the boundaries of Yugoslavia based upon plebiscites under
international supervision. This may have provided peaceable resolution
of the dispute and avoided the years of bloody civil war that followed.
Since this was not a colonial situation, the Commission's invocation of
the concept of uti possiditis juris was not appropriate.
F. Appraisal
The normative scope of the principle of self-determination lacks
precision. Specifically, it is unclear first whether the definition of
"peoples" includes ethnic minorities and second what the appropriate
remedy for a claim of self-determination should be - creation of a
sovereign independent state, free association with an independent
state, integration with an independent state, or any other political
status freely determined, as stated in the Friendly Relations
Declaration. °
It is, however, often asserted that the exercise of the right of self-
determination should normally not violate the "territorial integrity" of a
state, that the right is normally to be exercised within the framework of
existing sovereign states, assuming that the government represents the
people. Consequently, secession as a remedy may be available only in
exceptional circumstances involving gross breaches of fundamental
human rights.4'
Professor Allen Buchanan is the leading proponent of the position
that secession is a remedial right that can be exercised only in
exceptional circumstances when there is clear evidence that groups
39. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488,
1497-1499 (1992).
40. Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 21.
41. Prof. Cassese suggests this formulation. See supra, note 17, at 108-25.
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have suffered certain kinds of injustices. 2 He argues that secessionists'
claims can be valid only against a state that fails to act as a "trustee for
the people, conceived of as an intergenerational community."43 Implicit
in this argument is the suggestion that such claims cannot be valid
against a democratic state in which basic individual rights may be
exercised.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON QUEBEC'S
CLAIM TO SECEDE"
The Supreme Court of Canada responded to References from the
Governor in Council on three questions related to the unilateral
secession of Quebec from Canada. The first question related to the
Constitutional capacity of the National Assembly, legislature or
government of Quebec to effect the unilateral secession of Quebec from
Canada. The second question related to the role of international law in
authorizing these bodies to so act. The third question was, "In the
event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right
of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect
the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take
precedence in Canada?" 
In responding to the first question, the Court considered whether
Quebec has a right to unilateral secession. It stated that "a clear
majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would
confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the
other participants in Confederation would have to recognize."4 It
added, however:
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke
a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed
secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote,
by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and
could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law,
the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy
42. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER To LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991) for his earlier work favoring group
rights [hereinafter POLITICAL DIVORCE]. More recently, however, he argues for a pretty
restrictive approach. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Democracy and Secession, in NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 14 (M. Moore ed., 1998); Allen Buchanan, What's
So Special About Nations?, in RETHINKING NATIONALISM 283 (CAN. J. PHIL., Supp. Vol.
22, 1998).
43. POLITICAL DIVORCE, supra note 42, at 9.
44. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6.
45. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at 1342.
46. Id. at para. 150. I have cited from the Court's Conclusions because of their
precision. For a detailed discussion of these issues elaborated in the Court's opinion, see
id. at 1348-75.
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in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights
under the Constitution cannot be divorced from Constitutional
obligations. Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted.
The continued existence and operation of the Canadian Constitutional
order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other
provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the
right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear
majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing
so, Quebec respects the rights of others. The negotiations that followed
such a vote would address the potential act of secession as well as its
possible terms should in fact secession proceed. There would be no
conclusions predetermined by law on any issue. Negotiations would
need to address the interests of the other provinces, the federal
government, Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within
and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities .
As to the nature of negotiations, the Court acknowledged that:
[wihile the negotiators would have to contemplate the possibility of
secession, there would be no absolute legal entitlement to it and no
assumption that an agreement reconciling all relevant rights and
obligations would actually be reached. It is foreseeable that even
negotiations carried out in conformity with the underlying
constitutional principles could reach an impasse. We need not
speculate here as to what would then transpire. Under the
Constitution, secession requires that an amendment be negotiated.4
On the second question, in which the Court was asked to consider
whether a right to unilateral secession exists under international law,
the Court said that it did not need to decide the "people" issue in the
context of Quebec-the basis of the right to self-determination being
that it belongs to all "peoples"-for a right to secession only arises in a
colonial context or "where 'a people' is subject to alien subjugation,
domination or exploitation; and possibly where 'a people' is denied any
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of
which it forms a part."9 It added:
In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-
determination within the framework of their existing state. A state
whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its
internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity
under international law and to have that territorial integrity
recognized by other states. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a
47. Id. at para. 151.
48. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at para. 97.
49. Id. at para. 154.
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colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that
Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to
pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development. In
the circumstances, the National Assembly, the legislature or the
government of Quebec do[es] not enjoy a right at international law to
effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally.50
After having rejected the contention that Quebec has a unilateral
right to secede, the Court pronounced the "Effectivity" principle, that is,
that regardless of the legality of the steps leading to the creation of a
reality, reality counts and a de facto secession may result." Thus, the
Court acknowledged that "international law may well, depending on the
circumstances, adapt to recognize a political and/or factual reality."52
The Court explained:
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international
law, to unilateral secession, that is secession without negotiation on
the basis just discussed, this does not rule out the possibility of an
unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto
secession. The ultimate success of such a secession would be
dependent on recognition by the international community, which is
likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard
to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in
determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. Such
recognition, even if granted, would not, however, provide any
retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the
Constitution of Canada or at international law .53
On the third question, the Court said that "there is no conflict
between domestic and international law to be addressed in the context
of this Reference."'
To summarize the Court's contribution to the ongoing discourse on
secession, three points are to be noted: one, the Court advised that
Quebec does not have the right to unilaterally secede, although it
clarified the situations in which the right would be present; two, the
Court announced the "Effectivity" principle; and three by linking
democratic rights and constitutional obligations, the Court
acknowledged that after a "clear expression of a clear majority of
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada,"5 negotiations
could follow on the issue of secession. It, however, suggested that the
outcome of any negotiated settlement would be a step in the direction of
50. Id.
51. Id. at para. 140.
52. Id. at para. 141.
53. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at para. 155.
54. Id. at para. 147.
55. See supra note 6, at 1344.
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amending the Canadian Constitution. Thus, the appropriate provisions
of the Canadian Constitution, the 1982 Constitution Act,56 would apply.
This would require resolutions by the House of Commons and Senate
and by the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces
that have, in aggregate, at least fifty percent of the population of all the
provinces.
Subsequent to the 1998 Supreme Court consideration of Quebec's
claim to secede, the Parliament of Canada passed the Clarity Acts to
define the wording of a question in any future referendum on a
province's sovereignty by stating that "the House of Commons shall
consider whether the question would result in a clear expression of the
will of the population of a province on whether the province should
cease to be part of Canada and become an independent state."5 9 The Act
also determines the majority threshold for such a decision as it states:
In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a
clear majority of the population of a province that the province cease to
be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall take into account:
(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the
secessionist option;
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and
c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant.60
It is only upon satisfaction of these conditions that the government
is to "enter into negotiations on the terms which a province might cease
to be part of Canada." For its part, the National Assembly of Quebec
in December 2000 enacted an independent declaration setting out for
the people and province of Quebec an affirmation of their freedom to
determine their future and to adopt measures to legally establish this
freedom. It provides that, "[wihen the Quebec people is consulted by
way of referendum under the Referendum Act, the winning option is the
option that obtains a majority of the valid votes cast, namely fifty
56. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11, s. 43, 135 C. Gaz. 41, part 1 (relating to "any alteration to boundaries between
provinces").
57. Id. at s. 38(1)(a) and (b).
58. Clarity Act, ch. 26, S.C. 2000, 135 C. Gaz. 41, part I (Can.) (giving effect to the
requirements for clarity as set out in the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Quebec Secession Reference). [Hereinafter Clarity Act].
59. Id. at s. 1(3).
60. Clarity Act, supra note 58, at s. 2(2).
61. Id. at s. 2(4).
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percent of the valid votes cast plus one. ' 6 The Clarity Act and this Act
are obviously on a collision course. Stay tuned.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION IN Kosovo AND EAST TIMOR
A. Kosovo
The nineteen-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
intervened militarily in Kosovo, a province of Serbia, in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, in the first intervention of its kind undertaken
by the Alliance.6 Only pertinent aspects of that operation relating to
the topic under discussion will be recounted here.
The Autonomous Province of Kosovo was granted special autonomy
under the 1974 Constitution, which was later revoked in 1988-89
through constitutional changes under President Slobodon Milosevic.
Milosevic's repressive policies led to the eventual crisis in Kosovo and
NATO intervention. 4  The so-called "Contact Group," comprising
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, along with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Council, and eventually the U.N.
Security Council, became involved in discussions on resolving the
deepening crisis. In March 1998, the Group proposed a comprehensive
arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including
Kosovo.'
Then on March 31, 1998, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1160 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter expressing "its
support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a
substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-
administration," and accepting the proposal by the Contact Group that
the Kosovo problem should be solved on the principle of the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia.' The resolution threatened additional
measures in case of the "failure to make constructive progress towards
the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo."r7
The Security Council's request went unheeded, and, as the
humanitarian situation further deteriorated, the Council, acting again
62. Bill 99, ch. I, (4), S.Q. 46 (2000).
63. See generally Ved P. Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and
International Law, 10 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-25 (1999/2000).
64. See generally GREG CAMPBELL, THE ROAD To KOSOVO: A BALKAN DIARY
(Westview Press 2000); JULIE A. MERTUS, KosOVO: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A
WAR (U. Cal. Press 1999).
65. U.N. Doc. S/1998/223 (1998); See also U.N. Doc. S/1998/272 (1998).
66. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at para. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (1998).
67. Id. at para. 19.
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under Chapter VII, adopted Resolution 1199, which demanded that the
parties cease hostilities and, "enter immediately into a meaningful
dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and
to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated
political solution to the issue of Kosovo."' It called upon Yugoslavia to
facilitate "the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their
homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian
organizations and supplies to Kosovo."69
The situation grew worse. After several warnings and attempts at
negotiation, the Security Council, acting again under Chapter VII,
adopted Resolution 1203 on October 24, 1998, aimed at protecting
unarmed monitors who were overseeing the cease-fire from the
ground."0
Clashes between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army
guerillas intensified. Negotiations were held in Rambouillet, outside
Paris, from February 6 to 23, 1999, and a second round in Paris from
March 15 to 18, leading to the proposed Rambouillet Accords.7' Under
the Accords, the framework of basic principles was founded on the
maintenance of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and political autonomy for Kosovo.72 President Milosevic,.
however, refused to accept the plan, which contemplated the
establishment of a multinational implementation force with NATO at
its core.73 He also rejected the mechanism for the final settlement for
Kosovo, to be determined by an international meeting three years into
the future, convened primarily "on the basis of the will of the people" of
Kosovo. 74 Clearly he realized that the ninety-percent majority ethnic
Albanians would be the ones to determine Kosovo's status. Although
the Kosovo Albanian delegation ultimately signed the proposed peace
agreement, the Serbs did not.0
The Serbs made it clear that they were not going to negotiate
further nor comply with any existing agreements and moved greater
force into Kosovo, initiating their offensive against the ethnic Albanian
68. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at para. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998).
69. Id. at para. 4(c).
70. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998); see John M. Goshko, UN. Council Backs Kosovo Pact, Clears Way for NATO
Intervention, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at A28.
71. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999,
available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2001). [Hereinafter Interim Agreement].
72. Id. at ch. 1, art. 1.
73. Interim Agreement, supra note 71, at ch. 7, art 1, para. 1(b).
74. Id. at ch. 8, art. 1, para. 3.
75. See, e.g., NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, available at
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2001).
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Kosovars. Considering their effectiveness thwarted by the Serbs, the
OSCE withdrew its verification mission on March 20. Envoy Richard
Holbrooke tried one last time to coax Milosevic to sign the Rambouilet
Accords on March 22, but this, too, failed, and NATO launched its air
campaign, "Operation Allied Force," against Serbia the following day."6
The war dragged on for eleven weeks. Efforts at finding a political
solution culminated on May 6, 1999, when the foreign ministers of the
Group of Eight met in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on a set of principles
to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis."
The Security Council ultimately resolved that the political solution
to the Kosovo crisis would be based on the general principles adopted by
the Group of Eight foreign ministers, 8 which included, along with an
immediate and verifiable end to the violence and repression in Kosovo:
the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo; the establishment of an
interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the U.N. Security
Council, and the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced
persons to Kosovo; and a political process toward the establishment of
an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial
self government for Kosovo based on the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 
79
B. East Timor
The events in East Timor that led to the establishment of a
multinational intervention force led by Australia are well known.
Indonesia had used oppressive means for several years to quash all
dissent to its occupation after the Portuguese left East Timor. Its
military and militias had carried out a reign of terror. The important
point for the present discussion is that eventually it was only with
Indonesia's consent that the United Nations undertook a plebiscite,
which finally led to East Timor's independence.
The U.N. General Assembly listed East Timor as a non-self-
governing territory while it was a Portuguese colony, rejecting
Portugal's contention that it was one of its "overseas provinces."" In
76. See id. See also Editorial, The Rationale for Air Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1999, at A26, col. 1; Jane Perlez, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; NATO Authorizes
Bomb Strikes; Primakov, In Air, Skips U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at Al, col. 6.
77. U.N. Doc. S/1999/516 (1999) [hereinafter Group of Eight Principles]. For an
excerpt from the statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Eight, see also AP,
Group of Eight's Kosovo Statement, May 6, 1999, available at
http-//www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050799kosovo-g8-text.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2001).
78. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RESJ1244
(1999).
79. Group of Eight Principles, supra note 776.
80. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1807 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1149th mtg., U.N. Doc.
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December 1975, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor, occupied
the territory, and began to integrate it into Indonesia, a move
condemned by the General Assembly in its Resolution 3485 of
December 12, 1975.1 Ten days later, the Security Council adopted
another similar resolution, recognizing "the inalienable right of the
people of East Timor to self-determination and independence" and
calling upon the government of Indonesia "to withdraw without delay
all its forces from the Territory."82
After the Indonesian Parliament incorporated Timor as Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province, effective July 17, 1976, the General Assembly
rejected Indonesia's claim of having integrated it into Indonesia, in a
resolution adopted in December, 1976, since the people had not freely
exercised their right to self-determination.83 The General Assembly
continued reiterating its position in resolutions until 1982.M The U.N.
Secretary-General, however, continued his consultations with Indonesia
and Portugal for a comprehensive settlement of the problem.
Eventually, in May 1999, a set of agreements was concluded variously
between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations.85
The first agreement, between Indonesia and Portugal, provided for
a request to the Secretary-General to put a proposal for special
autonomy for the East Timorese people through a "popular
consultation" process. However, if the people voted against the
proposal, arrangements would be made to transfer authority in East
Timor to the United Nations and the Secretary-General would institute
a transition process leading towards independence. The second was a
tripartite agreement that Indonesia and Portugal signed with the
United Nations regarding modalities for the popular consultation of
East Timorese through a direct ballot.'
A/5217 (1962).
81. G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, 2439th Mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975). The resolution deplored "the military intervention of the armed forces of
Indonesia in Portuguese Timor," calling for an immediate withdrawal so as "to enable the
people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and
independence."
82. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Agenda/I869
(1975).
83. G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 125, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/31/35 (1975).
84. The last of these was G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
227, U.N. Doc. A1RES/37/30 (1982).
85. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on
the Question of East Timor, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53"' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513,
Annex 1 (1999); Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the
East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53' Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1999/513, Annex II (1999); East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR,
53' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, Annex III (1999).
86. East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53'" Sess., U.N. Doc.
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The popular consultation occurred on August 30, 1999, and, despite
a great deal of harassment by pro-integration Indonesian "militias," the
voters overwhelmingly favored independence, with approximately
ninety-eight percent of those registered voting with 21.5 percent for
autonomy and 78.5 percent for independence."' This was followed by
widespread violence waged by the militias with support of Indonesian
military forces, resulting in many casualties, and eventually Indonesia's
willingness to accept assistance from the international community.
The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1264, in
which it expressed concern with reports of flagrant violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law in East Timor."
And, after determining that Chapter VII applied, the Council
authorized the establishment of a multinational force-the
International Force for East Timor-under a unified command
structure, "to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and
support UNAMET [United Nations Mission in East Timor] in carrying
out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian
assistance operations. . . .89 States participating in the force were
authorized by the Security Council "to take all necessary measures to
fulfill this mandate."90 Australia led the force. 91
Subsequently, on October 25, 1999, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1272, again acting under Chapter VII,' under which it
decided to establish a United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET), "which will be empowered to exercise all
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of
justice."' , The UNTAET's task has not been easy, since the task
amounts to that of "nation-building," in the absence of any preexisting
institutions there.9
After her visit to East Timor, Professor Ruth Wedgwood criticized
the UNTAET's operation. She wrote that "the U.N. has
underperformed and is still unprepared for the long-term security
S/1999/513, Annex III (1999); Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular
Consultation of the East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53'
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, Annex 11 (1999).
87. Press Release, United Nations, Assembly Hails Onset of East Timor's Transition
to Independence; Creates New Haiti Mission, Calls on Afghan Parties for Dialogue (Dec.
17, 1999), U.N. Doc. GA/9691 (1999).
88. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264
(1999).
89. Id. at para. 3.
90. Id.
91. S.C. Res. 1264, supra note 88, at 2.
92. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54' Sess., 4057 Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
93. Id. at para. 1.
94. James Traub, Inventing East Timor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 74 (Jul./Aug. 2000).
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dilemma of that isolated nation of one million people."95 However, it
seems obvious that the goals of nation-building-establishing
democratic institutions and ensuring political stability and economic
viability-cannot be reached over a short period of time.
East Timor's long-awaited first democratic election was held on
August 30, 2001 for an 88-member assembly that will draw up East
Timor's first constitution in preparation for independence in 2002.9
More than ninety percent of registered voters cast ballots.9 7  On
September 10, the United Nations electoral commission approved the
vote as "free and fair."" The U.N. Transitional Administrator for the
territory, Sergio Vieira de Mello, said, "Henceforward, East Timor will
have an elected representative body working for the people to frame a
Constitution that is of the people... [Until the new government is
formed,] an East Timorese Council of Ministers will rule the territory
under United Nations sponsorship.""
VI. CONCLUSION
As a concept, self-determination is undoubtedly complex .and
difficult to operationalize, although much has been written on the
distinction between internal and external self-determination and as to
who constitutes "a people" able to exercise the right." Thus, the
challenge for international lawyers is to clarify the normative content of
the concept.
The difficulty of giving effect to the concept of self-determination is
illustrated by the unheeded claims of many minority and indigenous
groups on the ground that establish that their identity is not being
protected by the state. The 1994 Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples'o and the various recent declarations on the rights
95. Ruth Wedgwood, Letter to the Editor, Trouble in Timor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 197
(Nov./Dec. 2000).
96. See generally World; in Brief, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2001, at A22; see also Seth
Mydans, East Timorese Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, sec. 4, at 2, col. 4.
97. Seth Mydans, East Timorese Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, sec. 4, at 2, col. 4.
98. Seth Mydans, U.N. Certifies First Election in the Newly Born East Timor, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at A15, col. 5.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Eric Kolodner, Essay: The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 153 (1994); Ruth L. Gana, Which 'Self'? Race and Gender in the Right to
Self-Determination as a Prerequisite to the Right to Development, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 133
(1995); Jon M. Van Dyke, Carmen Di Amore-Siah, Gerald W. Berkley-Coates, Self-
Determination for Nonself-governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of
Guam and Hawaii, 18 HAWAII L. REV. 623 (1996), Michele L. Radin, The Right to
Development as a Mechanism for Group Autonomy: Protection of Tibetan Cultural Rights,
68 WASH. L. REV. 695 (1993).
101. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
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of minorities, such as the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,"°'
the Council of Europe's 1995 Framework Convention Regarding the
Rights of National Minorities,"°3 and the earlier 1991 Report of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation (now Organization of Security
and Co-operation in Europe) Committee of Experts on National
Minorities, ' " attest to the world community's insistence that these
groups have the right to the protection of their identities and that they
have the opportunity to participate effectively in the political and
economic life of their states to develop their culture, language, religion,
traditions and customs.
As to external self-determination and the claim to secession and an
independent state, it is fair to conclude that the United Nations and its
member states do not support claims for unilateral secession. The
latest developments, especially after Kosovo and East Timor, and in the
light of the Canadian Supreme Court's pronouncement relating to the
claim for Quebec's secession, however, indicate that there could be
exceptional circumstances which might lead to the acceptance of a claim
to unilateral secession. One such exception on which there is
consensus, but which has passed into history, is in the colonial context.
The second exception is undemocratic, authoritarian regimes, which are
not "representative," thus not providing the opportunity for the "people"
to participate effectively in the political and economic life of the state,
especially when there is a pattern of flagrant violations of human
rights. This is the exception recognized by President Clinton in his
Quebec speech, as noted earlier, and by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Along with the substantive criteria,'°5 it seems essential to consider
suitable procedures-weighted majority in favor of secession and
waiting period between secessionist referenda, for example-as well.1"
Professors Paul Williams and Michael Scharf have recently applied
102. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/135, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993).
103. Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, § II, art. 5, reproduced in 34 I.L.M. 351, 354 (1995) ("Without
prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties
shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to
national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any actions
aimed at such assimilation.").
104. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Report of the CSCE Meeting
of Experts on National Minorities, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1692, 1695 (1991).
105. Margaret Moore examines the just cause, choice and national self-determination
theories of secession in The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of Nationalism,
13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 225 (Jul. 2000). See also MARGARET MOORE, NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION (1998).
106. Daniel M. Weinstock discusses these in Toward a Proceduralist Theory of
Secession, 13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 251 (Jul. 2000).
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a useful approach in the Nagorno Karabagh/Azerbaijan situation,
combining "intermediate sovereignty" and "earned recognition" to
achieve self-determination. 7 Intermediate sovereignty contemplates a
negotiated grant of a level of sovereignty for a period, during which both
sides would establish a system of protection of human rights and
minority rights and "engage in a series of defined confidence building
measures. " 108 This would take place with the support of the
international community in preparation for full independence. Earned
recognition would follow, including a process of determination by an
international mechanism to give effect to the latter of two referenda
within Nagorno Karabagh, with the final result being recognition by the
international community as an independent state. 1 9
To reiterate, we have not heard the last of secession. The need to
clarify both substantive and procedural criteria for determination of the
validity of secessionist claims is paramount.
107. Memorandum Prepared by the PUB. INrfL LAW & POLY GROUP and the NEW ENG.
CTR. FOR INT'L LAW & POL'Y, The Nagorno Karabagh Crisis: A Blueprint for Resolution,
(June 2000), available at httpJ/www.nesl.edu/center/pubs.nagorno.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2001) (on file with the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy).
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id.
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